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Abstract 
The past thirty years have seen rapid advances in the technological component 
of banking services and as a consequence new legal issues have come to the 
fore, especially with regard to Electronic Fund Transfers (EFTs) which are now 
used to transfer money around the world, and have made fund transactions 
between payers and payees easier, faster and more secure. The method 
involves risks for both banks and customers, due to the possibility of 
unauthorized payments risks, credit and insolvency problems, and 
confidentiality issues. Most contracts and obligations now depend on the new 
technology, although there is a variety of methods for dealing with the 
concomitant risks. EFTs share a number of similarities with paper-based funds 
transfers in regard to methods of regulation, and the careful observer can 
identify patterns and themes. 
Today, the business world depends heavily on EFT systems for its procedures; 
and government and academia have also taken a keen interest in EFTs. This 
thesis reviews and examines the existing legal position of liability of banks and 
customers for risks associated with EFT transactions: unauthorized EFT 
instruction and the problem of customer identity, credit risk and privacy, 
especially, the systems employed for safeguarding the customer’s transactions 
and data. The thesis also makes recommendations for change. 
iv 
 
The rules for the allocation of risk are based on the various mechanisms used 
to access the account. Also, due to the complexities of EFT, consumer 
protection becomes a paramount goal and is a subject of much concern, 
particularly when it comes to determining liability for losses. The UK 
government implemented the Payment Services Directive 2007 by adopting the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009, to regulate the system. However, such 
Regulations do not constitute a comprehensive regime that applies to all legal 
issues arising in the context of the EFT system. This study argues the necessity 
for a re-examination of existing laws and proposes a model for the future 
approach to the issues associated with EFT payment. Different approaches to 
EFT will be assessed, and the comparative and contrasting elements will be 
analysed in order to propose a comprehensive solution to the deficiencies in the 
current framework. Central to the problem is the absence of any uniform 
standard: individual banks offer differing contractual terms and conditions and 
different means of accessing accounts. Consequently it is time to formulate new 
and comprehensive rules for the allocation of liability of risks associated with 
EFT transactions. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
The world today is witnessing a tremendous development in the field of 
information technology, communication techniques, and rapid access to 
electronic data. The electronic revolution has changed the balance of economic 
and political forces. Thus, there is no way to disregard this new world influenced 
by science and technology, where information is not recorded on visible paper 
but transferred across an electronic screen. The world of information technology 
is thus a borderless world, which does not know geographical boundaries.  
In line with this development, banks have created a new mode of funds 
transaction called “electronic banking” or “e-banking”.1  In the context of the 
modern banking system via the Internet, ‘electronic banking’ is defined as ‘the 
provision of banking services and the issuing and performance of payments 
through the banking system by electronic means and other advanced 
technology’.2 Thus, e-banking encompasses an entire set of processes through 
which a customer can transfer funds electronically without having to physically 
visit a bank, and these processes also include services where customers can 
access their accounts, conduct consumer and business transactions, receive 
                                               
1
 The term 'banking' is framed in a particular way within the framework of English legislation, 
and is covered under the Banking Act 2009 and, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
Part 4, section 22, (FSMA 2000 hereafter). 
2 Gkoutzinis, A. A., Internet Banking and the Law in Europe: Regulation, Financial Integration 
and Electronic Commerce (2010), pp. 7-8. 
 
2 
 
necessary information on different financial services and products on the 
Internet.3  
Thus, this form of banking has made transactions of funds between payers and 
payees easier and faster, which the services provided as outlined above are 
modified to meet contemporary needs: 24 hour account access; orders for 
payments; use of digital signatures; use of public access terminals such as the 
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) for making payments, internet shopping and 
direct electronic funds transfers.  
The Electronic Funds Transfer or EFT constitutes one of the most significant 
banking services. 4  EFT is considered as the third of three significant 
generations in methods of payment. 5  The first generation method is cash, 
(notes and coins), while the second is bills of exchange and cheques.6 The 
third, EFT, is a process by which, under instructions from a customer, a bank 
transfers funds from or to the customer’s bank account by electronic means. 
EFT transactions occur within the existing UK framework of legal agreements, 
for example, agency law, contract law and the Payment Services Regulations 
2009.7 Regards to the EFT instruments like debit cards, credit cards or ATM 
cards, the agreement between the bank and the customer forms the legal 
                                               
3
 Barclays, Customer Agreement, March 2012, 
http://www.barclays.co.uk/ImportantInformation/TermsandConditions/P1242575350746; HSBC, 
General Terms and Conditions, April 2012  http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/PA_esf-ca-app-  
content/content/uk/pdfs/en/General_Current_Accounts_Aprl1.pdf 9 January 2013.    
4
 Dorn, J. A., The future of Money in the Information Age (1997), p. 23; UK Payments 
Administration, Key Facts and Figures 
2011http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/resources_publications/key_facts_and_figures/ 22 February 
2012. 
5
 Arora, A, Electronic Banking and the Law (1988), p. 7. 
6
 Frazer, P., Plastic and Electronic Money: New Payment Systems and Their Implications 
(1985), p. 3. 
7  Payment Services Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/209) amended by Payment Services 
(Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2475) and Payment Services Regulations 2012 (SI 
2012/1791). (PSR 2009 hereafter). 
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contract between the two parties and shapes how any future dispute would be 
resolved.8  
The system of funds transfer generally refers to the entire setup of a nation’s 
financial institutions, like banks, and the associated practices that allow and 
facilitate the process of inter-bank fund transactions. 9  There are, however, 
several significant historical facts which must be understood because they shed 
considerable light on the issues involved in the development of EFT. The 
system of fund transfers was, until recently, primarily paper-based, normally 
through cash and cheques. It was only in 1960 that a shift in this traditional 
system of funds transfers occurred in the form of the EFT system.10 The Post 
Office introduced the first national funds transfer operations. It granted the right 
to involvement in fund transfer facilities and was granted the right to supply full 
banking services to its customers. Two decades later, the bank fund transfer 
and the national fund transfer became connected, so that funds could be 
transferred from an account with a clearing bank to an account kept with the 
National Girobank.11 Following this, in 1985, the National Girobank became a 
part of the clearing house. Subsequently it was acquired by Santander UK Plc. 
The Association for Payment Clearing Services was the only name used to 
describe the UK payments association, which existed to facilitate the 
cooperative activity of banks, building societies and card issuers.12 However, in 
                                               
8
 Kilonzo, K. D., ‘An analysis of the legal challenges posed by electronic banking’, (2007) 1 
Kenya Law Review 323 at p. 325.  
9
 UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers, United Nations (1987) 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/transfers/LG_E-fundstransfer-e.pdf 7 June 
2011. 
10
 The Post Office Act 1969, section 7(1)(b) which  replaced by the Postal Services Act 2000, 
section 127(6) and Schedule 9.   
11
 Giro notion is used to explain money transfer operations. 
12
 Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS hereafter). 
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July, 2009 the APACS replaced by the UK Payments Administration (UKPA), in 
favour of names that better described the different players in the payment 
system, since the UK payments industry has a number of different and separate 
clearing operations in industry groups.  
1.1 The history and development of the clearing systems 
Payment systems offer an account-based transfer service between two final 
customers. Transfers can occur between personal customers, between 
businesses or between personal and business customers.13 The process of 
exchanging payment instructions between banks is called ‘clearing’.  In the UK 
there are four major clearing systems for giro transfers, responsibility for which 
is divided between four independent companies operating under the auspices of 
the UK Payments Council. 14  The reasons for involving different players in 
clearing operations systems are: firstly, there are different parts of the payment 
system; secondly, there are different numbers of parties involved in the clearing 
and settlement payment system. Finally, each party has functions and 
operations which are different from others. First, there is the credit clearing 
system run by the Cheque and Credit Clearing Company,15 which is responsible 
for the clearing of paper-based credit transfer system, used for the physical 
exchange of high-volume and low-value transactions, for example, bank giro 
credit. C&CCC started in 1985, is a membership-based industry body with 11 
                                               
13 Office of Fair Trading, UK payment systems: An OFT market study of clearing systems and 
review of plastic card networks, 2003. 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/financial_products/oft658.pdf 14 July 2013. 
14
 UKPA, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/ 14 July 2013. 
15
 Cheque and Credit Clearing Company (C&CCC hereafter). 
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settlement members. In 2008 UKPA, decided to set a target date of 31 October 
2018 for closing the central cheque clearing systems, with a final decision to be 
taken in 2016. Rahmatian believes that such a decision will not be of benefit to 
customers and is, therefore, against the replacement of the cheque as a 
payment method in the UK.16 In contrast, Fisher argues that the cheque as a 
payment method has to end to protect customers from fraud.17 Ellinger, et al. 
argue that the banking sector should consider investing the time and recourse 
into a sophisticated, fully-fledged system of cheque truncation. Finally, in 2011 
the UKPA abandoned its decision and cheques will continue for as long as 
customers need them.18 
Secondly, there is Bankers’ Automated Clearing Services Limited, 19  which 
provides a high-volume, low-value, bulk electronic clearing service for credit and 
debit transfers, including direct debits and direct credits, where the payer sends 
his instructions directly to BACS rather than through a bank. BACS was 
established in 1968 and was considered the first clearing system relying on 
EFT. Until 1971 BACS was operated by the Inter-Bank Computer Bureau. 
Subsequently, BACS ran the system. In 1986, the company began to use the 
new name of BACS Limited. Later however, in 2004, BACS Limited was divided 
into BACS Payments Schemes Limited20 and VocaLink.21 In 2011, 5.6 billion 
                                               
16
 Rahmatian, A., ‘Must cheques disappear by 1018?’, (2011) 26 International Banking Law and 
Regulation 310 at p. 311. 
17
 Fisher, J., ‘The UK’s faster payment project: avoiding a bonanza for cybercrime fraudsters’, 
(2008) 15 Journal of Financial Crime 155 at p. 162. 
18
 Ellinger, et al., Modern Banking Law (2011), p. 397; Cox, R. and Taylor, J., ‘Cheques’, in 
Brindle, M. and Cox, R., Law of Bank Payments (2010), p. 497; UKPA, UK Payment Council, 
http://www.chequeandcredit.co.uk/cheque_and_credit_clearing/history_of_the_cheque/payment
_dates_through_the_ages/-/page/2116/ 15 January 2013. 
19
 Bankers’ Automated Clearing Services Limited (BACS hereafter). 
20
 BACS Payments Schemes Ltd is responsible for developing BACS services.  
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transactions have been made via BACS with a total value of £4.3 trillion.22 The 
third clearing system is the Clearing House Automated Payment System,23 a 
real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, which is operated by the CHAPS 
Clearing Co Ltd.24 CHAPS, provides a clearing service for international high-
volume sterling credit transfers.25 Finally, in May 2008 there is the CHAPS-
operated ‘Faster Payments Service’, which provides a clearing service for high-
volume, low-value sterling credit transfers, for example, internet and phone 
payments, which is based around the ATM and debit card messages, for less 
than £10,000 and standing orders for less than £100,000.26 In November 2011, 
the responsibility for the Faster Payments Services was transferred from 
CHAPS to Faster Payments Scheme Limited.27 Currently, there are ten member 
banks and building societies in the Faster Payments Scheme. By the end of 
2011 over 85% of phone and internet payments were being processed through 
Faster Payments.28  
The UK payment clearing systems described above have developed through 
the actions of commercial institutions and are not, in the main, the subjects of 
specific legislation or regulatory provisions. The most widely used clearings 
systems in value terms are owned and controlled by their members through the 
clearing companies under the UKPA umbrella.  
                                                                                                                                         
21
 VocaLink runs the payment infrastructure which is now owned by 18 banks and building 
societies, see UKPA, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/uk_payment_schemes/bacs/; Also, see 
http://www.vocalink.com 19 April 2013. 
22
 UKPA, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/uk_payment_schemes/bacs/ 19 April 2013. 
23
 Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS hereafter). 
24
 UKPA, http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk/who_do_we_work_with/payments_schemes/chaps/ 
9 September 2013. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 UKPA, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/uk_payment_schemes/ 3 August 2012.  
27
 UKPA, http://www.fasterpayments.org.uk/faster_payments/about_faster_payments/-
/page/1941/ 9 September 2013. 
28
UKPA, http://www.fasterpayments.org.uk/faster_payments/about_faster_payments/-
/page/1941/ 19 April 2013. 
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1.2 Development of the EFT legal framework 
The development of transactions and funds transfers via the Internet, combined 
with the development of international commerce, needs predictable and clear 
rules under which customers’ transactions occur. Customers are naturally 
adverse to the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in the rules of law. They 
want certainty about the legal rules under which their transactions occur, since 
in this way customers can precisely measure and reduce the risks arising from 
EFT transactions. Regularity in the law across jurisdictions assists and helps to 
allocate and determine legal issues relating to EFT.29 The payment system law 
in the UK is influenced by the European Union’s programme, as the UK is a 
member of the EU, which was intended to create a single market in payment 
services by optimising efficiency, enhancing competition and innovation, 
increasing consumer choice and raising the standards of consumer protection 
across Europe.30  
Since its creation, the European Union (EU) has been working diligently to 
establish optimal regulation at EU level, 31  although it is difficult to do so, 
because EU Member States traditionally seek to maintain a maximum space of 
national sovereignty. Through ongoing geographical enlargement and gradual 
European integration, the ideal of EU uniformity of laws lost some ground, as 
                                               
29
 Bollen, R., ‘Harmonisation of international payment law: a survey of the UNCITRAL model law 
on credit transfers: Part 1’, (2008) 23 International Banking Law and Regulation 44 at p. 44. 
30
 Brandt, P. and Graham, P., ‘An update on the UK's implementation of the Payment Services 
Directive’, (2009) 64 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 at p. 2. 
31
 Further, see Bollen, R., ‘European regulation of payment services – the story so far’, (2007) 
22 International Banking Law and Regulation 451 at p. 452. 
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new claims for differentiation and flexibility made their appearance.32 Likewise, 
the completion of the internal market required a reform of the legislative process 
to facilitate and accelerate the adoption of the necessary measures for its 
completion, since the existing techniques were slow and engendered excessive 
uniformity.33  
“Harmonization” can be thought of as the process through which domestic laws 
may be modified to enhance predictability in cross-border commercial 
transactions, whereas “unification” is the adoption by States of common legal 
standard governing particular aspects of domestic and international business 
transactions.34 Thus, it is important to investigate the harmonization of the EFT 
system in the European Union and look at its application in these areas. The 
reference to the new legal framework indicates that there are already in force 
legal instruments to regulate EFTs. Different legal frameworks have different 
legal effects. The relevant legal instruments are the Cross-Border Credit 
Transfers Directive 1997/5 and the Payment Services Directive 2007 
(2007/64/EC).35  
The transfer of funds between the payer’s account and the payee’s account 
when both have an account in the same branch of the same bank (an intra-
branch transfer), 36  or at different branches of same bank (an inter-branch 
transfer), will require an adjustment of the balances of the payer’s and payee’s 
                                               
32
 Mavromati, D., The Law of Payment Services in the EU (2007), p.85. 
33
 Ibid. 
34 UNCITRAL website, What does UNCITRAL mean by the "harmonization" and "unification" of 
the law of international trade? 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html#harmonization 15 July 2013. 
35
European Payment Council, SEPA Legal and Regulatory Framework 
http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/content.cfm?page=sepa_legal_and_regulatory_frame
work 15 July 2013. 
36 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1989] Q.B. 728 at pp. 750-751. 
9 
 
accounts at that bank. The payer’s account is debited and the payee’s account 
is credited. In these circumstances, there is no transfer of funds between banks. 
However, in most cases, the transfer of funds takes place in circumstances 
where the payer’s account and the payee’s account are held at different banks 
(inter-bank transfer). In an inter-bank transfer a payment instruction will transmit 
either directly from the payer’s bank to the payee’s bank or through intermediary 
banks to the payee’s bank. 37  In these circumstances, there is therefore a 
transfer of funds between banks. This process is known as settlement and can 
occur on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.38 Bilateral settlement takes place 
where both payer’s and payee’s banks have an account with the other. 
Settlement is effective through an adjustment of these accounts.39 In contrast, 
multilateral settlement involves the settlement of accounts of the payer’s bank 
and the payee’s bank held at a third bank. The third bank could be a common 
correspondent of the both banks (payer’s bank and payee’s bank), where they 
both have accounts. Alternatively, the third bank could be a central bank. 40  
Settlement may be either gross or net. With gross settlement, the payer’s bank 
and the payee’s bank settle each payment instruction independently regardless 
of any other payment obligations issuing between the payer’s bank and the 
payee’s bank. In contrast, with net settlement, the reciprocal payment 
obligations of the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank are set off against each 
                                               
37
 Mengle, D., The Importance of Close-Out Netting, (2010, ISDA Research Notes), p. 2. 
38
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 564; Cox, R. and Taylor, J., ‘Fund Transfers’, in Brindle, M. and Cox, 
R., Law of Bank Payments (2010), p. 60. 
39
 Hapgood, M., et al., Paget's Law of Banking (2007), pp. 363-364.  
40
 Ibid., at p. 364; Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p.564; Cox, R. and Taylor, J., ‘Fund Transfers’, op.cit., 
p.60.  
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other and only the net balance paid.41 In bilateral netting, a parties’ position is 
measured by reference to its net position with regard to each separate 
counterparty, and not by reference to the settlement as a whole. In contrast, in 
multilateral netting, a parties’ position is measured by reference to its net 
position with regard to all other parties in the settlement as a whole. 
Consequently, each party will end up as a net net-debtor or a net net-creditor in 
connection to all other parties in the settlement.42 The legal ground for “netting” 
in the context of inter-bank settlements is based in contract. This is where the 
ISDA “master agreements” come into play. 43  “Master agreements” is the 
standardized, pre-printed form agreement published by the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which is used to document over the-
counter (OTC) derivatives trades. The parties add to or modify the terms of the 
ISDA Master through the use of a Schedule to the ISDA master agreement. The 
ISDA Master, along with the Schedule to the ISDA Master Agreement, if any, 
are umbrella documents that parties typically use to govern their trading 
relationship, often covering many transactions (each of which is evidenced by a 
transaction confirmation) of different types.44  
Netting settlement has an important advantage in that it reduces the quantity 
and value of settlement between accounts held at different banks, which helps 
to reduce transaction charges and improved liquidity. Furthermore, net 
settlement has advantages in relation to exposure to receiver risk. Normally in 
EFT, when a bank receives a payment instruction from another bank involved in 
                                               
41
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p.564.  
42
 Ibid., at pp. 564-565.  
43
 http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ 04 December 2013.  
44
 Ibid.  
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a chain payment, the bank makes the transaction funds available to its 
customer before it has actually received the credit due on finalisation of the 
multilateral netting at the end of the day. Therefore, the collecting bank bears 
the risk that it may not be placed in funds. Moreover, when the bank acted on its 
customer’s instruction, the receiving bank may itself pass on a payment order 
down a chain of banks. The default of one bank involved in the fund transfer to 
execute payment means that the other banks involved in the payment 
transaction have no ability to execute their own payment obligations.45 This is 
called a systemic or credit risk.  
In order to reduce systemic risk in payment systems that operate on the basis of 
payment netting, and to minimize the disruption caused by insolvency 
proceedings against a participant in a payment or securities settlement 
systems, the EC adopted Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment 
and securities settlement systems.46 Article 3(1)47 of the Directive provides that 
transfer instruction and netting are to be validly enforceable and binding on third 
parties, even in the result of insolvency proceedings, as long as the instructions 
for the transfer are entered into the system prior to the moment when the 
insolvency is deemed to have begun; article 3(2) provides against the 
“unwinding” of payment netting as a consequence of any national legislation or 
financial practices which allow transactions and contracts to be revoked in 
cases where they were concluded before the moment when the insolvency 
                                               
45
 Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 364.  
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proceedings were initiated; article 548 decrees that there is to be no revocation 
of a transfer order on the part of a participant in the system or a third party from 
the moment which is defined in the rules; article 6(1) rules that the moment 
when the insolvency process begins is that when the judicial or administrative 
authority concerned announces its decision; 49 and finally, article 750 ensures 
that the insolvency proceedings do not retrospectively affect the obligations and 
rights of the participants as a consequence of the latter’s participation in a 
system at a point earlier than the beginning of the proceedings. The UK has 
implemented the Directive of 1998 through the Financial Markets and 
Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations 1999. 51  The Regulations 1999 
apply only to systems that are accorded designation by a ‘designating 
authority’.52 In this capacity as a designating authority, the Bank of England 
granted the CHAPS Sterling clearing ‘designated system’ status.53   
The legal framework of the European Union (EU) has developed differently and 
that has led to the development of a UK legal framework which is part from the 
EU, but which nevertheless does not respond directly to the risks associated 
with EFT. For example, the Directive of 1998 on settlement finality in payment 
and securities settlement systems provides insolvency proceedings but did not 
address the point at which the EFT transactions are to be considered final 
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between the banks, or between the banks and customers or between the 
payees and the payers. Also, it does not address the question of which party 
bears the risk of the insolvency of one of the banks involved in the EFT 
transactions. PSD 2007 does indeed address the rights, obligations and 
liabilities of both banks and customers in cases of unauthorized payment and 
non-execution or defective execution of a payment instruction where the 
payment is within the EU. However, it fails to address and solve the problem of 
customer identity, the finality of payment, intermediary bank’s liability and 
customer’s privacy. Therefore, there is a need to regulate the EFT system.  
The lack of regulation of issues associated with EFT is a problem, as the 
existing rules applicable to EFT are insufficient to address the transactions’ 
parties’ rights, obligations and liabilities, which is costly to all concerned and 
discourages the use of the system. 54  The existing laws lack a consistent 
conceptual foundation and fail to address the problems of access to banking 
services, such as customer identity. The inadequacy of customer identification 
in the regulation of EFT payment, particularly payments by cards entails risks 
for consumer privacy. EFT regulation should require consumer protection in the 
use payment by card associations such as Visa and MasterCard, not only to 
make their rules public but also to regulate consumer protection, 55 for example, 
card issuer’s right to chargeback facility.56 Finally, EFT regulation should require 
consumer protection in relation to unfair terms in banker-customer contracts. 
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 Bollen supports such a view and argues that harmonisation reduces the risk that a problem 
will be treated and solved differently in other counties; Bollen, harmonisation of international 
payment law: a survey of the UNCITRAL model law on credit transfers: part 1, op.cit., at pp. 44-
45. 
55
 Credit cards payment are protecting by Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
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Law is frequently created to give direction to new developments and to 
accomplish some political or social objective such as consumer protection.57 
Indeed, the goal of regulating EFT systems is not to obstruct progress but to 
protect the weaker party and prohibit abusive or unsound practices. 58  This 
thesis demonstrates that there is a need to regulate the EFT system and it 
seeks to vary the balance in the banker-customer relationship in favour of the 
customer. 59  Moreover, the EFT regulatory framework should distinguish 
between different types of customers, for example, businesses and consumers. 
Joris and Gutwirth60 support the view that EFT system should be regulated 
under one body of law, for the following reasons: first, financially speaking, 
banks occupy an advantageous position, in that they can apply pressure to their 
customers with a view to gaining favourable conditions in bank-customer 
contracts. Secondly, it is essential that any steps which are taken for the 
protection of consumers should have a compulsory element. 61  Thirdly, 
regarding regulation of the most sensitive areas of EFT, such as encryption 
security, issues of liability and the burden of proof, guidelines which are entirely 
voluntary are clearly inadequate and unacceptable. Finally, it is a fact that 
payment instruments for example, cheque62 and bill of exchange63 have been 
                                               
57 Joris, T., and Gutwirth, S., ‘Electronic Funds Transfer and the consumer: the “soft law” 
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regulated by uniform legislation, although EFTs still operate satisfactorily, thus 
there is no reason to deal with such system in a different way.64 
1.2.1 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit 
Transfers 1992 
The first approach that was adopted in 1992 by the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law was a Model Law on International Credit Transfers 
which dealt with cross-border credit transfers only.65 The UNCITRAL Model Law 
was designed to address two significant changes in how fund transfers were 
handled internationally.66 The first change was a promotion using electronic 
payment, and the second change was the general movement from debit 
transfers to credit transfers.67 A credit transfer instruction is initiated by the 
payer who orders his bank to move funds from his account to the payee’s bank 
account.68 Thus, the payer’s bank moves the amount of the transaction to the 
payee’s bank by some form of credit transfer, such as a standing order. 
Conversely, a debit transfer instruction is initiated by the payee who orders his 
bank to request the funds from the payer’s bank account, for example as a 
                                               
64
 It is worth to clarify that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 12 June 2013 
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direct debit. The UNCITRAL Model Law attempted to regulate the essential 
rules, leaving the national authorities the freedom to regulate their own legal 
systems.   
The creation of the single market in the EU after 1992 brought about an 
improved community regime for the business sector. The Commission, which 
had previously issued the Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive, issued a 
Green Paper on the working of the payment system in the internal market. The 
Green Paper established the main principles of the payment systems under the 
single market.  
The recommendations explained the area of cross-border credit transfers, but 
there was no organized application, which reduced the number of applications. 
This drove the Commission to issue a Communication on the transfer of funds. 
Subsequently, in 1997, the EU adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Credit Transfers by implementing the Cross-Border Credit 
Transfers Directive.69 This is the legal background which led to the issuing of 
the Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive 1997/5. 
1.2.2 The Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive 1997/5/EC 
Directive 1997/5/EC was the first legislative regime to deal explicitly with cross-
border credit transfers at the EU level. The Directive covered retail credit 
transfers up to the value 50,000 Euros. The aim of EU innovations in this area 
was to facilitate intra-Community business by enabling international payments 
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 Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive 1997/5/EC.  
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to become easy and effective as local payment. 70  The UK government 
implemented the 1997/5/EC Directive by establishing the Cross-Border Credit 
Transfer Regulations 1999,71 which clarifies the responsibilities of institutions 
participating in the sending, processing and receipt of cross-border credit 
transfers. The central provisions of the Directive 1997/5 were as follows: 
(a) Article 3 explained the conditions and requirements of the credit 
institutions and instructed customers how to make a cross-border credit 
transfer. It also provided information, for example, on the time needed for 
carrying out a credit transfer.  
(b) Article 6 determined the time for the carrying out of a transaction, which 
was five days. 
(c) Article 7 imposed several obligations on the banks, such as the 
obligation to transfer the full credit transaction’s funds to the payee, and the 
obligation not to deduct any fund from the transaction’s fund unless there 
was approval from the payer for such deductions. 
(d) Article 8 established the rules of reimbursement in the case of the non-
execution of the credit transfer by the bank. The 1997 Cross-Border Credit 
Transfers Directive came without any indication of the banks’ rights to cancel 
credit transfers in accordance with the customer’s request. Therefore, the 
European Economic Community member states have the right to issue or to 
retain their appropriate provisions on the matter.72 
(e) Article 10 explained the rules of disputes between banks and customers 
relating to the payment settlement.   
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In comparing the UNCITRAL Model Law and the Directive 1997/5, it seems that 
the Directive 1997/5 placed more attention on protecting consumers than the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, (articles 3 and 7 of the Directive). Also there is a 
difference in the ambit of the application. The UNCITRAL Model Law was 
considered more comprehensive in that it covered all international transfers.73 In 
contrast, the 1997/5 Directive covered only international transfers in the EU 
area and was limited to 50,000 Euros. 74  Another dissimilarity was that the 
UNCITRAL Model Law did not cover the time of execution of a conditional 
payment instruction,75 whilst the Directive 1997/5 covered the time of execution 
both conditional and unconditional payment instruction t.76  
As mentioned earlier, the aim of the 1997/5 Directive was to remove the 
obstacles of cross-border credit transfers within the EU Member States. The 
main focus is to facilitate transfer of funds easily and effectively as local 
payment. Some of these aims have been recognised but only to a limited 
extent.77 However, many more legal and regulatory obstacles still impede the 
development of a dynamic and efficient payment system such as uniform rate 
for cross-border credit transfers in the single market.78 Seyad argues that the 
most significant shortcoming in the 1997/5 Directive is that the Directive 
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objectives are not adequately reflected in the measures employed nationally.79 
He believes that the 1997/5 Directive failed to achieve its aims.80 He states: 
“The Member States have failed to sufficiently transpose the transparency 
requirements into their respective legal system. The nature and scope of 
information provided before and after the execution of cross-border credit 
transfers do not properly correspond to the requirements of the relevant 
legal instruments…………. also failed to ensure a uniform rate for cross-
border credit transfers in the single market.”81       
Indeed, the 1997/5 Directive failed to ensure a uniform rate for cross-border 
credit transfers in the EU. That is because the payment agents apply different 
charges for cross-border credit transfers based on country or destination, even 
though it is addressed within the EU. The charges may also differ depending on 
the currency denominated for a cross-border credit transfer.82    
Eventually, a safe and efficient payment system should be modernised to 
reduce risks and increase trustworthiness and efficiency. Development of the 
electronic payment system in the EU made the Commission of the European 
Communities look for a Single Euro Payments Market to make the card 
payments and credit transfers easier, cheaper and safer. Central to the growth 
of the Single Euro Payment Market is the Payment Services Directive,83 which 
should be viewed in the light of the achievement of these overall aims.   
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1.2.3 The Payment Services Directive 2007 (2007/64/EC)  
The Cross-Border Credit Transfers Directive, 1997/5/EC, was replaced by the 
Payment Services Directive 2007 (2007/64/EC). The PSD 2007 aimed to 
harmonize the common legal framework and it intended to create a Single Euro 
Payments Market focussing on electronic payments.84 The PSD 2007 also aims 
to promote the integration and rationalization of national payment systems and 
their underpinning national legislation.85 The PSD 2007 was considered broader 
than Directive 1997/5 because it covered both Euro payments and Sterling 
payments to and from the UK. In brief, the essential goals of the PSD 2007 
were improved economies of scale, thus generating more competition to help 
introduce a fair payment market system; also to present legally harmonized 
rules involving information requirements and the obligations and rights related 
to the banks and customers, with a consumer protection focus.86  
Directive 2007 established a set of requirements for both banks and customers 
which must respect standard covering rules, these are: execution time - 
Directive 2007 sets a mandatory execution time of Day +1 for all credit transfers 
without any currency conversion; liability for non-execution or defective 
execution of a payment order where the payment is within the Member States; 
customer’s liability for misuse of a payment instrument up to the value of 150 
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euros; and the full amount of the transaction must be credited in the payee’s 
account and, any charges or fees must be recouped separately. The PSD 2007 
applied to both retail and wholesale transactions. Furthermore, the PSD 2007 
covered both debit and credit transfers. It applies whenever one or both 
transactions’ parties are in the Member States. However, cheques and cash 
were outside the scope of Directive 2007. The reason for the exclusion is that 
those services cannot be processed efficiently as electronic payment. 
The PSD 2007 had to be implemented into EU Member States’ law by 1 
November 2009. The UK was committed to meeting that deadline. In the UK, 
the Payment Services Regulations 2009 replaced the PSD 2007. The Payment 
Services Regulations 2009 have been made after extensive consultation both 
on the draft Directive 2007 and on the draft Regulations 2009 themselves.87 The 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 were published on 9 February 2009.  
1.2.4 The Payment Services Regulations 200988  
The PSR 2009 present a novel authorization regime, and allots rights to 
customers subject to information, for example, irrevocability of payment 
instructions, charges, and execution time. Generally, the PSR 2009 embraces 
all methods of electronic payment. It has a wide application to EFT transactions 
such as BACS, CHAPS, and payment by cards. Nevertheless, payment in cash 
and cheques are outside the scope of the Regulations 2009. PSR 2009 applies 
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to banker-customer transactions in the UK. 89  It also covers transactions 
between the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank within the European Economic 
Area. 90  The PSR 2009 embraces Sterling, Euro, and other European 
currencies, 91  although it executes transactions involving non-European 
currencies such as the American dollar.    
The rights, duties and liabilities of the banker-customer relationship in the EFT 
are currently covered by the PSR 2009 when applicable. In this regard, the 
contractual rights, duties and liabilities will be determined according to Parts 5 
and 6 of the PSR 2009. It introduces rights and obligations in respect of 
subjects’ countermand of payment instructions, charges, execution time, 
internet payment via telephone or card, and the regulation of information.92 
However, PSR 2009 contain different rules for different types of customer, 
namely, “consumers”, 93  businesses, “micro-enterprises” 94  and “charities”. 95 
Accordingly, the parties may agree to not apply regulations 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 
75, 76 and 77, where the customer is not a consumer, micro-enterprise or a 
charity.96 The PSR 2009 have stipulated various information requirements from 
customers in framework contracts.97 Information is requested at various times; it 
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is required before the payment order is passed;98 after receipt of the payment 
order; 99  and after the payment order is carried out and the transaction 
executed.100 Furthermore, there are information requirements for the bank when 
framework contracts are involved.101 
These regulations, however, are not without flaws and deficiencies. 
Consequently, any EFT issues which are beyond the ambit of the regulations 
will be determined by the principles of common law, which deals with the duties 
and liabilities imposed by the banker-customer relationship and provide such 
remedy as may be necessary.  
1.3 Scope and objectives  
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the EFT as a sophisticated method 
of payment, thus equally sophisticated consumer protection becomes a major 
goal and the question of liability for risks arising from using EFT is of great 
concern. Banking by its very nature is a high risk business. The major risks 
associated with EFT are unauthorized EFT payment, credit risk and privacy. 
The risk allocation rules existing on the basis of various mechanisms used to 
access the account and they do not provide realistic incentives for either the 
customer or the bank to safeguard against risks in a reasonable manner. There 
is no standard formula in the EFT system, which makes it difficult to identify 
which party bears the losses for unauthorized risk, non-payment or to determine 
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whether there is sufficient protection for the customer’s privacy. Thus, it is time 
to regulate the EFT system in one body of law. This study focuses on UK Law 
with the objective of reflecting on the ambiguity surrounding the EFT system. 
One of the most significant current discussions in legal philosophy is whether 
the customers have sufficient protection and remedies against their banks. 
Existing analyses have given no comprehensive method for determining which 
party bears the losses in EFT risks. There are differences between one bank 
and another regarding the provisions made by banks for locating risks in the 
details of the terms and conditions of contracts. The scope of this thesis is to 
investigate the risk issues involved in the use of electronic payment systems. 
The thesis aims to explore the scope of the liability of the EFT parties for risks 
associated under English law. It does not aim to cover all the electronic 
payment methods that have been presented in the last two decades. In fact, the 
aim is to summarize the most significant issues which have emerged with 
regard to electronic payments and then to address the liability for both parties to 
the EFT transaction, namely, banks and customers. The thesis therefore 
focuses on the four points below: 
First, EFT users are exposed to various types of unauthorized transaction risks, 
for example, fraud and, stolen or misused cards. Unauthorized EFT instruction 
exists when a person who does not have the right to initiate a fund transfer 
instruction does so. If the unauthorized instruction issued by the offender is 
passed, then one of the parties involved in the unauthorized transactions will 
bear the risk, even if there is no wrongdoing on the part of that party and all 
reasonable care and skill was employed. Where that risk eventually resides will 
depend on a sophisticated set of payment rules that rely further on: the status of 
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the person without the authority; the quality and type of security procedures 
used to process the instruction; and the instruments used to issue the EFT 
instructions. Section 7 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 states: 
“(1) In any legal proceedings- 
(a) an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated 
with a particular electronic communication or particular electronic data, 
and 
(b) the certification by any person of such a signature, shall each be 
admissible in evidence in relation to any question as to the authenticity 
of the communication or data or as to the integrity of the 
communication or data.  
(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature is so much of 
anything in electronic form as-  
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with any 
electronic communication or electronic data; and  
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of 
being used in establishing the authenticity of the communication or 
data, the integrity of the communication or data, or both.  
(3) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature incorporated 
into or associated with a particular electronic communication or 
particular electronic data is certified by any person if that person 
(whether before or after the making of the communication) has made a 
statement confirming that-  
(a) the signature,  
(b) a means of producing, communicating or verifying the signature, or  
(c) a procedure applied to the signature, is (either alone or in 
combination with other factors) a valid means of establishing the 
authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the 
communication or data, or both.” 
This provision makes it clear that electronic signatures, supporting certificates 
and the processes whereby such signatures and certificates are created and 
used may be admitted as evidence in legal proceedings.  Although the 
reference to “in any legal proceedings” at the start of the section might suggest 
that it applies only to court documents, explanatory note 44 indicates that the 
section allows electronic signatures to be used as evidence with regard to any 
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question involving the authenticity or integrity of an electronic communication or 
data. 
Section 7 also makes it clear that it is a matter for the court to evaluate the legal 
effect of an e-signature in any individual case by deciding whether it has been 
correctly used and what evidential weight it should be given.102 The Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 does not provide a statutory definition of a signature, 
which might assist in deciding whether or not e-signatures are to be considered 
as signatures in the traditional sense. 103  Instead, the 2000 Act effectively 
incorporates the existing common law relating to signatures.  As discussed in 
more detail below, case law has drawn analogies between handwritten 
signatures and other types of authentication in terms of their functions.  
Applying this “function approach”, English courts now recognise e-signatures as 
the legal equivalent of manual signatures.104 
Although there are laws that specifically address the issues of fraud and other 
legal problems within internet banking and funds transfers, not much attention 
has been given to the area of remedies. In this era of high-end technology, it is 
necessary to review and re-examine unauthorized risk processes within the 
EFT transactions. This thesis will argue that the rules of contract law and 
agency law applied to EFT transactions lead to uncertainty and unpredictability 
regarding the EFT’s parties’ rights, obligations and liabilities. A further 
conclusion is that the bank should be liable for authenticated but unauthorized 
payment instructions when it is executed by a third party without the payer’s 
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negligence or fault. The contention of this thesis is that it is time to propose 
different rules for allocating the risk of unauthorized EFT transactions.  
Secondly, there is always a credit risk for both banks and customers. All 
customers of banks are exposed to the risk of the insolvency of their bank and 
the risk of the bank defaulting to execute payment transaction. The payee bears 
that insolvency risk if it parts with its value after EFT completion. In contrast, the 
payer’s bank bears that risk if it guarantees the EFT payment, regardless of 
EFT types, even though the customer’s account is inadequate. The payer, on 
the other hand, bears that insolvency risk before EFT completion. Finality of the 
EFT payment and the legal nature of payment methods are essential keys to 
determining which party bears the risk of insolvency. This thesis demonstrates 
that completion of EFT transactions has special criteria and differs from one 
case to another and thus the question of payment completion in the context of 
EFT has differing answers. 
Thirdly, there are now numerous bank records full of sensitive customer 
information in the form of electronic data. The growth of EFT makes it possible 
for banks to execute increasingly sophisticated analyses of their customers’ 
saving and spending habits, which enable banks to market their own products 
more effectively, but also provide a potentially very valuable source of 
information for third parties, such as Credit Reference Agencies. Consequently, 
consumer protection has become a central concern, especially with regard to 
privacy and the capacity of the banks to employ protection systems which are 
efficient in safeguarding customers’ confidential data. The conclusion reached 
in this thesis is that there is a lack of uniform or harmonizing legislation in the 
procedures for data exchange and that the customer’s consent is therefore the 
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essential key to the transmission of customer information. There is a further 
conclusion that consent for the passing of customer information should be 
subject to certain conditions. Therefore it is important to have an approved 
model to regulate and clarify the principles and conditions of customer data 
exchange. 
The bank’s duty of confidentiality implies a legal obligation to maintain the 
customer’s information securely. In Tournier v National Provincial and Union 
Bank of England,105 the Court of Appeal identified the principles of a bank's duty 
of confidentiality. In this case the defendant bank disclosed to its customer's 
employer, plaintiff’s employer, the fact that one of the customer's unpaid 
cheques was drawn in favour of a bookmaker's account. Consequently, the 
customer's employer did not renew his employment contract with the customer. 
The plaintiff sued the bank for slander, and for breach of an implied contract 
that the defendants would not disclose to third persons the state of the plaintiff’s 
account or any transactions relating thereto.106 The outcome of case was that 
confidentiality was an implied term in the customer’s contract and that any 
breach could give rise to liability in damages if loss results. Thus the decision 
was to the plaintiff (customer).   
In Tournier the court held that the bank’s duty of confidentiality covers all 
customers’ information about themselves and their accounts obtained by the 
bank, irrespective of the information source and for as long as the banker-
customer relationship exists. A bank's duty of confidentiality is not absolute, and 
is subject to four exceptions, identified in Tournier: (1) disclosure by compulsion 
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of law; (2) disclosure under duty to the public interest; (3) disclosure under the 
bank’s own interest, and (4) disclosure under the customer’s approval. The first 
two qualifications mean that the disclosure of a customer’s private data may be 
required by law in cases where the public interest prevails, as the bank has no 
power to avoid the rules of law and will be liable if the revelation does not occur. 
Disclosure under the public interest has been described as ‘the difficult and 
comprehensive meaning of the Tournier qualification’.107 These difficulties could 
be due to a lack of clarity regarding the circumstances which would create 
exceptions in the public interest. Disclosure under the bank’s own interest is the 
third exception to the bank’s duty of confidentiality identified by Tournier. The 
fourth qualification in Tournier is the customer’s consent, which may be either 
explicit or implicit. In Tournier, the court held that the best instance of a 
customer’s implicit approval for the revelation of confidential information is 
where he authorizes the bank to provide a reference. This approach has been 
adopted by the banking sector for years. 108  However, it is sensible not to 
assume that a customer who provides his bank details when applying for a 
credit card is giving implicit approval for the disclosure of confidential 
information by the bank. Tournier has therefore been exposed to criticism in this 
respect. 
Fourthly, the scope of the bank’s liability for direct damages, consequential 
damages, interest losses and currency exchange losses in the context of EFT 
transactions is uncertain and unpredictable. 
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This study will demonstrate that the absence of a comprehensive statute 
dealing with the EFT system leads to unpredictability and uncertainty in the 
parties’ liability for the risks associated with EFT transactions. For that reason 
this thesis argues that there is a need for particular rules to regulate EFT 
systems. Furthermore, applying the rules of contract law and agency law are 
insufficient to provide the final solution to the legal problems associated with 
EFT transactions. The essential objectives of this thesis are: 
First, to address the EFT parties’ liability for unauthorized EFT payment and in 
particular to allocate the liability for authenticated but unauthorized payment 
instruction. Identity authentication in the context of EFT is a problem, because it 
is difficult to determine whether the payment instruction is authorized or not. 
Such difficulty is related to the absence of a physical meeting between the bank 
and customer. This thesis will show that applying the existing law, namely 
contract law and agency law, leads to the problem of customer identity. The 
banks are obliged to install effective encryption methods available for the 
prevention of unauthorized access to accounts and for the safeguarding of their 
own and the customers’ interests. Any avoidable shortcomings in these security 
measures will result in the bank’s liability. That is because the bank is in control 
of the security procedures which are used by the customers. Thus, the bank 
cannot obtain benefit of the flaw in the machinery that customers are required to 
use. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider a bank liable for an authenticated 
but unauthorized transaction when the payer acted without fraud or gross 
negligence and he denies issuing such a transaction.   
Secondly, to address the exact time of the completion of EFT payments and to 
identify the party who bears the risk of insolvency. In EFT transactions there are 
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a number of parties and functions presumed by every party that could be 
affected by the time of the payment. This thesis will show that, regarding the 
question of ‘finality of EFT payment,’ different answers should be adopted. The 
PSR 2009 present new rules for irrevocability of payment instruction and 
execution time of payment instructions. Nevertheless, they do not resolve the 
question of when the EFT should be considered final.  
Thirdly, to address the banks’ liability for safeguarding its customer’s 
confidential information. Security means the protection of the integrity of EFT 
systems and their information from illegal or unauthorized access and use. It is 
important to address whether banks employ encryption systems which sufficient 
to keep customers’ information confidential and to protect electronic 
transactions data. This thesis will demonstrate the need for a new legal 
approach and the need for this approach to be comprehensive in the context of 
a bank’s duty of confidentiality in EFT transactions. Further, due to the EFT 
system’s development, the banks have to take all reasonable care to provide 
very high security procedures to prevent any attack or unauthorized access to 
the banks’ accounts and transactions and the customer’s electronic data. 
Fourthly, to address the bank’s liability to the customer for direct damages and 
consequential damages. The most common disputes arising from EFTs involve 
unauthorized payment and failures or delays in transfers. Damages attributable 
to these breaches or delays may include losses to the principal amount of the 
transaction when the payer’s bank debits his account due to unauthorized 
instruction. Furthermore, the payer will not be able to use that amount of money 
for his own business purpose because it is no longer in his account. 
Accordingly, the payer may lose favourable contracts or sustain financial loss as 
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a penalty for later payment. Further, the payer will lose the interest he would 
have been paid for that amount of money if it had still been in his account. The 
payer may also lose the fees he paid to the payer’s bank to make the fund 
transfer to a specific payee and the money instead may be transferred to a 
fraudster. Finally, there are losses resulting from foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations between the expected and actual time of receipt funds transferred. 
Resolution of these disputes requires the determination of party liability for the 
losses. The remedy of consequential damages, interest and currency exchange 
losses in the context of EFT is uncertain and unpredictable.  
The conclusion is that the PSR 2009 are a positive but insufficient step towards 
addressing all the uncertain issues surrounding EFT transactions. This thesis 
concludes that customer protection is the essential factor in the regulation of 
EFT. There is a lack of uniform or harmonized legislation applicable to existing 
EFT. Also, the thesis concludes that there is a deficiency in the existing law to 
determine which party bears the risk of unauthorized transaction, insolvency 
and disclosure of confidential information. Thus, it is time to conceive a different 
method to approach risk-allocation rules in the EFT system. There are new 
proposals for legal provisions to regulate EFT completion, authenticated but 
unauthorized instructions, privacy and recoverability of damages in cases of 
EFT losses. Although with the continuing evolution of electronic banking the 
suggested, regulations may not provide a comprehensive answer, they will 
address most of the salient issues and could play a major part in providing 
remedial solutions.  
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1.4 Questions raised by the research  
Traditionally, the monitoring measures, laws and regulatory norms associated 
with banking procedures were designed primarily to address safety and 
transparency issues within the functioning of financial institutions. To create a 
process that is safe for the customers and well protected from losses arising 
from a lack of adequate legal remedial processes is of the utmost importance 
for a successful banking operation, which by its very nature handles large 
amounts of money, and thus is classed as ‘high-risk’ business practice. The 
high risks associated with banks comprise mainly credit-interest risks, law 
related issues, and insolvency risks. Internet banking and the EFT system has 
further increased these risks while creating some new ones, which may arise 
from the banks’ attempts to circumvent regulatory and supervisory norms in 
order to expand their customer reach.109 Other risks of a legal nature stem from 
the ambiguities of various legal processes and the fact that regulations vary 
from one country to another.110  The main question that the thesis aims to 
answer is: which party bears risk of losses in cases of unauthorized 
transactions, authenticated but unauthorized transactions, insolvency and 
disclosure of customers’ private information. The thesis also argues the need to 
regulate the EFT system in a more consistent manner. 
In order to address this question, the research also answers secondary and 
associated questions, such as: What is the legal nature of an EFT instruction? 
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What is the legal validity and recognition of electronic signatures as a 
signature? What is the liability of certification authorities and electronic 
signatures? When is an EFT payment considered final? What is the legal nature 
of a plastic card payment? Is the bank’s duty of confidentiality absolute? Does 
the bank’s duty of confidentiality fall under the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950? Does the bank 
have the right to disclose its customer data to the Credit Reference Agencies? 
Finally, in the case of EFT losses, does the bank bear both direct damages, and 
consequential damages or one of these, or neither? 
1.5 Methodology and structure of the thesis 
EFT has changed the nature of the risks associated with funds transfers. EFTs 
create new risks which by virtue of their novelty have not yet been well 
understood, and even when understood have not yet been well regulated. The 
aim of this thesis is to examine the scope of the liability of the banks and 
customers for insolvency, unauthorized payment and disclosure of customers’ 
private information in the context of EFT under English law. The thesis’s main 
academic reference point is the intersection between law and practice. This 
study methodology is to analyse, investigate and evaluate existing English law 
in order to assess whether it is sufficient and appropriate in regard to the legal 
risks currently associated with EFT transactions. It provides a clear and 
authoritative explanation of the law governing EFT in the UK. It helps identify 
the practical legal questions likely to arise and explains how to deal with them 
effectively. Analysis of the latest case law is a particular feature of this study, as 
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the courts address the uncertainties created by the new technology. Recent 
judgments from the UK are explained throughout the text. The thesis addresses 
key areas of contention, such as the legal nature of funds transfer, completion 
of EFT payment, EFT parties’ liabilities, liability for authenticated but 
unauthorized transactions, the problem of customers’ identity, data protection in 
an electronic context and damages for recoverable EFT losses. It deals with 
newly emerging areas of importance, such as encryption, data protection and 
disclosure of customers’ private information to the Credit References Agencies. 
It also includes coverage of the UK implementations of the PSD 2007 and the 
E-Signatures Directive. This will be done by examining and assessing the PSR 
2009 compared with the general principles of agency law, contract law and the 
rules which apply to forged cheques in English law. Finally, it deals with bank 
practice, as evidenced by examination of the general contracts terms and 
conditions published by Barclays, Lloyd’s TSB and HSBC. Important judgments 
are examined. 111  The study puts forward recommendations for future 
approaches to determining parties’ liabilities in EFT transactions and proposes 
model rules for the protection of customers’ rights in EFTs. 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the 
background of the EFT clearing system, the legal EFT framework and serves as 
a general introduction. Chapter two is devoted to identifying the basic legal 
concepts and important definitions involved in the EFT system and clears the 
way for a fuller analysis in subsequent chapters. The chapter starts by defining 
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the EFT system in relation to the aims of the present study. It describes different 
forms of payment instruction and different categories of EFT. The essential 
legal implications of EFT instructions, such as sources of law, the legal status of 
an EFT instruction, and the contractual relationship created by such an 
instruction are clarified. It is emphasized that an understanding of the legal 
nature of EFT instructions helps to build a proper regulatory regime for what are 
often conceptually difficult products. 
Chapter three deals with a long standing issue in banking transactions: 
unauthorized EFT instruction. The basic motivation behind such transactions is 
fraud. This chapter finds out how the application of the common law rules of 
agency to EFT creates the issue of identity authentication due to the 
idiosyncratic nature of authentication in the EFT instruction. Chapter three 
analyses the existing laws that cover unauthorized EFT transactions, namely 
the common law rules and the PSR 2009. The authorization and carrying out of 
EFT instructions are governed by the PSR 2009 Part 6, consisting of 
Regulations 51-79. These regulations also establish rules governing the parties’ 
duties and obligations in the transactions. This chapter will argue that the laws 
are insufficient or inefficient in addressing the problems associated with 
unauthorized EFT. This chapter will also examine whether banks are obliged to 
have a high security system in EFT to protect customer’s accounts and funds. 
The legal position of the security procedures and the security methods used to 
authenticate EFT are investigated in this chapter. Finally, chapter Three will 
determine which party bears the risk in an unauthorized transaction and which 
party will bear the losses in the case of authentication of unauthorized EFT 
instructions. 
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A tracking of the process of an EFT transaction is described in chapter four. 
Among the bank’s duties to its customers is executing the payment instruction 
and making the payment to the payee. Chapter four attempts to find out the 
exact time of an EFT transaction by carrying out an analysis of current EFT 
principles. An analysis of EFT completion time is also carried out, via an 
investigation of the PSR 2009 and the common law rules. The different rules 
and principles used to point out the exact time of payment completion will be 
assessed, the comparative and conflicting points will be analysed and 
comprehensive ways of resolving the deficiencies in the current regulations will 
be suggested. 
An EFT is completed at the destination bank in the system chain in a credit 
transfer and the payment operation is completed at the payee’s bank. 
Conversely, in a debit transfer the payment operation is completed at the 
payer’s bank. To achieve the purpose of this chapter it is important to examine 
the legal nature of electronic payment methods. The legal nature of a payment 
can be conditional, as in payment by debit card, or it can be an absolute 
payment, such as in credit card payments. Finally, by identifying the time of 
payment completion this chapter will examine the liability of the risk of 
insolvency in EFT transactions and will address the question of which party will 
bear the losses. 
Chapter five attempts to investigate the bank’s duty of confidentiality, as it is 
one of the main obligations of a bank to its customer. Some problems that are 
related to legal validity, liability and customer protection, particularly where a 
hacker gains entry to accounts, are discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, 
there are some circumstances when the bank has the right to disclose a 
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customer’s confidential information or data. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine these problems, along with the present laws and regulations relevant 
to the EFT system, and to discover how they can be used to regulate the EFT’s 
main legal issues. The investigation will also show that the banks face an 
increasingly complicated task in reconciling and balancing their different 
obligations with regard to information and details pertaining to their customers, 
given that, customers may have significant expectations about banking 
confidentiality. Therefore, it is argued, in future both the jurisdiction and the 
government should not further extend the rules or qualifications regarding the 
duty of confidentiality without taking into account all the consequences of the 
general laws of confidentiality and the sophistication of the electronic banking 
sector. Also, they will have to evaluate statements regarding misuse of 
confidential information and their obligations in this area, in order to make sure 
that the bank uses very high security systems to maintain the confidentiality of 
customer information.  
In the EFT transaction, where a bank is held responsible for a breach of one or 
more of its contractual obligations, a customer may request compensation. 
Accordingly, chapter six attempts to show what measure of losses are 
applicable in the different circumstances of a bank’s breach of their obligations 
within EFT. This principally involves the execution of an EFT instruction 
according to unauthorized instructions, the banks’ insolvency and defaults in 
making EFT payments or disclosure customer’s private data without legal 
authority. Where there is no regime to measure losses or damages, common 
law rules will be invoked to express an estimate of losses in particular 
circumstances where banks breach their obligations.  
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Chapter seven is a summary and a conclusion drawn from the chapters cited 
above. It includes most but not all of the present author’s views and also, model 
proposals and recommendations, although views and recommendations can 
also be found in the other chapters. This chapter’s main aims are to recall and 
highlight the significant issues and to suggest means of resolving such issues. 
The significant issue which this concluding chapter attempts to address is the 
deficiency of the existing law; therefore the necessity for a particular regime 
dealing with the EFT system will be discussed therein. 
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Chapter Two 
Legal Aspects of EFT System 
2.1 Introduction 
The definition of EFT is the starting point for any work on the subject, since the 
parameters of the discussion in this thesis will depend greatly on such a 
definition. EFT means the movement of an amount of money from a customer’s 
bank account to another’s bank account by electronic means.1 Such a transfer 
is classified as either a non-consumer activated EFT or a consumer activated 
EFT.2 Also, EFT is classified as either a credit transfer or a debit transfer. A 
non-consumer activated EFT means the bank activates the payment, through 
CHAPS Clearing Company, for example, which is either a credit transfer or a 
direct debit, while a consumer activated EFT means the customer activates the 
payment, for example in a payment by card. Consumer activated EFT is always 
described as a debit transfer order.3  
This thesis is devoted to the study of the rights, obligations and liabilities for 
losses and the risks of customers and banks in the context of EFT transactions. 
The function of this chapter is to present an overview of the legal aspects of 
EFT transactions. To achieve this aim the chapter will be divided into five 
sections. Section 2.2 will spell out the essential legal definition of an EFT 
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instruction. EFT terminology will be discussed in section 2.3. This section will 
analyse the terminology of the United States Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
and UNCITRAL and compare it with the terminology used within the PSR 2009. 
Section 2.4 explores the significance of the different categories of EFT. Finally, 
section 2.5 is devoted to examining the legal implications of EFT. Section 2.5.1 
examines the law as it applies to an EFT transaction. Section 2.5.2 explains and 
clarifies plastic card contractual schemas. Section 2.5.3 will examine the legal 
nature of EFT under common law to determine how the law applies to EFT 
transactions. This section will conclude that the legal nature of funds transfer is 
neither an assignment, nor a negotiable instrument, and does not create trust 
funds. Instead, an EFT is merely a mandate from the customer to the bank. In 
this regard, comprehension of the legal nature of an EFT helps to build a proper 
regulatory regime for what are often conceptually difficult products.4 Section 2.6 
will summarize the main findings of this chapter, which notes that EFT 
transactions are subject to different legal rules, for example, the rules of 
contract law, agency law and the PSR 2009. The existing law, however, does 
not provide final answers to all the legal uncertainties arising in the EFT context.  
2.2 Definition of EFT  
English law does not give a specific definition of the concept of payment in a 
general sense. Goode suggests a commonly accepted definition of payment as: 
“a gift or loan of money or any act offered and accepted in performance of a 
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money obligation”.5 According to this definition, a payment is not always money 
but can also be some other form or action of exchange between the two parties 
involved in a transaction. Thus, any action accepted by the payee in enactment 
of a money duty can be considered payment. With regard to EFT there is no 
particular definition, EFT means replacing paper-based payment orders with 
electronic methods to authorize a building society, bank or other financial 
institution to credit or debit a customer’s account. 6  Geva 7  has defined the 
payment mechanism in the following words: ‘any machinery facilitating an 
electronic payment in monetary value; while authorizing or granting the payee 
the right to request the fund transfer from the third party, it permits the payer (1) 
to escape the transfer of funds in the physical delivery; (2) where applicable, to 
obtain a settlement between the payer to the payee’. The Jack Committee has 
defined EFT as follows:8 
“a funds transfer effected through the banking system by electronic 
techniques, with input and output methods being largely or completely in 
electronic form”  
By this definition the significant difference between paper-based fund transfer 
and EFT is the way the payment instruction is created. EFT transactions are 
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initiated by a payment instruction from the customer to his bank to transfer, or 
collect, money from one bank account to another by electronic devices.9  
EFT orders, whether debit transfer orders or credit transfer orders, are initiated 
by using off-line or on-line electronic devices.10 The Jack Committee considered 
an Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS hereafter) to be a 
means of transferring money from the payer's account to the payee's account 
by use of the payer’s payment via his card at the payee's cash point to obtain 
goods, services or cash as an on-line EFT.11 Recently it has become possible to 
transact EFTPOS via a mobile phone.12 
Both non-consumer activated EFT and consumer activated EFT fall within the 
ambit of this thesis. Any EFT transaction is initiated by a payment instruction 
which could be transmitted, directly or indirectly, from the customer to a bank by 
giving an order either to transfer or collect a fixed amount of funds to a payee’s 
bank which does not state a condition of payment to the payee other than time 
of payment. By this definition, a payment instruction has several features: first, 
the purpose of the payment instruction is the payment, which is either collected 
directly or is awaiting collection, and in which the sum of money must be fixed. 
Secondly, the payment instruction must be unconditional, although the 
customer is free to determine the time of payment. 13  Thirdly, the payment 
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instruction has to be addressed to a bank or financial institution.14 Therefore, a 
funds transfer addressed to an individual does not constitute an EFT instruction. 
A final element of the EFT instruction is that an electronic payment always 
depends on the transfer of money from a debtor’s bank account to the creditor's 
bank account, irrespective of whether by a debit transfer system or by a credit 
transfer system. Recently, with the implementation of the PSR 2009 a payment 
order is defined under regulation 2(1) as “any instruction by (a) a payer; or (b) a 
payee, to their respective payment service provider requesting the execution of 
a payment transaction”. This definition governs both funds transfer types, credit 
transfers and debit transfers, and it is the definition adopted in this thesis. 
Electronic transfer of funds from one bank account to another, whether intra-
branch (accounts held at the same branch of the same bank), inter-branch 
(accounts held at different branches of the same bank), or inter-bank (accounts 
held at different banks). If the EFT transaction is passed it will result in the 
debiting of the payer’s account by the payer’s bank; the transfer of funds by the 
payer’s bank to the payee’s bank; the acceptance by the payee’s bank of the 
transfer whereby the payee’s bank is indebted to the payee; and the crediting of 
the payee’s account by the payee’s bank’. In brief, EFT replaces the payer’s 
debt by making the payee’s bank indebted to the payee instead of the payer. 
Any shortcoming in these procedures will give rise to the liability of one of the 
transaction’s parties. Therefore, it is important to address each point of 
proceedings to determine the liability, for example, the point at which EFT 
payment to be considered final to allocate the liability of the bank’s insolvency. 
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2.3 EFT terminology 
Before 2009 some attempts were made in the UK to standardize the 
terminology of the EFT. They were largely influenced by article 4A of the UCC. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Credit Transfer 1992 has adopted the same 
terminology as the UCC. However, article 4A of the UCC, which was adopted in 
1989, describes credit transfer instructions only. 15  Further, the same 
terminology in article 4A and The UNCITRAL Model Law on Credit Transfer was 
adopted in the Credit Transfer Directive on Cross-Border Credit Transfers,16 
and within UK law, in 1999, with the implementation of the Directive 1997 
through the Cross-Border Credit Transfer Regulations 1999; 17  the same 
terminology has been adopted. The Cross-Border Credit Transfer Regulations 
1999 are limited in scope, covering only cross-border credit transfers18 of not 
more than 50,000 euros or the equivalent in another European Economic Area 
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46 
 
currency. In 2007 the Credit Transfer Directive was replaced by the PSD,19 
which was adopted into English law through the PSR 2009. Part 5 and 6 deal 
with information required from the banks or any other financial institution to their 
customers involved in EFT transactions falling within their ambit, and the 
regulations explain clearly the rights and duties of the parties. 20  PSR 2009 
presents a novel terminology which differs from that of the Cross-Border Credit 
Transfer Regulations 1999 (Figure 1, page 48), and the same terminology 
applies to both credit and debit transfer instructions. 21  Accordingly, the 
terminology used in the PSR 2009 is as follows: the term payer is used to refer 
to the customer who initiates, or consents to, the initiation of the payment 
instruction; while the term payee refers to the person who is the intended 
recipient of funds which have been the subject of a payment instruction 22 
(Figure 2, page 48). 
Given the above descriptions, it seems that the points of comparison between 
the terminology used in the UCC and UNCITRAL with the terminology used in 
the PSR 2009 could be as follows: 
(A) The UCC and the Cross-Border Credit Transfer Regulations 1999 used 
the term originator to refer to the customer who initiates, or consents to 
the initiation of the payment order, while the term beneficiary referred to 
the person who is the intended recipient of funds which have been the 
subject of a payment order. In the PSR 2009 the term payer is used to 
refer to the customer who initiates, or consents to the initiation of the 
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payment instruction and the term payee refers to the person who is the 
intended recipient of funds which have been the subject of a payment 
instruction. 
(B) The terminology employed in the Cross-Border Credit Transfer 
Regulations 1999 provides a more useful and comprehensive 
terminology insofar as it not only covers international instruments and 
domestic legislation in other jurisdictions but is also specific to the 
context of EFT, whereas the terminology of the PSR 2009 is general and 
is applicable to both electronic and cash payments. 
(C) Nonetheless, the terminology presented in the PSR 2009 is much more 
comprehensive in scope than its predecessor. The Cross-Border Credit 
Transfer Regulations and UUC terminology restrict the term “fund 
transfer” to credit transfers and it does not apply to debit transfers, 
although the Cross-Border Credit Transfer Regulations use the same 
terminology for both credit and debit transfers. By contrast, the PSR 2009 
terminology applies to both credit and debit transfers.  
Accordingly, to achieve the aims of this thesis the terminology used in the PSR 
2009 has been adopted. The term “payer” will be used to refer to the customer 
who initiates, or consents to the initiation of the payment order. The term 
“payee” will refer to the person who is the intended recipient of funds which 
have been the subject of a payment order. Furthermore, the term “payer’s bank” 
will refer to the bank which moves the funds and the term “payee’s bank” will 
refer to the bank which requests the funds. Also this thesis will use the terms 
“correspondent” or “intermediary” bank to refer to any intermediary institutions. 
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Figure 1: The Cross-Border Credit Transfer Regulations and UCC terminology. 
 
Figure 2: The PSR 2009 terminology. 
 
2.4 EFT systems categories 
An EFT is classified as a credit transfer or a debit transfer,23 and secondly, as 
either a non-consumer-activated EFT or a consumer-activated EFT.24 A non-
consumer-activated EFT or wholesale EFT transaction means the bank 
activates the payment through a large value transfer system such as BACS, 
                                               
23
 Further, see Goode, R., Commercial Law (2009), pp. 504-505. 
24
 Saxby, op.cit., Ch. 5. 
49 
 
CHAPS and Faster Payment. A consumer-activated EFT or retail transaction 
means it is the customer who activates the payment, which in most cases is a 
debit transfer order, effected by using a card, for example, or some form of 
internet payment, or via a mobile phone. 25  A retail EFT transaction or 
consumer-activated EFT, such as one involving payment by cards, is used to 
make a transaction by which  the customer obtains goods or/and services and 
at the same time makes a payment by card, the funds being transferred 
electronically from the cardholder’s account to the merchant’s account. 26 
Therefore, a consumer-activated EFT contains a different contractual 
agreement and each agreement is governed by a separate contract.27 
2.4.1 Credit and debit transfers 
A funds transfer by any electronic device involves the payee’s acceptance of 
the transaction settlement by means of such a device. Therefore, the payee’s 
bank must be clearly identified and there must be no ambiguity about the 
address at which the transaction’s funds are credited to the payee's account.28 
The payee’s bank replaces the payer’s obligation: this replacement is due to the 
payer creating a payment instruction and such an instruction being accepted by 
the payee’s bank.29 Consequently, payment is made despite the payee's bank 
not actually crediting the payee’s account: accepting the payment instruction is 
                                               
25
 Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 354. 
26
 Robinson, D., ‘The structure and Characteristics of the Principal Electronic Banking system’, 
in Goode, R., Electronic Banking: The Legal Implications (1985), p. 1. 
27
 See section 2.5.2 of this chapter. 
28
 Geva, International Funds Transfers: Mechanisms and Laws, op.cit., p. 8. 
29
 Ibid. 
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sufficient for the payment to be considered final. 30  EFT systems can be 
categorized either as credit transfers or as debit transfers, depending on the 
way in which the payment instruction is transferred to the payer’s bank. 
A credit transfer instruction is initiated by the payer who orders his bank to 
move funds from his account to the payee’s bank account.31 Thus, the payer’s 
bank moves the amount of the transaction to the payee’s bank by some form of 
credit transfer, such as a standing order or payment instruction initiated through 
the internet banking system. On receipt of the payer’s payment instruction, the 
payer’s bank account is debited and the payee’s bank account is credited when 
the payee’s and payer’s accounts are held at same bank or a payment 
instruction is forwarded to the payee’s bank, which will then credit the payee’s 
account (Figure 3 below). 
Figure 3: Credit transfer system. 
 
                                               
30
 See chapter four.  
31
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 562; Cox, R. and Taylor, J., ‘Funds Transfers’, in Brindle, M. and 
Cox, R., Law of Bank Payments (2010), p. 57; Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 361. 
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Conversely, a debit transfer instruction is initiated by the payee, who asks his 
bank to request the funds from the payer’s bank account, for example as a 
direct debit. A debit transfer instruction can be initiated by the payer and passed 
on to the payee, as for instance in a payment by cheque.32 On receipt of the 
payee’s order, the payee’s bank usually credits the payee’s account 
provisionally with the funds to be withdrawn and then forwards orders to the 
payer’s bank. Subsequently the payer’s account will be debited. The transfer of 
funds to the payee’s account is actually considered final when the debit to the 
payer’s account becomes irrevocable (Figure 4 below). 
Figure 4: Debit transfer system. 
 
                                               
32
 Goode, Commercial Law, op.cit., p. 504; Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 562. 
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2.4.2 Non-customer-activated EFT systems 
The four basic clearance methods operating in the UK are: the C&CCC; BACS; 
CHAPS;33 and the ‘Faster Payments Services’. Together these systems, for all 
of which liability is currently divided between four independent companies 
operating under the auspices of the UKPA.34 C&CCC is paper-based, involving 
the manual transmission of giro forms and is similar to the clearing of cheques. 
The other three methods: BACS, CHAPS, and ‘Faster Payment Schemes 
Limited’ involve electronic clearing. Nevertheless, the clearing techniques are 
basically a matter of practice rather than of law, although certain aspects of the 
procedure involved are relevant for defining the legal roles assumed by the 
practice.    
2.4.2.1 Clearance via BACS 
BACS are clearances of small and medium-value funds transfers, either by 
debit transfers, such as standing orders, which are used largely by individuals 
for the payment of regular fixed sums, or credit transfers, such credit being used 
mainly for the disbursement of regular bulk payments such as salaries and 
wages.35 Furthermore, BACS is used for other transactions, such as one-off 
payments to business suppliers and to pass customer payments initiated via 
                                               
33
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., at p.577; Kolodziej, A., ‘Customer-banker liability in electronic banking’, 
(1986) 7 Journal of Company Lawyer 191 at p. 191. 
34
 These companies are Cheque and Credit Clearing Company (C&CCC); Bankers’ Automated 
Clearing Services Limited (BACS); Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS); and 
Faster Payments Scheme Limited. 
35
 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Payment systems in the United Kingdom’, in The Red 
Book (2003), p. 4.4 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss53p14uk.pdf 17 July 2013.  
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internet or telephone. Finally, interbank transfers, originating from direct debits, 
allow recipients of large numbers of payments. Processes are cleared via 
BACS, for example, allowing insurance companies and service utilities to collect 
these payments automatically from bank or building society accounts. The great 
advantage of using the BACS system is that it enables fund transfers without 
the need for paper work or for actual transmission of documents. The BACS 
clearing procedures normally used to take three days and this was the main 
criticism of such a method.36 However, the PSR 2009 stipulated that from 1st 
January 2012 the BACS clearing procedures time must change from three days 
to one day. 37  BACS thereafter employed the sophisticated CHAPS ‘Faster 
Payments Services’, which presents a near-real time or same day service. 
Presently there are 16 BACS members.38 Each member has immediate access 
to the BACS system and offers BACS with credit and debit payment orders as 
electronic messages for processing.39 However, users have the right to sponsor 
their customers, for example, non-member banks, building societies and 
corporate customers, who are not members of BACS, permitting them to 
transfer their own electronic messages to BACS. Liability, however, remains 
with the member and not with the sponsored customer. 
                                               
36
 Cox and Taylor, Funds Transfers, op.cit., p. 83. 
37
 The PSR 2009, regulation 70(1) and (2).  
38
 For a list of present members, see 
http://www.bacs.co.uk/bacs/corporate/corporateoverview/pages/ourmembers.aspx 15 February 
2012. 
39
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 579; Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 377. 
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2.4.2.2 Clearance via CHAPS 
CHAPS payment is an electronic bank-to-bank; same-day funds transfer made 
within the UK in sterling, and is generally used for high-value interbank 
transactions.40 CHAPS Euro went live on 4 January 1999 and provided a high-
value clearing for euro-denominated payments running over SWIFT. On 28 
August 2001, CHAPS Sterling and CHAPS Euro were consolidated into a ‘New 
CHAPS’ system. But, CHAPS Euro closed on 16 May 2008 just prior to 
TARGET2 going live. One quadrillion pounds processed through CHAPS 
following a payment of £500 million made on 25 July 2011.41 Statistics show 
that the total value of EFT cleared via CHAPS for 2012 was £7.7 trillion.42 The 
main advantage of CHAPS is that it is fast, since the money is transferred on 
the same day. CHAPS funds transfer orders are irrevocable. CHAPS Sterling is 
one of the largest real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems in the world. 
Banks themselves use CHAPS to move money around the financial system, but 
it is normally used for other types of funds transfer, such as business-to-
business funds transfers, and also by people buying or selling a high-value 
item. CHAPS allows its member banks access to TARGET2, which are the 
payment operations for cross-border and inter-bank data using the 
sophisticated uniform system of the International Organization for 
Standardization run by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
                                               
40
 UKPA, http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/payment_options/chaps/-/page/203/ 5 February 2013. 
41
 UKPA, CHAPS Clearing Company, 2010 
http://www.chapsco.co.uk/chaps_company/about_chapsco/-/page/1971/ 15 February 2013. 
42
 UKPA, CHAPS Statistic http://www.chapsco.co.uk/about_chaps/chaps_statistics/ 13 
September 2013. 
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Telecommunication, ‘SWIFT’. 43  According to the CHAPS Scheme Rules, 
payments made through CHAPS must be unconditional,44 and furthermore a 
payment message cannot be revoked from the point at which the members’ 
settlement account is debited45  (Figure 5 below). 
Figure 5: Funds movement through CHAPS Sterling system. 
 
2.4.2.3 The Faster Payments Service 
The Faster Payments Service was the first new payment service to be 
presented in the UK for more than 20 years.46 By the end of May 2008 most 
banks had started offering the new Faster Payments Service for online banking 
and phone payments. Accordingly, standing orders began to be processed 
using the new service. PSR 2009 stipulates that from the beginning of 2012 all 
fund transfers must reach the payee’s account by the next working day after the 
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 Universal Financial Industry Message Scheme www.iso20022.org 13 September 2013. 
44  CHAPS Clearing Company, CHAPS Scheme Rules (Version 10, July 2013), rule 3.1.2 
http://www.chapsco.co.uk/files/chaps/governance_documents/chaps_co_rules.pdf 18 July 2013.  
45
 Ibid., rule 3.2.1. 
46
 UKPA, http://www.fasterpayments.org.uk/faster_payments/about_faster_payments/-
/page/1941/ 15 February 2013. 
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customer has initiated the EFT order.47 To ensure that  this service is available 
to all customers, all members that currently accept BACS funds transfers give 
an assurance that they are able to accept standing orders, phone and online 
banking payments through Faster Payments. 48  The new maximum time 
schedule for EFT, technically known as Day+1, requires payments to reach the 
payee’s account by the end of the next working day. Nevertheless, all standing 
orders, cards payment and phone banking payments in the UK will exceed this 
requirement, being processed end-to-end within two hours through the Faster 
Payments service.49 
The liability of the Faster Payments scheme is limited to the day-to-day 
procedures and management of the service.50 Also, it is limited to covering four 
methods of payment orders: first, ‘instant payments’ for when the payer wants 
to make a single credit funds transfer immediately; secondly, ‘forward-dated 
payment’ for when the payer wants to make single credit funds transfer but not 
at the present time; thirdly, ‘standing orders’51 whereby the payer gives his bank 
a mandate to pay the same recipient the same amount at regular intervals;52 
and finally, ‘Corporate Bulk’ payments, which are files of BACS funds transfer 
data that can be submitted to the Faster Payments Service for funds transfer on 
the same day. It seems that there are several dissimilarities between the ‘Faster 
Payments Service’ and the other clearances system types. The most significant 
                                               
47
 PSR 2009, regulation 70(1)(2); Also, see UKPA, Payments Council 
http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk/media_centre/press_releases/-/page/1995/ 15 February 
2013. 
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 PSR 2009, regulation 70(1)(2.). 
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 UKPA, Payments Council, op.cit. 
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 Ibid.  
51
 Before the ‘Faster Payments Service’ standing order is carried out via PACS. 
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 UKPA, Faster Payments 2011. 
http://www.fasterpayments.org.uk/faster_payments/how_to_use_the_faster_payments_service_
new/-/page/1947/ 15 February 2013. 
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dissimilarity between the ‘Faster Payments Service’ and the BACS payment is 
the speed of the funds transfer operations. BACS has a three day payment 
cycle, while the ‘Faster Payments Service’ gives same day clearance based on 
the methods of payment order involved. Furthermore, ‘Faster Payments 
Service’ is used for instant and forward-dated payments, 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, although standing orders are only processed between midnight 
and 6.00 a.m. on business days.53 
2.4.3 Consumer-activated EFT systems 
When the customer selects a particular method to use in the EFT systems it is 
often referred to as a consumer-activated EFT or retail EFT.54 In this thesis, 
consumer-activated EFT systems refer to payment by cards, internet payments 
and payment by mobile phone. Credit cards, charge cards, debit cards, which 
are known as EFTPOS, ATM cards, and prepaid cards, will also be within the 
ambit of this thesis. 55 Cheque cards out of scope of this thesis because in 2011 
it stopped for using. According to the UKPA, Payment Council, the UK Domestic 
Cheque Guarantee Card Scheme closed on 30 June 2011 cheque cards 
means:  
“A cheque guarantee card was a plastic card that was used with a cheque 
as a guarantee to the recipient that the payer’s bank would pay them the 
value of the cheque, provided that the cheque was legitimately presented 
by the account holder and accepted by the payee in accordance with the 
conditions of use of the Scheme. The card confirmed the payer’s identity 
                                               
53
 UKPA, op.cit. 
54
 Heller, S., ‘A proposal for consideration of a unified payments law’, (2009) 83 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 485 at p. 488; Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 354. 
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and guaranteed a sum up to the limit marked on the cheque card. The 
limit was normally £50 or £100, but 12% of cards carried a £250 guarantee 
limit. It was not possible to place a stop on a guaranteed cheque and once 
the bank received the cheque they would have had to pay it”. 
Debit and credit cards are the most frequently used payment methods because 
of the lack of commercial obstacles to their use.56 These methods of payment 
are used comprehensively for retail payments. Statistics on the use of plastic 
card payments shows that in 2010 total spending by this method was £353 
billion; by 2011 the figure had grown to £379 billion, 57  and in 2012 it had 
increased to £478.6 billion.58 
 2.4.3.1 Credit cards 
The first credit card issuer in the United Kingdom was Barclaycard in 1966.59 
Credit cards supply their customers with multifarious benefits. They authorize 
the holder to obtain goods and/or services as well as cash.60  Credit cards 
classify as credit-tokens and so are regulated by section 14(1) of the Consumer 
Credit Act (CCA) 1974 which defines a credit token as:  
“a card, check, voucher, coupon, stamp, form, booklet or other document 
or thing given to an individual by a person carrying on a consumer credit 
business, who undertakes—(a) That on the production of it (whether or not 
some other action is also required) he will supply cash, goods and 
services(or any of them) on credit, or (b) That where, on the production of 
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 Hornle, J., ‘The European Union takes initiative in the field of e-commerce’, (2000) 3 Journal 
of Information Law & Technology http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/hornle 31 
May 2012.  
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it to a third party (whether or not any other action is also required), the 
third party supply cash, goods and services (or any of them), he will pay 
the third party for them (whether or not deduction any discount or 
commission), in return for payment to him by the individual”. 
The overall common aim for a credit-token is to enable the card holder to obtain 
goods, services and /or cash by using a card or often a token.61 A consumer 
credit transaction refers to any purchase and sale and therefore the provision of 
credit within a regulated consumer credit agreement is necessary. A credit card 
is also issued under a credit-token agreement, 62 which is a transaction between 
the debtor and the supplier 63  under a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement 
regulated by the CCA, section 12(b).64 
Under section 14(b) of the CCA 1974, usage of a credit card creates a tripartite 
relationship between the card issuer, the card holder and the trader. 65 
Occasionally the card holder is given a cheque book, thus the card holder's 
account can be used in a classical bank transaction as well.66 When the card 
holder wants to obtain cash through the use of an ATM there are two parties 
involved, rather than the three normally present in other kinds of credit token 
transactions.67 Thus, the card holder’s account is debited electronically while 
the card holder is receiving his cash from the ATM. Finally, the PSR 2009 is not 
applicable to the credit cards issued within CCA, because PSR 2009 is merely a 
reiteration of the CCA 1974 provisions. 
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 Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 83. 
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 Bank of Scotland v Alfred Truman [2005] EWHC 583 (QB) at pp. 586-587. 
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 Lambert, J., Banking the Legal Environment (1993), p. 140. 
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2.4.3.2 Charge cards 
The use of charge cards is limited mainly to transactions involving 
entertainment, thus they are often called ‘‘Travel and Entertainment (T&E) 
Cards.’’ 68 The procedures for charge cards use are the similar to credit card, 
except that the holder is not entitled to cash withdrawal facility and must 
liquidate the balance in one payment. 69  As a result of the adoption of the 
Consumer Credit Directive,70  currently charge cards fall under section 14 of the 
CCA 1974. They are predominantly governed by the Act and are otherwise 
governed by the PSR 2009. Before the implementation of the Consumer Credit 
Directive, there was no doubt that charge cards generally gave rise to ‘exempt 
agreements’71 and hence the cards fall outside the ambit of CCA1974 and did 
not give rise to credit-tokens and credit-token agreements.72 Nevertheless, the 
Consumer Credit (Exempt Agreements) Order 1998 was incompatible with the 
Consumer Credit Directive 2008. It is no longer available and therefore charge 
cards now fall within the ambit of section 14 of the CCA 1974 and give rise to 
credit-token agreements.73 Thus the same rules described in relation to credit 
cards apply here.  
Charge card payment takes place when the order to the card issuer is given by 
filling in the relevant payment boxes on the provider’s website checkout and the 
suppler will gain authorization of the order, that is, the card issuer’s confirmation 
                                               
68
 Sayer, P., Credit Cards and the Law: An Introduction (1988), p. 5. 
69
 Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 84; Sayer, op.cit., p. 5. 
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 Ellinger, et al., op. cit., at p. 655 and 665; Cox and Taylor, Funds Transfers, op.cit., p 250 and 
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that it will honour the order (which will generally be given if the transaction is 
within the cardholder’s charge card and the card is not suspected to be stolen), 
while the cardholder is still online to the checkout page.74  
2.4.3.3 Debit cards 
The use of debit cards or EFTPOS75 has grown rapidly in the last twenty years. 
This form of electronic service offers the rightful holders access to their bank 
account at any time and from any geographic location in the world. 76 Such 
access is possible via the use of plastic cards issued by the bank in the holder's 
name and can be used at the point of purchase, at a cash point machine, at the 
bank or via telephone transaction.77 Debit card payment works by authorizing 
the holder either to make retail payment at the point of obtaining goods and 
services or to obtain cash via ATM.78 The security of the transaction is assured 
by issuing customers with personal identification numbers (PINs). 79  This 
ensures that the card and the PIN belong to the rightful holder through a 
comparison of the card’s details and the bank’s customer account, and used in 
this way the PIN acts as a mandate to the bank for payment.80 When the rightful 
holder uses a PIN to make a purchase the debit will be on his or her current 
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 Smith, J. H. G., et al., Internet Law and Regulation (2007), p. 879.  
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Practice, op.cit., p. 77. 
76
 Smith, M., and Robertson, P., ‘Plastic Money’ in Brindle, M. and Cox, R., Law of Bank 
Payments (2010), p. 214. 
77
 Akindemowo, E., ‘Contract, deposit or e-value? reconsidering stored value products for a 
modernized payments framework’, (2009) 7 Business & Commercial Law Journal 275 at p. 302.  
78
 Smith and Robertson, op.cit., p.226; Caskey, J. P., et al., ‘Is the debit card revolution finally 
here?’, (1994) 4 Economic Review 79 at p.80; Kolodziej, op.cit., p.192. 
79
 Since 14 February 2006 rightful holders demand to recognise their PINs. 
80
 Hapgood, et al., op.cit., p. 393. 
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account, so the card holder’s account must always be kept in credit.81 When a 
debit card is used, the payer’s account and the payee's account are settled by 
debit and credit messages sent electronically over the network.82 Debit cards 
are also used to obtain goods and/or services through mail order or telephone 
transactions. In these types of transactions the card holder gives the payee 
some security information, and the payee must save this information for his 
records.83 There are two basic debit cards schemes in operation in the UK, Visa 
Debit (owned by Visa), and Switch/Maestro, run by Maestro Card Services 
Ltd.84  
Most commercial law commentators85argue that debit cards are credit token 
agreements regulated by the Consumer Credit Act (CCA) 1974 when there is 
an overdraft facility, but not when there is no overdraft agreement. Overdraft is 
a contract to provide a customer with an overdraft facility which is called a 
running-account credit.86 An overdraft facility on a card holder's bank account 
will often be an unrestricted-use credit contract which means it is not made 
within a pre-existing agreement with any sellers. Therefore it is a debtor-creditor 
agreement.87 So with an overdraft facility a debit card agreement falls under the 
definition of a credit-token agreement.88 Debit cards do not fall under sections 
56 and 75 of the CCA 1974 because they are not considered to involve a 
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“debtor-creditor-supplier” agreement in accordance with which the debit card 
issuer will not be responsible for any misuse by the seller. Hapgood, et al,89 
however, state that debit cards are not credit-token agreements, but should be 
regulated under the debtor-creditor-supplier agreement90 because the holder 
obtains goods or services from the seller and pays from his bank account. He 
suggested that credit token agreements are to be defined as “regulated 
agreements” so that debit cards are just a method of payment and outside the 
ambit of the CCA 1974. Since credit is drawn by the debit card user from the 
card issuer at the point of purchase the relationship between the card holder 
and the card issuer falls under section 14(3) CCA, so it is difficult to argue that 
debit cards do not fall under the CCA 1974.91 Section 14(3) of the CCA 1974 
specifies that the issuer of cards is obliged to guarantee the payment to the 
suppliers (third party) every time the cardholder receives goods, services or 
cash. Under Section 14(2) of CCA 1974, the above relationship falls under 
credit-token agreements. Not all agreements where a credit token is issued fall 
within the definition of credit token agreements; not all debit card issues, for 
example, are accompanied by an overdraft account. Whether debit cards are to 
be considered as credit tokens or as credit token agreements is a matter which 
remains open to debate. The author’s view is that debit cards fall outside the 
ambit of the CCA 1974. Thus, the issuer of the card is under no obligation to 
guarantee the payment and make the transaction when there are insufficient 
funds in the cardholder’s account and there is no overdraft facility. Secondly, 
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debit card holders are not protected by the CCA 1974 rules, which would, for 
example, enabe the card issuer to obtain chargeback.  
Within the PSR 2009 the situation is different. It seems that the PSR 2009 
covers payment by debit cards as well as payment by all other types of cards, 
since debit cards are held to fall within the definition of a ‘payment instrument’ 
created under a payment services contract. 92 Therefore, the debit card holder is 
subject to protection under the PSR 2009.93 Also it covers the parties’ rights, 
liabilities and duties.94 It is important to note a possible conflict between the 
CCA 1974 regulations and those of PSR 2009 with regard to payments by card, 
such as in case of misuse of the card.95 Solving that conflict simply by applying 
the CCA 1974 to the obligations and liabilities of cards issues in relation to 
‘regulated agreements’ and the PSR 2009 will not be applicable, because PSR 
2009 are merely a reiteration of the CCA 1974 provisions.96 
2.4.3.4 ATM cards 
In 1967 the first cash machine in the UK was introduced by Barclays Bank.97 An 
ATM card enables the holder to obtain cash only, so it is not a credit device. 
The cardholder uses the card by inserting it into the machine and typing his 
Personal Identification Number (PIN). Holders of ATM cards can use the card 
only in the ATM of the cards issuing bank or the ATMs of other banks with 
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whom the issuing bank has reached an agreement.98 However, most banks and 
building societies issuing ATM cards are members of networks using shared 
ATMs, such as LINK in the UK.99 The PSR 2009 regulations apply to ATM cards 
and cover the agreement between the cardholder and the issuing bank. 100 
However, the PSR 2009 do not cover the relationship between the cardholder 
and another bank or building society which owns the ATM used by the 
cardholder. 101  ATM cards do not fall under the CCA 1974, and there is 
disagreement over the classification of ATM cards as credit tokens.102 
2.4.3.5 Prepaid cards 
Prepaid cards, or stored value cards, involve the storing of monetary value as 
electronic data outside of a bank account. Thus, the prepaid card holder may 
obtain an account for only a relatively small proportion of payments of lower 
value such as bus and tube fares. Prepaid cards can be equivalent to credit or 
debit cards and many of these cards are created under the aegis of Maestro, 
MasterCard, or Visa. Further, a number of prepaid cards can be purchased, 
loaded with a low value and used until the money on the card is spent. Others 
are re-loadable and can be ‘topped-up’.103 The closest equivalent to a prepaid 
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card is cash rather some other type of card.104 The prepaid card is an electronic 
value which the holder uses with his money for goods and/or services 
purchased from a seller involved in the scheme. In contrast, with a credit card it 
is the card’s issuer who pays for goods and/or services each time it is used by 
the holder, and at that same time the holder will be indebted to the issuer. 
Finally, prepaid cards do not fall under the CCA 1974, but under the PSR 2009. 
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 E-Money Directive 2009 (2009/110/EC) particularly text in article 13 that e-money in view of 
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Table 1: Attributes and examples of cards payment. 
Attributes Credit 
Cards 
Charge 
Cards 
Debit Cards ATM Cards Prepaid 
Cards 
Account  
Bank 
account 
 
Bank account 
Customer 
current 
account 
Customer 
current 
account 
No bank 
and 
customer 
account 
Value  
Limited 
value 
 
Limited value 
 
Unlimited 
value 
 
Limited 
value 
 
Limited 
value 
CCA 1974 
Applicabl
e 
Yes Yes No No No 
PSR 2009 
Applicabl
e 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Functions 1- Withdra
w 
money 
2- Pay for 
goods 
and 
services 
3- Cash 
back 
 
Pay for 
particular 
services 
1- Withdraw 
money 
2- Pay for 
goods and 
services 
3- Cash back 
 
Withdraw 
money only 
 
Pay for 
particular 
services 
Acceptan
ce 
Yes Payee must 
agree to use 
Yes Issuing 
bank 
or any ATM 
of LINK 
network 
Payee must 
agree to 
use 
Examples Visa Credit, 
MasterCard, 
and 
American 
Express 
American 
Express 
cards 
Visa Debit, 
MasterCard, 
and 
Visa Electron 
ATM cards Visa and 
MasterCard 
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2.5 The essential legal implications of EFT instructions 
2.5.1 Sources of law 
In the context of a modern banking system using the internet, “electronic 
banking” or “e-banking” is defined as a banking operation conducted by 
authorized banks from a remote location through tools that function under the 
bank's direct management or through outsourced agents. Thus, e-banking 
encompasses an entire set of processes through which a customer can transfer 
funds electronically without having to visit a bank physically. These processes 
also include services where customers can access their accounts, conduct 
personal or business transactions and receive on the internet necessary 
information on different financial services and products.  
In the UK, the lack of comprehensive regulation governing EFT means that EFT 
transactions come under the jurisdiction of the law of contract and the law of 
agency. Although the PSR 2009 is considered to be the most significant 
legislation dealing with EFT when the EFT falls within the 2009 Regulations,105 
the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations 1999 
also apply.106 The Regulations 2009 present new rights for customers regarding 
such matters as, for example, charges, execution time and the revocability of 
payment instructions, while the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement 
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Finality) Regulations 1999 address issues related to safety of the payment 
procedures and securities payments in the event of the insolvency of a payment 
party.  
2.5.1.1 Law of agency 
The established legal view of the banker-customer relationship in relation to 
EFT is that it is an agent- principal relationship.107 There is consensus108 in the 
literature that the bank acts as an agent to its customers in carrying out 
transactions. The importance of the law of agency in EFT is demonstrated 
through the decision of Webster J. in Royal Products v Midland Bank.109 The 
litigants were Royal Products, which had a current account with the defendants, 
Midland Bank and also with the Bank of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture 
Ltd, (BICAL) in Malta. Royal Products gave an order to the Midland Bank in UK 
to transfer £13,000 from their current account there to their current account with 
BICAL in Malta. However, BICAL was facing insolvency problems at that time. 
The Midland Bank therefore wanted to avoid involvement in the legal issue and 
used the Bank of Valletta (National) in Malta as its intermediary to transfer 
£13,000 to BICAL. National subsequently transferred the funds to BICAL, 
informing them that the funds were to be credited to Royal Products’ account. 
The next day BICAL became insolvent and failed to credit the £13,000 to Royal 
Products’ account. Consequently, Royal Products sued Midland on the grounds 
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that, if National was not the agent of Midland then their order was never 
executed, which meant that Midland was liable; but if National was acting as an 
agent of Midland, then National broke essential obligations and duties of a 
fiduciary nature, for breach of which Midland was liable. In this case, the 
decision of Webster, J. was for Midland. 110  With regard to the relationship 
between the payer and the payer’s bank, Webster, J. held that the legal 
implication of the payment instruction given by the customer to the bank was 
only a mandate and the relationship between the payer’s bank and its customer 
is that of agent-principal and governed by agency law. Accordingly, one of the 
bank's duties as its customer’s agent was strict adherence to the customer’s 
mandate. Therefore, as the funds transfer was addressed to Midland Bank as 
part of the banker-customer relationship, Webster, J. held that Midland was 
under a duty to exercise all reasonable skill and care in executing the 
customer’s instruction, and that National acted as Midland’s agent. The court 
held that an agency relationship existed between the payer, Royal Products, 
and the payer’s bank, Midland. Additionally, an agency relationship existed 
between Midland and National, the intermediary. Webster, J. held: 
“in carrying out its part of the transaction Midland owed Royal Products a 
duty to use reasonable care and skill…. and that they would be vicariously 
liable for the breach of that duty by any servant or agent to whom they 
delegated the carrying out of the instructions. Midland, therefore, would be 
liable to Royal Products for National's negligence, if any, in that respect. But 
in my judgment National owed no duty of any kind direct to Royal 
Products…... In my judgment, therefore, National are not to be regarded as 
having been agents of Royal Products and did not, therefore, owe them any 
of the duties, including a fiduciary duty, owed by an agent to his principal.”111 
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Nevertheless, there was an absence of agency relationship between the payer, 
Royal Products, and the intermediary bank, National. The court held that in 
spite of the fact that Midland acted as an agent to Royal Products and that 
Midland was entitled to employ National to effect the fund transfer, Midland was 
not capable of creating any relationship between Royal Products and National. 
Accordingly, National was under no duty at all to Royal Products, not even 
fiduciary duties.112 
2.5.1.2 Law of contract 
The second legal view of the banker-customer relationship in relation to EFT is 
the debtor-creditor relationship.113 This relationship is founded on the fact that 
the customer’s funds deposited in the bank’s account are owned by the bank, 
which the customer has to claim from the bank as a creditor. When the 
customer’s account is in credit the customer will act as creditor to the bank, and 
conversely the bank acts as creditor when the customer’s account is debited or 
overdrawn.114 Although, in Royal Products v Midland Bank the court held that 
the Midland's contract with Royal Products was not specifically a contract to 
supply a fund transfer only, the two parties were, nevertheless, held to be in a 
contractual agreement because of their underlying relationship as a bank and 
customer, the payer bank normally charging the payer a fee to issue a fund 
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transfer on the payer’s behalf.115 In each case, the terms and conditions of the 
contract between the parties will be significant in determining the duties and the 
obligations for both parties. In this regard, the payer’s bank normally excludes 
liability for the negligence or default of its correspondent in its contract with the 
customer.116  
2.5.2 Plastic cards contractual schemes 
As explained previously, there are different types of plastic card payments and 
every type will involve a network of agreements, some involving a tripartite 
agreement, 117  (figure 6, page 75), recently, with the development of card 
payment networks, the contractual schemes have come to involve four parties: 
the card holder, the issuer, the merchant and the merchant acquirer. 118 
Indisputably, these agreements will depend on the issuer’s terms and 
conditions, and these will differ from one issuer to another.119 They include the 
agreement between the card holder and the card issuer, the agreement 
between the merchant and the card issuer and the agreement between the 
merchant and the card holder. In a tripartite agreement each party has two 
agreements in the transaction.120  
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2.5.2.1 Agreement between the card holder and the card issuer  
Normally this contract entitles the issuer to pay for the holder's transactions.121 
This contract requires information from the card holder, such as: the holder’s 
name and address, the sum of money involved and other details.122 With the 
debit card scheme the position is different the terms and conditions for use of 
debit cards are included within the general terms and conditions for the bank 
account.123   
2.5.2.2 Agreement between the merchant and the card issuer 
There is a contractual agreement between the merchant and the card issuer, 
based on the relationship between them.124 Generally, this contract will contain 
a form giving details of which cards the seller is entitled to accept for the 
settlement.125 On the one hand, the card issuer accepts liability for paying the 
card holder's transactions126 while on the other hand the merchant burdens the 
card issuer to pay the merchant on the basis of the contract between them.127 
Under the contract between merchant and issuer the merchant cannot refuse to 
sell goods and/or services to the holders who pay using any legally valid card.  
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Furthermore, there is a contractual agreement between the merchant and the 
merchant’s bank, which called the ‘Merchant Agreement’ and contains standard 
terms. According to this contract, the seller is authorized and obliged to accept 
the card in payment in making transactions, and the bank agrees to pay to the 
merchant the value of the transactions.128   
2.5.2.3 Agreement between the merchant and the card holder 
The third contract existing between the merchant and the card holder is usually 
oral. However, the implied conditions and terms imposed remain under the 
regulation of the “Sale of Goods Act 1979” or the “Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982”. The rights of the payer and the payee are based on that 
agreement. Such a contract could be subject to the rules of either CCA 1974 or 
PSR 2009. Therefore, if the issuer provides a settlement to the payee, it means 
the card holder authorizes the issuer to pay and allows the issuer to exercise 
his right to draw from the card holder's account. Figure 6 overleaf describes the 
three party card schemes. 
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Figure 6: The three party card schemes 
 
2.5.2.4 Agreement between the merchant and the merchant acquirer 
The fourth type of contract (addition to the three contractual agreements 
explained above), under a card scheme may involve four parties. This point is 
illustrated by the decision in Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc.129 
The House of Lords held that, in general, the contract in a credit card 
transaction had a tripartite structure, involving contracts between the card 
issuer, the cardholder and the merchant. However, with the introduction of 
modern electronic banking credit card schemes, this subsequently developed 
into a four-party structure involving a “merchant acquirer”. This contract is not 
regulated by the CCA 1974 or PSR 2009, as the bank is free to opt out of the 
protection presented by Part 5 and 6 of the PSR 2009. Thus, this contract will 
be regulated according to the master agreements scheme by VISA and 
MasterCard. The purpose of a “merchant acquirer” is to recruit new sellers to 
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accept payment by cards (debit cards and credit cards). Modern electronic 
banking has driven the card issuers to become members of one or other of the 
two basic international cards networks, Visa and MasterCard. Within the 
principles of Visa and MasterCard networks (merchant acquirer), the banks 
(card issuers) are authorized to issue cards and normally undertake to honour 
the cards and payments130 (Figure 7 below). 
Figure 7: The four party card schemes. 
 
2.5.3 The legal nature of an EFT instruction   
In defining the legal nature of the payment instruction, it is of primary 
importance to clarify the law governing EFT contractual relationships. In 
addition, the law serves to address the principles and rules which can be 
applied to the parties’ rights, obligations and liabilities. The next four sections 
will demonstrate that under English law the funds transfer is only a mandate 
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initiated by the payer to his bank.131 There will also be arguments against the 
suggestion that an EFT works as an assignment and also against the view that 
the funds transfer may be a negotiable instrument. There will also be a 
discussion and refutation of the view that an EFT instruction may be a device 
which creates a trust of funds. 
2.5.3.1 An EFT instruction is not an assignment 
A reading of the available literature leaves no doubt that funds transfers either 
by debit or credit, are involved in the settlement of the balances of the payer 
and the payee accounts, regardless of whether the funds transfer is within a 
single bank or between different banks.132 EFT is only a transfer of value and 
not a transfer of money, so there is no physical transfer.133 Respectively the 
payer’s bank account is debited and the payee’s bank account is credited.134 
Cox and Taylor have clarified that in practice, if there is no term in the contract 
to the contrary, the payer does not assign his rights towards the payer’s bank to 
the payee or the payee’s bank.135  Accordingly the payment order could be 
revoked until the time the payment orders become irrevocable, for example, 
before it reaches the payee’s bank, while the assignment order would be 
irrevocable once it is complete.136 In Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust 
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Co137 Staughton J. has asserted that a funds transfer is not an assignment. 
Staughton J.’s view has been reinforced by the House of Lords in R. v 
Preddy.138 Staughton J. held: 
““Transfer” may be a somewhat misleading word, since the original 
obligation is not assigned (notwithstanding dicta in one American case 
which speak of assignment); a new obligation by a new debtor is 
created.”139  
A funds transfer system is not a statutory assignment. Ellinger, et al.140 have 
confirmed that a funds transfer system is not a statutory assignment under 
section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 for the following reasons: first, in the 
fund transfer the customer usually orders the bank to transfer part of the debit 
owed by the bank to its customer. Thus, the assignment of part of a debt is not 
approved by section136 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 141  Secondly, the 
customer may not have any outstanding credit at the time of issuing the funds 
transfer, as the customer believes that the amount required to complete the 
transaction will be available at the time the transfer is to be affected. Thus, the 
assignment of future funds is not recognised by section 136 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925.142  
Moreover, none of the funds transfer types, for example, bank giro credit, CHAPS 
and EFTPOS discloses an intention to confer on the payee the right to claim 
payment of the amount involved from the payer’s bank, as would result in the 
case of an assignment.143 With regard to EFT, parties there is no intention that 
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part of the debt payable by the payer’s bank to the payer be made over to the 
payee as a chose in action claimable by him. Therefore, EFT operations work in 
different way, with the machinery and with the objectives pertaining to the 
assignment of debts.144 Accordingly, an EFT is not an assignment and the Law of 
Property Act 1925, does not apply to such transactions.     
2.5.3.2 An EFT instruction is not an negotiable instrument 
Section 3 of the Bill of Exchange Act 1882, enshrines the requirements for a 
funds transfer instrument to be a negotiable instrument: first, it must be an 
“unconditional order” in writing; second, it must be addressed by one person to 
another, and thirdly, ordering the addressee to pay on demand or at a fixed or 
determinable future time a specific amount of money to the payee. Regarding 
the former requirements, negotiable instruments are considered to consist of a 
paper which passes from one party to another, either by delivery or by 
indorsement, as a result of which that negotiable instrument itself becomes the 
subject of payments transfer or negotiation. Thus, the funds transfer such as 
cash and EFT is not negotiable instrument.145 EFT falls outside the ambit of 
definition of a negotiable instrument, as it is not a written order by the customer 
to his bank to transfer or collect funds from one account to another by electronic 
means. This is well illustrated by the decision in The Brimnes146 in which the 
Court of Appeal held that the legal nature of a funds transfer order conferred by 
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a telex message could not be a negotiable instrument, so that a telex could not 
be equivalent to a cheque, Cairns L.J. held: 
“The property in money passes on delivery; so does the property in a 
cheque. Partly by operation of the law merchant and the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1882, partly by the customs of business, cheques have come to be 
regarded as the equivalent of money (subject always to being afterwards 
defeated by dishonour). I do not think that the telex message in this case 
can be regarded in the same way. It was not a negotiable instrument. It 
could have been revoked by Hambros [the payer’s bank] at any time 
before being acted on by M.G.T. [payee’s bank], and, if it had been so 
revoked, no action could have been brought on it as it could on a stopped 
cheque.”147 
Furthermore, a negotiable instrument’s contract creates explicit rights which are 
separate from the underlying agreement which has been made and an EFT 
does not do this. Regarding to EFT, the payer instructs his bank to pass funds 
from his account to the payee’s account pursuant to the underlying agreement 
between them, and yet the payee cannot hold that the instruction gave him 
rights and that the payment is considered made.148 Thus, as an EFT is not a 
real transfer on demand or within a determinable time, it becomes a transfer 
once the payer has created the payment instruction.149   
Although, an EFT is not considered to be a negotiable instrument, in Esso 
Petroleum Co Ltd v Milton,150 the claimant, the occupier of a petrol service 
station, was required to pay for his petrol deliveries by direct debit 
arrangements with his bank. The claimant cancelled his direct debit mandate 
when £170,000 was still outstanding for petrol previously delivered by the 
defendants. The Court of Appeal held that the payment arrangements of the 
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parties by direct debit were to be treated as same as payment by cheque, and 
the claim was the same as that of a payee who had no guarantee of a cheque’s 
payment. It was submitted that an EFT instruction (direct debit) was equivalent 
to payment by cheque and, a fortiori, equivalent to payment by cash. The Court 
of Appeal held: 
“modern commercial practice was to treat payments by direct debit in the 
same way as payments by cheque and the equivalent of cash.”151 
However, Cox and Taylor152 disagreed with this view and they confirm that if the 
Court of Appeal is right, this point ‘could be applied to payment made, or agreed 
to be made, by other forms of credit and debit transfer between bank accounts. 
Furthermore, a funds transfer instruction does not embody any contractual 
rights arising from the underlying transaction, and the payee in an EFT 
transaction is not possessed of a right to payment. Hence, EFT instructions fall 
outside the definition of a negotiable instrument, since EFT instructions are not 
payments at a particular date or on demand. Further, EFT instructions are not 
payments on the instructions of a particular individual or to the bearer. Finally, 
EFT instructions do not often include words which can be construed as a formal 
instruction passed from the payer to his bank. 
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2.5.3.3 An EFT instruction does not create trust funds 
There is no doubt that an amount in a bank account can from the matter of law 
a trust fund. An EFT instruction does not give explicit trust of the funds which 
are intended for transfer because the use of the word trust is not sufficient in 
itself for a trust to issue, there must also be the intention to create a trust.153 So 
in a case where a payer becomes insolvent before the payment order is 
effected, the payee will be on the side of ordinary unsecured creditors, since 
there is no intention to create trust funds when the bank is ordered to transfer 
the amount to the payee. In Re Kayford Ltd (In Liquidation)154 the court held that 
a trust of the funds in a bank account has been found are far removed from 
cases involving a funds transfer order. Therefore, in Re Kayford Ltd the order by 
the account holder to the bank was to create a “Customer’s Trust Deposit 
Account”. Moreover, the clear intention was to safeguard the customers, whose 
fund was paid into the account, in the event of the insolvency of the account 
holder. In an ordinary EFT instruction, there is no intention to create such trust.  
In an EFT transaction the payer, who is a customer of the transferring bank, 
instructs the bank to move funds (credit transfer) from his account to the 
payee’s account. In this case the bank will debit the payer’s account, and then 
the payment is effected,155  nevertheless, the bank will not hold funds in a 
separate account for the purpose of transferring it to the payee’s account. 
Accordingly, the view of a separate account does not work in EFT transactions, 
because it is unlikely that the payer will open a new account to credit it with the 
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funds issued through a special payment instruction. 156  However, when the 
customer has more than one account and makes a debit card payment, he 
should specify which bank account is to be used. Even this, however, does not 
create a trust fund as long as the account is not uniquely for a single 
transaction. It is proposed that ‘the separation of the money is not the most 
essential element even in this case, because the two situations, of trust and of 
the EFT transaction are totally dissimilar.’157 
The nature of an EFT instruction works against considering it as a trust fund. An 
EFT instruction to transfer funds from the payer’s account to the payee’s 
account can be countermanded, since the EFT system allows this to happen 
before the final settlement. In contrast, once a payment is considered final, it 
cannot be revoked. In this sense the payer has possessed the funds up to 
either the time of implementation of the payment instruction, or the time of 
payment depending on the EFT system used. The payee in an EFT transaction 
cannot take any legal action against the paying bank for the funds of the 
payment instruction, because he has no right to the funds unless the money 
actually enters his bank account. Conversely, if an EFT order creates a trust 
fund, the payee could take legal action against the paying bank, as trustee, 
once the instruction is issued. Ultimately neither the language of an EFT 
instruction nor its legal nature provide the intention to create a trust fund for the 
benefit of to the payee; and in the case of there being no clear indication, the 
jurisdiction is prevented from discovering the effects of such intention.158  
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2.5.3.4 An EFT instruction constitutes a mandate 
Within common law,159 the legal nature of a payment instruction in a credit 
transfer transaction is regarded as an authority and an instruction from a payer 
to his bank to transfer a sum of money to a payee’s account. This point is 
illustrated by the decision of Webster J. in Royal Products v Midland Bank.160 
The court held:  
“What, then, are the legal implications of those instructions? How are they 
to be regarded, as a matter of law? In my judgment they are to be 
regarded simply as an authority and instruction, from a customer to its 
bank, to transfer an amount standing to the credit of that customer with 
that bank to the credit of its account with another bank, that other bank 
being impliedly authorized by the customer to accept that credit by virtue 
of the fact that the customer has a current account with it, no consent to 
the receipt of the credit being expected from or required of that other bank, 
by virtue of the same fact. It is, in other words, a banking operation, of a 
kind which is often carried out internally, that is to say, within the same 
bank or between two branches of the same bank and which, at least from 
the point of view of the customer, is no different in nature or quality when, 
as in the present case, it is carried out between different banks.”.161 
This decision confirmed that funds transfer is executed by the payer’s bank 
between different accounts in different banks according to the authority 
conferred by the customer to its bank. Furthermore, the nature of an EFT was 
scrutinized in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in R. v King.162 Lord 
Lane held: 
“The CHAPS order is certainly a document. Its effect is to direct the paying 
bank to debit the paying customer's account with £x (plus any charges) 
and to transfer the £x to the credit of the payee's account at another bank 
and to do so by means of an electronic device which would carry out the 
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necessary operations as soon as the staff of the paying bank key the 
information contained in the document into the machine and then put the 
machine into operation.”163 
It seems that, within Lord Lane’s decision, a payment instruction is a sort of 
direction or order to the payer’s bank, as agent to the payer,164 to debit the 
payer’s account by the transaction’s funds and transfer such funds to the 
payee’s account. That order creates an authority or mandate to make a fund 
transfer. It does not, however, constitute an assignment of funds. 165 
Consequently, the payee’s right to the funds transferred issues from the 
moment of completion of the transfer and not from the moment of delivering the 
instruction to the payer’s bank. The concluded funds transfer constitutes only a 
mandate and from this two consequences arise: First, the payer has the right to 
revoke the payment instruction unless it has been executed. Second, the payee 
has no right to the money transferred until the payment order is completed. 166  
2.6 Conclusion 
An EFT is the movement of an amount from a customer’s bank account to 
another’s bank account enabling funds to be transferred electronically. Funds 
transfer operations constitute only a mandate from the customer to the bank to 
transfer the transactions’ funds. The sophistication of EFT has obliged the UK to 
adopt particular legal frameworks to regulate such transactions. However, this 
chapter has illustrated that there have been different initiatives in formulating 
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rules to cover EFT transactions. First, there are common law rules. Secondly, 
there is the CCA 1974 and thirdly, the PSR 2009: these are considered to 
contain the most significant regulation of EFT transactions. The PSR 2009 are 
not regarded as final in answering all the legal uncertainties arising in the 
context of EFT, although they do establish the basic rights, obligations and 
liabilities of parties involved in EFT transactions. 
The remaining chapters of this thesis will investigate the existing rules and 
principles that could be applied to EFT transactions and their risks. The thesis 
will show that the rules covering EFT transactions do not ensure certainty and 
predictability of the parties’ rights, obligations and liabilities in the context of EFT 
transactions. Thus, the previous rules are not adequate and are not capable of 
being applied to the particular legal problems raised by EFT risks, particularly 
with regard to the party who bears the risk of non-payment in such transactions. 
The same inadequacy applies in the context of the liability of the payer and the 
payer’s bank in the case of authenticated but unauthorized EFT orders and, 
equally important, in the bank’s duty of confidentiality against disclosure of 
customer information in the EFT context. There is also the question of the 
extent of the bank’s liability for direct and indirect damages arising from EFT 
risks. Under the PSR 2009 the EFT transactions’ parties’ rights, obligations and 
liability for unauthorized transaction have been addressed, however the PSR 
2009 did not solve the problem of customer identity. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that the PSR needs to be amended in view of the absence of clarity on 
the questions of who bears the risk for non-payments; at what point a payment 
is deemed to be completed; and who bears the risk in cases of authenticated 
but unauthorized payment instructions.  
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Chapter Three 
EFT Parties’ Liability for Unauthorized Payment  
3.1 Introduction 
EFT users are exposed to various types of unauthorized transactions, for 
example, fraud, stolen PINs and cards, or misuse of cards.1 An unauthorized 
EFT instruction exists when a person who does not have the right to do so 
initiates a fund transfer instruction. If an EFT instruction issued by a person who 
does not have the authority to do so accepted then one of the EFT transaction’s 
parties will bear the risk, even if there is no wrongdoing from that party and all 
reasonable care and skill was taken.2 The party who bears the risk of this 
unauthorized payment could be the payer or the payer’s bank. The current risk 
allocation rules are based on the various mechanisms used to access an 
account and do not create realistic incentives on either the customer or the 
bank to safeguard against risks in a reasonable manner. The absence of 
standard legal rules within the EFT system makes it difficult to identify the party 
that should bear the risk. Thus it is time to regulate the EFT system within one 
body of law. Although there are laws that specifically address the issues of 
fraud and other legal problems in the area of internet banking and fund 
transfers, insufficient attention has been given to remedies. In this era of high-
                                               
1
 Shinn, E. T., ‘An overview of unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfers: alternatives in reducing 
consumer liability’, (1985) 90 Commercial Law Journal 216 at p. 217; Hapgood, M., et al., 
Paget's Law of Banking, (2007), pp. 494-498. 
2
 Rusch, L. J., ‘Reimagining payment systems: allocation of risk for unauthorised payment 
inception’, (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 561 at pp. 566-567. 
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end technology, it is necessary to review and re-examine unauthorized risk 
processes within EFT transactions. It will be concluded that the present laws 
are insufficient to address all the uncertainties surrounding unauthorized EFT 
transactions. This chapter focuses on the allocation of risk in unauthorized EFT 
instructions. It does so for the following reasons: first, because for some years 
there has been heated discussion within banking as to who should bear the 
responsibility in cases of unauthorized EFT transactions. The absence of 
specific rules devoted to EFT has given rise to an important debate regarding 
the various parties’ rights, obligations and responsibilities in the EFT context, 
particularly where unauthorized transactions are involved. Secondly, because 
there is no particular regime governing EFT transactions, problems may arise 
from the fact that the bank receives the payment instruction from its customer 
via electronic devices, and in the absence of any physical meeting between the 
parties the bank may not be able to authenticate the customer’s identity and so 
cannot be certain that the payment instruction is legitimately authorized. PSR 
2009, regulation 55, sets out that the payment order will be regarded as 
authorized when the customer has given consent to carrying out the payment. 
However, the Regulation does not address the problem of verifying that the 
payment instruction issued from the rightful card holder. Furthermore, regulation 
57 enshrines the customer’s obligations in relation to payment transactions, to 
abide by the terms and conditions regarding use of the card. While regulation 
60 places the burden of proof directly onto the bank to show that the 
unauthorized transaction was authenticated and exactly recorded, and that 
there was no technical breakdown. 3  Even if the bank shows this, it is not 
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 PSR 2009, regulation 51(3)(a) establishes that when the customer is not business the parties 
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necessary sufficient to prove that the payment was authorized or that the 
customer was fraudulent or grossly negligent. Accordingly regulation 61 obliges 
the payer’s bank to refund the transaction funds when the bank made the 
payment in response to an unauthorized instruction. Nevertheless, the PSR 
2009 comes without any indication as to which party bears the losses in case of 
an authenticated but unauthorized transaction. Finally, there is a problem of 
security procedures and whether or not a bank has employed an adequate 
encrypting system to protect its customer data from any attack. 
As far as the customers are concerned, the primary basis of liability to the bank 
will be in contract, and effectively the bank stipulates the terms and conditions. 
Therefore, the banks do their best to limit and avoid liability in cases of 
unauthorized EFT transactions. Nevertheless liability could also arise in tort, 
either for the person who is not customer or for a third party such as a Trusted 
Third Party. Focussing on an examination of the PSR 2009 and common law 
principles, this chapter will argue that the existing law inadequate to address the 
parties’ obligations and liabilities for unauthorized payment. Furthermore, 
applying the law of agency leads to inconsistency and uncertainty in addressing 
the liabilities of the parties involved in an authenticated but unauthorized 
instruction. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 will explain the problem of 
unauthorized EFT instructions. Unauthorized transactions are frequently 
executed by means of fraud; therefore, the section will contain a clarification of 
the concept of fraud in commercial civil law. Section 3.3 is devoted to examining 
                                                                                                                                         
may agree that’ regulation 60 does not apply.   
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the existing law, namely agency law and contract law, with regard to the 
authentication of EFT instructions and the problem of identity authorisation. This 
section demonstrates that the existing law does not solve the difficulties of 
either the authentication of customer identity or the bank’s liability for 
authenticated but unauthorized EFT instructions. Thus, it is time to address 
these problems by determining customers’ and banks’ liabilities for the 
authentication of unauthorized transactions in a manner which would be 
acceptable to both parties. To achieve this aim, section 3.4 will examine the 
EFT parties’ liability for unauthorized EFT instructions. The chapter ends with 
the conclusion that the existing law does not present a clear and definite 
account of EFT parties’ liability for unauthorized EFT instructions. 
3.2 Unauthorized EFT instructions: identifying the problem 
There are three different times at which an unauthorized EFT instruction may be 
initiated. First of all, when the instruction is originally initiated: the best instance 
of this would be when an authenticated payment instruction is created and 
transmitted to the payer’s bank in the name of a rightful customer but by a 
person who does not have the right to issue payment order, as in the case of a 
lost or stolen payment instrument. Secondly, during the transfer procedure of a 
genuine EFT instruction, as for example when a person who has the authority 
creates an authenticated payment instruction, but a person who has no 
authority, such as the payer’s bank employee, changes the payment instruction 
details before the payment instruction is received by the payee’s bank. Thirdly, 
after receipt of the EFT instruction by the payee’s bank, for example, when an 
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authenticated EFT instruction is sent and received in the name of a rightful 
customer, but some individual, perhaps an employee of the payee’s bank, 
unlawfully changes the payment instruction details before the payment is 
executed. Unauthorized EFT instructions can in fact happen at any stage of the 
procedure. However, the most common time for an unauthorized EFT 
instruction is before or when an instruction is initiated, possibly because this is 
the most vulnerable point in the EFT procedure. However, any attempt to 
allocate losses resulting from unauthorized EFT instructions must investigate 
and provide for all possible cases in which it could happen.4 This chapter will 
investigate three different times at which an unauthorized EFT payment 
instruction may be initiated and the EFT parties’ liability for unauthorized 
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The most common form of unauthorized EFT transaction is fraud. Fraud, within 
civil purpose, has been not defined under any statutory provision and thus there 
is no common definition of fraud.5 McGrath6 asserts that deceit7 constitutes the 
nearest approximation to a claim in fraud to be found in the English civil law of 
tort. The test of fraud was laid down in Derry v Peek.8 Stirling J. held that the 
expression fraud never has been and never will be exhaustively defined, 
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 See Maduegbuna, S. O., ‘The effects of electronic banking techniques on the use of paper-
based payment mechanism in international trade’, (1994) July Journal of Business Law 388 at 
p. 359. 
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Kirk, D., Serious Fraud- A Banker’s Perspective, in Norton, J., Banks Fraud and Crime (1994), 
pp.1-4; Porter, D., ‘Insider fraud: spotting the wolf in sheep's clothing’, (2003) 4 Computer Fraud 
and Security 12 at p. 12; McGrath, P., Commercial Fraud in Civil Practice (2008), p.3; 
Goldspink, R., and Cole, J., International Commercial Fraud (2004), p. 2; Ormerod, op.cit., 
p.195. 
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because deceit occurs in many and various forms.9  In Derry v Peek, however, 
Lord Herschell held that in most cases the concept of fraud refers to dishonest 
misrepresentations. Without proof of fraud, no action of deceit was 
maintainable.10 His Lordship defined what must be proved, as follows:  
“Fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been 
made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring 
whether it be true or false. A false statement, made through carelessness 
and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence 
of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if 
made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not 
render the person making it liable to an action of deceit.” 11 
According to Derry v Peek a misrepresentation can be considered fraudulent 
only when it is made knowingly, without belief in its truth; or recklessly, 
heedlessly, without regard to whether it is true or false, 12  although, it is 
important to comprehend that mere knowledge that the statement made was 
untrue is inadequate in itself to constitute fraud. Therefore, a person can claim 
in the tort of deceit only where there is actual fraud.13 Lord Bramwell stressed 
the necessities for actual fraud. 14 Lord Bramwell held that: 
“There are various kinds of untruth. There is an absolute untruth, an 
untruth in itself, that no addition or qualification can make true ... So, as to 
knowing the truth. A man may know it, and yet it may not be present to his 
mind at the moment of speaking; or, if the fact is present to his mind, it 
may not occur to him to be of any use to mention it.”15 
Goldspink and Cole confirm that ‘English civil law has never sought to define 
the expression “Fraud”, or to provide a particular rules covering the rights and 
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remedies arising in subject of those whose acting is generally described as 
fraudulent’.16 Consequently the rules and remedies governing the civil rights are 
selected from a variety of legal sources. 17  Kirk’s definition could suitably 
encompass fraud in the environment of commercial civil law: 18  it is “the 
dishonest non-violent obtaining of some financial advantage or causing of some 
financial loss”.19 Under criminal law fraud is a combination of two factors: theft 
and deception. 20  Under civil law, however, theft is treated differently from 
fraud. 21  Within the Fraud Act 2006, deception is no longer considered a 
significant element to issue fraud.22  The Fraud Act 2006 replaced deception 
offences under sections 15 and 16 of the Theft Act 1968 by stipulate that fraud 
can be committed in three different methods: by false representation,23 by failing 
to reveal information,24 and by any action which intends to create a gain for him 
or for another; or cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.25 
The Fraud Act 2006 states that a representation may be express or implied.26 
Typically, such action would be represented by words or conduct. The Fraud 
Act 2006 explanatory notes, note 14 illustrates that there is no limitation on the 
method by which the representation may be expressed; therefore it could be by 
diverse methods including the spoken or written word.27 Whether under note 15 
a representation falling within the Fraud Act 2006 could be implicit action, such 
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as an invalid holder using the rightful holder’s card dishonestly and without 
authority.28 The Act created a new goal, that of bringing within the ambit of 
criminal law the latest methods of communication technology used to process 
internet transactions. 29  Hence, section 2(5) specifies cases where false 
representation applies to the latest methods of communication technology, for 
example chip and PIN. 30  Accordingly, in the context of EFT transactions a 
fraudulent action falls under the Fraud Act 2006, as an EFT instruction by 
electronic device involves either the transfer or receipt of funds.31  Ormerod 
argues that there is adequate protection against electronic fraud within section 2 
of the Fraud Act 2006.32  
Furthermore, subject to the offence of conspiracy of defraud the common 
definition of a conspiracy of defraud was presented in Scott v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner33 by Lord Dilhorne when he held that:  
“an agreement by two or more by dishonesty to deprive a person of 
something which is his or to which he is or would be entitled and an 
agreement by two or more by dishonesty to injure some proprietary right of 
his, suffices to constitute the offence of conspiracy to defraud.”34         
Conspiracy to defraud then has two elements; dishonesty to deprive a person of 
something which is his or to which he is or would be or might be entitled, and 
second element is to injure some proprietary right. This does not require the 
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 Ormerod, op.cit., p.200; Also, see Ahmad, N., ‘E-Commerce and legal issues surrounding 
credit cards: emerging issues and implications’, (2009) 15 Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review 114 at p. 120. 
33
 Scott v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1975] A.C. 819.    
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defendants' actions to directly result in the fraud. In R v Hollinshead,35  the 
House of Lords held that creating devices designed to alter electricity meter 
readings constituted conspiracy to defraud, even though the actual fraud would 
be executed by members of the public rather than the conspirators. In these 
positions, it is not necessary for the actions to lead directly to loss for the injury 
party; these are when the conspirators plan to deceive a person holding public 
office into acting counter to their duties, and when the conspirators know that 
their actions put the injury party’s property at risk, even if the risk never 
materialises.36 
Furthermore, subject to the offence of conspiracy of defraud, section 1(1) of 
Criminal Law Act 1977 states that: 
“… if a person agrees with any other person or persons that a of course of 
conduct shall be pursued which will necessarily amount to or involve the 
commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the 
agreement if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their 
intentions, he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in 
question. 
This section does not affect the common law offence of conspiracy so far as it 
relates to conspiracy to defraud. Although, in Wai Yu-Tsang v R37 a conspiracy 
to defraud is ‘not limited to the idea of economic loss, nor the idea of depriving 
someone of something of value. It extends generally to the purpose of fraud and 
deceit... if anyone… be prejudiced in any way… that is enough’.38 In this regard, 
it is not necessary for the crime to be completed, only some part of it, deception 
                                               
35
 R. v Hollinshead [1985] A.C. 975.  
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is not a necessary element because ‘the crime is complete where the intention 
is to cause the victim economic loss by dishonest means’.39         
In the EFT context, fraud means an unauthorized payment instruction which 
happens whenever the payment instruction is unlawfully created or changed by 
a person who has no right to do so in order to debit the payer’s account. 
Generally, fraud in the context of EFT can occur in two ways, either offline or 
online.40 Transactions such as those when the fraudulent person is face to face 
with the seller are known as offline fraud because they do not involve the use of 
the internet. Online fraud by definition occurs via the internet.41 In the case of 
offline purchases, the payee (seller) should be able to verify the payer’s identity 
since the transaction takes place with the payer face to face, while, in online 
transactions such verification, even with the use of security procedures is not 
easy and may be impossible. Consequently, the fraudster has an opportunity to 
use an unauthorized instrument with the rightful holder’s information in order to 
make transactions. Methods of perpetrating fraud have become more diverse 
as technology has become more sophisticated. As a result, banks choose from 
a variety of security procedures and rules to protect against the risk of fraud or 
forgery and these are included in the terms and conditions of the agreement 
between the bank and the customer.42 
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3.3 The basic schemes: authentication of EFT instructions 
An authority can be divided into two types, actual and apparent. Actual authority 
may be explicit or implicit. 43  It is explicit when the principal, the customer, 
expressly confers upon the agent, the bank, an authority to do something for 
and on behalf of him. Implicit authority is when it is inferred from the parties’ 
words and conduct that the agent has such power. 44  While, apparent or 
ostensible authority arises where a customer (the principal) deliberately or 
through want of ordinary care causes or allows a third person to believe that he 
is bound by the acts of another person (the agent).45 The principal only creates 
an inference that an agent has authority to act on his behalf even though no 
authority exists in fact.46 This is well illustrated by Lord Denning M.R. in Hely-
Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd:47 
“It is there shown that actual authority may be express or implied. It is 
express when it is given by express words, such as when boards of 
directors pass a resolution which authorises two of their number to sign 
cheques. It is implied when it is inferred from the conduct of the parties 
and the circumstances of the case, such as when the board of directors 
appoints one of their number to be managing director. They thereby 
impliedly authorise him to do all such things as fall within the usual scope 
of that office…. Ostensible or apparent authority is the authority of an 
agent as it appears to others.”48 
Actual or apparent authority of an agent governed by agency law and this 
governance is of essential importance in the context of unauthorized EFTs 
because the norms of agency law apply to determine whether or not an EFT 
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instruction is authorized. However, the application of the norms of agency law 
raises the issue of identity authentication and also the issue of whether the EFT 
instruction is an authorized one.49  
3.3.1 The existing law to authenticate EFT instruction and the 
problem of identity authorization 
The PSR 2009 rules that an authorization of payment instruction must be used 
in accordance with the personalised security features of the payment instrument 
agreed between the parties,50 for example, chip and PIN. Existing law deals 
with authorization solely in the context of the payer’s express approval,51 which 
is clearly compulsory. Such approval may be given before the bank executes 
the instruction, or after the execution of the payment instruction if this is agreed 
between the parties. 52  Such approval must be given ‘in the form, and in 
accordance with, the procedure agreed between the payer and the bank’.53 
Only express approval is dealt with here and the law seems quite unhelpful in 
defining situations where the customer might be taken implicitly to have 
authorized a transaction. Thus, there should be clarification of the point at which 
the law accepts implicit approval for the execution of EFT instructions, for 
example, a cardholder voluntarily gave the card and the security procedures to 
a friend or relative. Geva argues that: ‘The reference to an agreement, as well 
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as a procedure, weakens the possibility of an implied authority and may be read 
to eliminate altogether the possibility of an apparent authority’.54  
Another flaw that may be held against regulation 55 of the PSR 2009 is that 
there is nothing to indicate that the payee’s authorization has been given to his 
bank for executing a debit transfer from the payer’s account. Thus, the norms of 
agency common law need to be applied to determine whether or not the EFT 
instruction is an authorized one. 
It is argued55 that the legal nature of funds transfer is only a mandate passed 
from the customer to the bank to transfer or collect the transaction funds. 
Thereby, the general rules of agency law apply to EFT transitions and, banks 
act as agents to their customers, and thus the banks are bound to execute their 
customers’ mandate.56 The mandate is an authority from the customer to his 
bank.57 Thus as long as the bank has the customer’s authority to pay a cheque, 
it is entitled to debt the customer’s account. 58  Geva stated that in EFT 
transactions, an unauthorized instruction ‘must initiated from someone who 
either presumed control of the access device illegally, or bypassed the access 
device altogether. Such a person may be one of the customer’s member family, 
the customer’s employee or associate, or a total stranger’.59 In contrary, an 
authorized EFT instruction is a mandate created the customer or by a person 
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authorized by the customer to issue a payment instruction. The authority of an 
EFT instruction can only be examined with regard to procedures agreed 
between the customer and the bank.60 Accordingly, the bank has no right to 
debit its customer’s account due to an unauthorized EFT instruction or outside 
the limitation of the customer mandate.61 
Given the above position, it seems that applying the rules of mandate does not 
give the bank the required protection. Therefore, the bank will be reluctant to 
carry out the payment instruction entirely or may choose not to carry out it at 
high speed or at a low cost. The reason for such reluctance is that due to the 
electronic access to issue EFT instruction it is difficult for the bank to determine 
its customer’s identity or to verify that the person who issues the instruction is 
the customer himself or someone entitled by the customer’s actual or apparent 
authority. Therefore, the significant issue in identity authentication is that of 
identifying the person who passed the mandate and ensuring that he is 
authorized to do so. If the bank is assured of that identity it will be free from the 
responsibility for a forged or unauthorized payment instruction. There is 
therefore an important relationship between the mandate and identity 
authentication in settling payments. If the bank debits a customer’s account with 
settlement of a cheque that he did not sign, the bank has no right to such a 
debit and has to credit its customer’s account with the money charged.62 The 
author’s view is that applying the agency law rules to EFT leads to the 
conclusion that authenticated EFT instruction is authorized only when issued by 
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a person who has the authority to do so. Consequently, an authenticated EFT 
instruction initiated by a person who has no authority to do so is an 
unauthorized instruction, and the bank has no right to debit its customer’s 
account. Taking into consideration that a bank has the right to debit its 
customer’s account when the customer has given his implied authority to 
another person such as a friend or relative to withdraw funds from his account. 
Thus, if the unauthorized transaction takes place due to the implied authority 
the bank bears no liability to its customer. Furthermore, when the customer 
acted fraudulently or negligence the bank bears no liability to the customer. 
Therefore, within agency law the payer’s bank’s liability for authenticated but 
unauthorized payment instruction is unclear and unpredictable.  
Eventually, however, an unauthorized EFT came to be viewed as analogous to 
a forged or unauthorized cheque.63 Pennington reasoned that if a bank debits 
its customer’s account in accordance with an unauthorized payment instruction, 
the legal consequences would be as if the bank had honoured a forged or 
unauthorized cheque.64 The legal position of a bank in the case of a forged and 
unauthorized cheque is described in section 24 of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1882 which states:  
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a signature on a bill is forged 
or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose signature it 
purports to be, the forged or unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative, 
and no right to retain the bill or to give a discharge therefore or to enforce 
payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired through or 
under that signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to retain or 
enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the forgery or want 
of authority.  
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Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the ratification of an 
unauthorised signature not amounting to a forgery.” 
This section explicitly confirms that the holder of a bill with a forged or 
unauthorized signature has absolutely no rights against the bank. Furthermore, 
in the case of a forged cheque paid by the bank, the inference is that the bank 
is acting without its customer’s mandate and is not authorized to debit the 
customer’s account.65 Accordingly, the bank is liable to the customer if it makes 
a payment outside the limits of his mandate, and the customer may sue it for 
damages.66 In view of this, in the context of EFT transactions, if the bank debits 
its customer’s account according to an unauthorized instruction it is the bank’s 
responsibility to re-credit the customer account with the funds that had been 
debited due to the unauthorized instruction. 67  Regards to EFT, it is not 
reasonable to draw an analogy between the rules applicable to an unauthorized 
cheque and those which apply to electronic payment; that it is because EFT 
systems involve different technology issues, to which the application of the 
current law will not bring resolution of the problems. For example, EFT by any 
electronic device must be authenticated by using electronic security procedures. 
This raises the issue of identity authentication and in the context of EFT the 
situation is not comparable with that of an unauthorized cheque. Smart68 argues 
such point by states: ‘the optimist may suggest that there is nothing basically 
new in EFT; it is only a new method of charge. Therefore, any legal issue could 
be solved by analogy with existing law. Certainly the cheque, which binds the 
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bank only when it agrees to pay the cheque and which presents the unpaid 
payee with a right of action against the payer, is an uncertain basis for 
analogy’. 69  Furthermore, Geva argues that the bank’s duty to disclose and 
prevent unauthorized EFT payments depend on the security procedures used, 
thus it differs from a method to another.70 Geva has also elucidated that in the 
case of a forged manual signature the bank is obliged to verify and detect the 
manual signature on each cheque to ensure that the cheque is authenticated.71 
By contrast, in an EFT the bank is obliged to examine the instruction by means 
of its automated security procedure. 72  It is arguable that the hand-written 
individual signature determines the person who has signed the cheque, 73 
whereas the electronic security procedures for authenticating the payment 
instruction do not identify the person who issues that instruction.74 Therefore, 
the existing law does not solve issues relating to unauthorized EFT transaction, 
particular the issue of an authenticated but unauthorized EFT instruction. Thus, 
any an analogy results in unpredictability and lack of clarity with regard to the 
parties’ liabilities in cases involving authenticated but unauthorized EFT.  
Generally speaking, the customer’s instruction is binding upon him as its lawful 
issuer if it was initiated by him or with his express or implied authority and the 
bank which has executed its customer’s EFT instruction after it has passed the 
test of rightful authentication is allowed to pass the payment by debiting the 
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customer account.75 Furthermore, if the customer acted fraudulently the bank 
has the right to debit its customer’s account.  In this context, it is important to 
examine whether authentication by means of various “security procedures” is 
regulated by particular legislation dealing with the authentication of EFT 
instructions in ways similar to that of mutual signature. To examine this issue, 
the different forms of authentication procedure need to be explained separately 
and in detail in order for it to be decided whether the law recognises them as 
means of authentication. Accordingly, the next sections will examine the types 
of authentication procedure, such as passwords, user names, digital signatures 
and Trusted Third Parties (TTP), to ascertain whether they have legitimacy in 
English law. The legal aspects of authentication procedures will be examined in 
order to discover the extent to which they affect EFT parties in cases of 
authenticated but unauthorized EFT instruction. The following sections will 
express the conclusion that the authentication procedures under English law 
have legal legitimacy as evidence. Authentication is nevertheless defined with 
reference to the ability of the bank to use any security procedure to verify the 
authorization by means of a payment device. 76  It is the customer’s duty to 
inform his bank ‘without undue delay’ upon becoming aware of the unauthorized 
payment. However, the delay can never exceed 13 months from the date when 
the payer’s account was debited with the payment.77 Although, in the case of 
business customers the parties (bank-customer) may agree that a different time 
period applies. 78  However, it is the bank’s duty to prove that the payment 
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instruction was authenticated in cases where the customer denies 
authenticating the payment instruction. 79  If the bank reports that the 
authentication used the lawful security procedure, this is not in itself necessarily 
sufficient to indicate or prove the payment was authorized by the lawful 
customer.80 Therefore, except when the payer’s bank proves that the payer 
authorized the payment order, it should refund the amount of the payment. The 
legal validity of authentication procedures and their consequence for the EFT 
parties in cases of authenticated but not authorized EFT instruction is not 
regulated by specific legal norms and such absence leaves the parties with the 
right to regulate their agreement. This absence also allows the banks to protect 
themselves by establishing terms by which they bear no liability for 
authenticated but unauthorized EFT instructions carried out by a third party. 
3.3.2 Authentication procedures: functions, forms and validity 
One method of authentication in paper based settlement transactions is the 
signature. Guest81 defined a signature in this context as; ‘the writing of a person 
by his hand on a receipt or piece of paper to authenticate the payment order 
transaction’. With regard to EFT transactions, authentication methods have 
been changed by the use of electronic keys.82 The customer uses a user name 
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and password to execute the electronic mandate and transmit it to his bank.83 
Initiating the payment order in correct user name and password means the 
payment order is authenticated, and received by the customer’s bank via an 
electronic access key, irrespective of whether the person who issues the 
instruction is authorized to do so or not. Authenticating the payment order is 
done by security procedures employed by the bank.84 In practice banks employ 
different types of security procedure, for example, passwords, user names, 
electronic signatures and TTP, all of which will be examined in this section.  
On-line transactions raise difficulties for banks: they need to ascertain the 
identity of their customers and to ensure that the person who sends the 
mandate is entitled to do so by the customer himself or his actual or apparent 
authority. Therefore the verification of personal identity is of the greatest 
importance. Once the identity of the customer is authenticated the bank will no 
longer be responsible in cases of forged or unauthorized payment order. The 
functions of the authentication procedure are: firstly, to ensure the identity of the 
customer who issued the payment instruction; 85  secondly, to ensure that 
customer data are not accessible to persons other than the rightful holder; and 
thirdly, to use the security procedure agreed between the bank and customer as 
a non-repudiation measure, preventing the customer from denying the 
execution of the instruction.86  
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Before clarifying the different forms of authentication procedures involved with 
on-line EFT, it would be appropriate to start with the general meaning of 
encryption technique. Encryption technique is defined as: “the process of using 
an algorithm, a mathematical rule, to translate a given message into a jumbled 
form which is then unreadable by anyone who does not have the correct 
mathematical rule to translate the message back into its original form.”87 An 
encryption technique exists in two different forms: a symmetrical key and public 
key encryption. With a symmetrical key code the data is encrypted and broken 
with the same key.88 The deliverer encrypts the data before delivering it to the 
receiver and thus the data becomes unreadable. The key that encrypted the 
data must also be used for the decryption in order for the data to be readable. 
The receiver who wants to break through this data must have the same key. 
The best instance of the symmetrical key using is between banks in the SWIFT 
system. Robertson et al.89 argue that the best environment for a symmetrical 
encryption key is one where the number of users is relatively limited and where 
users can rely on each other to keep the shared key secure. Nevertheless, the 
data is coded and broken with the same key, which makes the symmetrical 
encryption key more vulnerable to being hacked and revealed.90 For that reason 
a new encryption system, known as public key encryption, has been 
established. 
The function of public key encryption is to protect customers’ data and solve the 
problem involved in the use of the symmetrical key. Public key encryption 
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requires a pair of keys; two uniquely related cryptographic keys, one public and 
one private.91  The public key is made available to everyone via a publicly 
accessible repository or directory. The use of the private key, however, must be 
restricted to its owner. The purpose of the private key is to encrypt data which is 
known to the owner alone, whereas the purpose of the public key is to decrypt 
data which is known to the bank.92 Public key encryption works as follows: the 
customer who keeps the private key can sign the payment instruction and 
encrypt the data with the private key and send it to the bank, which can decrypt 
the data with the public key.93 Where the public key can decrypt the data, the 
data is verified and sent to the customer, who has the private key. Normally the 
private key (chip) is saved on the customer’s smart card. The customer allows 
access to the private key by entering a password or PIN. 94  Public key 
encryption is considered more difficult and less vulnerable to attack than the 
symmetrical encryption key because different keys are used to encrypt and 
decrypt the same data.95  
Azzouni has elucidated the legal problems related to internet banking, for 
instance fraud, forgery and security procedures. Moreover, the responsibility of 
the parties in an EFT has been left unresolved.96 He has correctly argued that 
the reason for this unsatisfactory situation is that when the current laws 
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regarding special contracts, agency, and forged cheques are applied to internet 
banking there is ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to liability in cases of 
unauthorized transaction orders. 97 Azzouni explained the situation as follows: 
“The discussion of the different types of services, security, privacy and 
other legal issues, reveals that there are still many uncertainties regarding 
most aspects of online banking. The diversity in interpreting legal 
provisions and the different decisions held in cases with identical facts is 
another example of the incapability of the traditional law to lead with the 
distinct nature of the internet. Furthermore, in the absence of regulations 
dealing with specific issues of internet banking, such as liability, banks 
draw these rules trying to achieve the minimum liability in cases of system 
malfunctions and fraudulent transactions. Additionally, the diversity of rules 
between the different countries is an obstacle to the development of 
internet banking.”98 
Within the PSR 2009, authentication has been defined by reference to the type 
of payment instrument and the methods employed for the verification of its 
use.99 However, PSR fails to determine and resolve the problem of identity 
authentication. Differing solutions to the problems of security procedures have 
been suggested. The standard forms of security procedure for authenticating 
the EFT instruction and verifying the customer’s identity are chip and PIN, 
although there is nothing to prevent the EFT transaction parties from agreeing 
to other methods, for example, electronic signatures or TTP. 
Passwords and user names as a security procedure in electronic payments are 
common to all banks due to their low cost and ease of use. 100  However, 
regarding passwords and user names in machines there are two weaknesses: 
                                               
97
 Azzouni, op.cit., p. 362. 
98
 Ibid. 
99
 Regulation 60(2): “authenticated means the use of any procedure by which a payment service 
provider is able to verify the use of a specific payment instrument, including its personalized 
security features.”. 
100
 Azzouni, op.cit., p. 354; Geva, Consumer liability in unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfers, 
op.cit., p. 224. 
110 
 
first, they are issued only for existing authentication101 and secondly, they are 
insecure.102 Passwords as a security procedure are therefore always combined 
with a form of identity authentication or with a payment transaction 
authentication. 103  Banks are encouraged by the UKPA to use multi-factor 
authentication security in internet banking. 104  Thus, since 2006 multi-factor 
authentication security has become standard in banks. Standard multi-factor 
authentication security in internet banking will comprise a small instrument 
namely, a PIN and device.105 At the beginning of 2013 the Payment Council106 
announced that if a customer has difficulties in printing a PIN, he or she has the 
right to request from the bank to use the multi-factor authentication security 
method in internet banking, the chip and signature card. The multi-factor 
authentication of security, namely chip and signature cards, can be used by a 
person who has dexterity issues, visual impairment, memory problems or 
mobility issues which make it hard to use a PIN terminal. 107  Using multi-
authentication security devices does not represent a final solution to the 
problem of unauthorized transactions, although it makes unauthorized 
instructions more difficult.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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Passwords and user names are methods for authenticating payment 
instructions. However, the weaknesses in these methods and the sophistication 
of electronic banking through funds transfer systems causes the banks to be 
always in search of new security methods equal to the latest technological 
developments. 108  Accordingly, the electronic signature 109  and the TTP have 
emerged as security procedures for verifying the identity of the customer and 
also as means of authenticating payment instructions. 
3.3.2.1. Electronic signature 
An electronic signature (e-signature hereafter) is defined by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Electronic Signatures 2001 as: ‘data in an electronic form in, 
affixed to or logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to 
identify the signatory in relation to the data message and indicate the 
signatory’s approval of information contained in the data message.’110  
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures assumes that if the 
signature issues data it is uniquely connected to the customer. E-signatures are 
defined by Spyrelli as “computer-based personal identities”. 111  There are 
various ways to exercise an e-signature, such as an electronic sound, (a 
person's voice), a symbol, (a pictorial representation of a person in a JPEG file) 
and a process, (a procedure that conveys assent), attached to or logically 
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associated with a record.112 Any of these forms could be adopted by a customer 
with the intention to sign the record. An e-signature is not difficult to execute as 
long as something as easy as a typed name can serve as one. 113  Digital 
signature 114  is considered to be the most common form of e-signature. 115 
Mason and Bromby116 argue that an e-signature is a generic term which refers 
to all methods of e-signature, such as the PIN, the words ‘I accept’, and the 
writing of the personal name in an email. Digital signatures have three 
functions: first, to authenticate the payment instruction by identifying the person 
who issued the instruction; secondly, to protect the customer’s data from any 
attack; and thirdly, to prove that the transaction is authorized by the lawful 
person.117 Angel has elucidated these functions, as follows: 
“1. Authentication – to authenticate the identity of the person who signed 
the data so it is known who participated in the transaction.  
2. Integrity – to protect the integrity of the data so it is possible to know the 
message read has not been change, either accidentally or maliciously.  
3. Non-repudiation, to allow it to be proved later who participated in a 
transaction so that it cannot be denied who sent or received the data.”118 
A digital signature is like a ‘classical paper-based signing’ but it is one ‘which 
takes the concept of a personal signer and turns it into an electronic device.119 It 
exists in two forms: the symmetrical key and public key encryption,120 which is 
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based on an encryption technique.121 As explained above, with a symmetrical 
key the data is encrypted and broken with the same key. The electronic device 
is private to both the document and the signer and binds both of them 
together.122 Digital signatures ascertain the authenticity of the signer. Thus, any 
alteration made to the document after it is signed means an unauthorized 
person has altered the signature. Digital signatures moreover protect against 
illegal signatures and information changes.123 More recently, SWIFT establishes 
a multi-bank personal digital identity solution known as 3SKey. The solution, 
usable on the SWIFT network but also on proprietary networks or the internet, 
allows corporate user to sign financial messages and files sent to their banks, 
using a single signing device. It also offers banks a cost-effective way to 
implement secure authentication in electronic banking services by using a 
shared, reliable and trusted public key infrastructure, which guarantees to both 
banks and customers that their transactions are authentic, unchanged and 
legally binding. 3SKey digital signatures ensure that the data is coming from the 
attributed corporate user, that the content has not been changed after the 
approval process and presents a proof of signature.124 
Nonetheless, whichever method is employed an e-signature is insufficient to 
solve the problem of identification.125 This can be demonstrated by asking the 
question: how can a bank be certain that the security procedures used by the 
person belong to the person who has the authority to make EFT transaction, 
since the security procedure has no intimate relationship with any one. The 
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answer is that there is no guarantee that the security procedure emanates from 
the person who has the authority to do so. These types of security procedures 
do not solve all the problems relating to unauthorized EFT instructions. It 
appears then, that an e-signature is not the solution with regard to maintaining 
tight security, as there is nothing to prevent a person from typing another 
person's name. Therefore, this solution does not represent an advance in 
security and is to be considered an insecure way of signing documentation. In 
addition, it is not the best method for preventing unauthorized transactions 
because it cannot reliably prove any connection between the e-signature and 
the person who has the authority to prove the customer’s identity. Moreover, 
Robertson et al 126 consider that an e-signature does not fill the gap when a 
third party in some legal cases needs to decrypt the security device and access 
encrypted data, such as in cases involving the prevention of money laundering. 
A number of legal authors127 have argued that the Trusted Third Party (TTP), or 
alternatively the Certification Authorities (CA), is the best method to amend this 
shortcoming and ensure that the security procedure belongs to the authorized 
person. However, Robertson et al note that ‘the British Government has refused 
the option of imposing mandatory deposit of private keys because of concerns 
about the civil liberty implications’.128 Nevertheless, the TTP could be used by a 
bank on a voluntary basis. The question which remains, however, is whether 
the TTP can fill the security gap and help to determine the identity of the person 
who uses the security procedures to send the payment instruction.  
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3.3.2.2 The Trusted Third Party 
TTP acts as a depositary for both public and private encryption keys. For 
instance, where a first participant uses his or her private key to link with another 
participant while not knowing the public key, the first participant can request that 
key from a TTP. Also, in cases of a private key, a legal user can request such a 
key from the TTP, for example in case of the death of the owner. There is a 
similarity between the operation of the TTP and a notary in civil law 
jurisdictions.129 The notary has to guarantee that a particular user has signed a 
document, after ensuring his or her identity by comparing the information with 
some other form of official identity, such as a passport.130 Instead of depending 
on the e-signature to check a person’s identity, the TTP has the right to request 
from the person another form of security procedure to ensure a user’s identity. 
For example, the TTP may ask the user to bring a certificate which is an 
attestation from the notary guaranteeing the authenticity of the personal details 
provided. Relying on this certificate, the TTP issues an electronic certificate 
confirming that a specific firm owns particular public and private keys.131 Such 
electronic certification is authenticated by the TTP to authorize the use of a 
private key.132 The bank supplying the EFT service could be the TTP which 
issued the certificate and the certificate of authority is presented to ensure that 
the digital signature belongs to the rightful holder. 
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Indisputably, the user passes a payment instruction to the bank in the form of a: 
a digital signature and the certificate transferred to the bank. Before passing the 
payment instruction, the TTP will check the digital signature and the certificate 
to guarantee that such an instruction has been executed by the rightful 
person.133 Even so, such use does not prove that the lawful person issued the 
instruction. The user’s private key is an electronic file which could be used and 
copied by hackers on the internet. It seems that the TTP is not the best solution 
to fill the security gap regarding a customer’s identity. This being the case, the 
question of which party will bear the losses in cases of authentication of an 
unauthorized EFT instruction remains unanswered. Since the common law of 
contract applies to the EFT relationship between the bank and the customer in 
the context of unauthorized EFT, banks in their agreements avoid liability for 
authenticated but unauthorized payment instructions in explicit conditions and 
terms. 134  Nevertheless, the exclusion of liability could be subject to an 
evaluation under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 when the term is 
“unreasonable” and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
when the term is “unfair”.135 The banks have the right to include their contracts 
with the customers term to exclude liability, but only if this term is deemed 
reasonable and fair.136  Thus, it is time to give attention to this problem by 
                                               
133
 Wang, op.cit., pp. 32-33. 
134
 For example, see Lloyds TSB, Personal Banking terms and conditions 2012, section 8.4 
http://www.lloydstsb.com/media/lloydstsb2004/pdfs/personal_banking_terms_and_conditions.pd
f; HSBC, General Terms and Conditions, Current Account Terms and Conditions 2012, section 
9 http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/PA_esf-ca-app- 
content/content/uk/pdfs/en/General_Current_Accounts_Aprl1.pdf; Barclays, Customer 
Agreement 2012, section 
11http://www.barclays.co.uk/ImportantInformation/TermsandConditions/P1242575350746 13 
February 2013. 
135
 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2083). 
136
 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Schedule 2.  
117 
 
determining customers’ and banks’ liabilities for the authentication of 
unauthorized transactions and for both to agree with regard to their liabilities. 
  3.3.2.3 The legal validity and recognition of electronic signatures as 
a signature  
The forms of security procedure are still not regulated by particular statutory 
instruments relating to EFTs. Such an absence is understandable given the 
rapid pace of technological change. From time to time new security procedures 
are created and so it is not easy to establish particular legal provisions to deal 
with particular items of security procedure. Nevertheless, this absence of 
statutory instruments leads to the problem of determining the legal validity of an 
encryption device. The use of a lawful security procedure is not sufficient 
grounds for considering the instruction to have been authorized.137 Accordingly, 
a security procedure could be regarded as good evidence that the lawful 
customer authorized the transaction without such evidence affecting the parties’ 
liability in the EFT transaction, which is the same as their liability when the 
payment instruction is in the form of a handwritten signature.  
Under UK law there are two kinds of legislation governing the validity of security 
procedures: the Electronic Communications Act 2000 and the Electronic 
Signatures Regulations 2002.138  Both laws regulate the legal validity of the 
security procedures, 139  irrespective of the kind of transaction the security 
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procedures are used for. Therefore, security procedures such as passwords, 
electronic signatures and TTP are legal and admissible in the context of EFT. 
Indeed, section 7(1) of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 provides that 
an electronic signature, and the certification by a third party of such a signature, 
are each acceptable in evidence and also in proving the authenticity of the 
communication of data and the integrity of the communication of data. 
Nevertheless, the Electronic Communications Act 2000 comes without any 
indication to the legal effect of electronic signatures,140 therefore, the courts will 
have the final decision and such decision will be in accordance with the 
particular circumstances, including such factors as evidential value, 141  for 
example, whether an electronic signature fulfils the legal requirements to qualify 
as a signature within specific regulatory contexts, and the relationship between 
the parties: the signatory, the certification service-providers and the relying 
party.142 The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 establish liability of the 
certification service-providers for any damage or losses when the customer is 
proved to have taken all the reasonable steps and there is no negligence in his 
act.143 The Regulations 2002, however, came without any indication as to the 
liability of TTPs who decided not to provide certificates; therefore, it is the 
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courts’ duty to determine the liability of such providers under common law 
rules.144  
In the UK, there is no statutory definition for the signature which might assist in 
providing a decision as to whether or not electronic signatures and passwords 
are to be considered as signatures in the traditional sense.145 Case law has 
drawn analogies between handwritten signatures and other types of 
authentication.146 The “function approach” and the “form approach” are the two 
approaches adopted to determine the legitimacy and efficacy of a signature.147 
The “form approach” is used to define whether the signature is in the requested 
form, for instance, the initials of the person’s name or his surname.148 The 
“function approach”, on the other hand, is used to define the function of a 
signature by examining its purpose and comparing it with other techniques 
which may be said it performs similar functions. According to the ““function 
approach” it may result that any type of signature or technique fulfilling the 
same function is considered to be a signature. Robertson et al have stated as 
follows:149 
“If a functional approach is taken to what constitutes a signature there are 
strong arguments for recognising electronic signatures as true equivalents 
for all legal purposes: an electronic signature created using the more 
sophisticated techniques discussed above [symmetrical key encryption 
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and public key encryption]150 is much more difficult to forge and, in that 
sense, more reliable a proof of identity than a handwritten signature.”151 
Thus, the e-signature is legal if it achieves the functions of a signature, 
regardless of the form it takes.152 The English courts have adopted the “function 
approach”,153  and recognise e-signatures as the legal equivalent of manual 
signature. 154  Before 2006 the English courts identified the e-signature by 
drawing an analogy between it and the manual signature,155 which held that the 
legal position of the e-signature was equivalent to the manual signature. But 
after 2006 such a view was challenged by two cases and the English’s courts 
held that e-signatures are legal and equivalent to the manual signature. In 
Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta,156 the issue was, first, whether an email sent 
from the defendant’s e-mail account, on his orders, constituted as equivalent to 
a note or memorandum of an alleged guarantee to meet section 4 of the Statute 
of Frauds 1677157 and, secondly, whether the presence of the defendant's e-
mail name find on the copy of the e-mail constituted an adequate signature for 
the purpose of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677. The court held that a 
person could attach a signature sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds 1677 by any combination such as letters and numbers, 
providing always that whatever was used was inserted into the document in 
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order to give, and with the intention of giving, authenticity to it. Thus, regardless 
of the method and the form used, the most important factor was the intention.158 
On this ground, where the deliverer’s name was only automatically attached to 
the delivered document by the e-mail system, the significant element of 
purpose, that of authenticating the content of the email, was absent, and 
therefore the requirements of the Statute of Frauds 1677 were not met. The 
second case was Orton v Collins,159 which raised the following issue: whether 
writing the sender’s name at the end of an e-mail was enough to meet the 
requirement of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) 160  in constituting a 
signature. It is logical for the email receiver to presume that the name written 
was added intentionally; provided that the e-mail has no programs which can 
automatically write the name at the end of the letter. It follows that the courts 
have a duty to investigate whether the email system was programmed to add 
the name automatically in order to decide which authorities apply to the case in 
question. 
It has been proposed that the current difficulty in defining electronic negotiable 
instruments such as bills of exchange is the requirement for writing rather than 
the requirement for a signature.161 Writing has been defined within Schedule 1 
of the Interpretation Act 1978 as containing: “typing, printing, lithography, 
photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in a visible 
form”. Bainbridge162  argues that the detail saved in an electronic form is a 
document. Furthermore, an electronic record of computer data is unobservable 
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unless made so by a computer process upon it, such as print on paper.163 
Thereby applying the Interpretation Act 1978 definition to an electronic record 
requires the additional gloss of: capable of being made visible. 164  Riefa 165 
agrees with O’Connor and Brownsdon 166  that digital signatures are now 
removed from the normal methods of signature, and examples range from 
writing a name to the more sophisticated biometric techniques such as 
fingerprint scanning.  
Finally, given the situation described above, it seems that there is flexibility in 
the existing law: any security procedures used by the customer could be 
acceptable in evidence regarding the authenticity and integrity of the 
communication or data.167 Therefore, there is no need for legislation to establish 
emails and internet website pages as writing as defined by English Law.168 On 
this basis, the author’s view is that the security procedures under English law 
are legal. 169 However, even with the legal validity of security procedures used 
to authenticate the payment instruction, the problem of identity authentication 
and its legal impacts on the customer’s and the bank’s liabilities for 
authenticated but unauthorized EFT instructions continue to leave room for 
debate and no final solution to the problem has been found. 
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3.3.2.4 Liability of Certification Authorities and E-signatures 
In practice, the lawful holder of the Certification Authority (CA) could be found in 
some cases to have used certification in an unauthorized way.170 For example, 
where there is no suitable and adequate method of verifying the identity of the 
CA’s holder171 or where there is misappropriation of an e-signature and such an 
abuse is presented for transmission by a fraudster. The question arising is: who 
bears liability for such misappropriation or fraud? Reed has observed that “the 
obligations of CAs and the extent of their liability under existing law are difficult 
to determine”.172 He adds that within English law, the CAs can only be held 
liable according to contractual liability or tortious liability. 173  There is a 
contractual relationship between the CA and the user but there is no contract 
agreement between the CA and the relying party. Further question that needs to 
be asked, however, is whether a relying party who is not party to the contract 
and sustained losses as a result of a CA negligence has the right to sue the 
CA? Regulation 4 of the Electronic Signature Regulations 2002 has determined 
the liability of certification service-providers, and determines their duty of care to 
the relying party.174  Such duty also covers the accuracy of the certification 
information. Conversely, if the issuer fails to protect the certificate by reason of 
negligence175 or defaults to cancel the certification,176 as in a case where there 
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is suspicion regarding the security of the signature, that issuer will be liable to 
the rightful holder for any loss or damage. However, under Electronic Signature 
Regulations 2002 regulation 3, it is the customer who bears the burden of proof 
that the certifier is negligent, although the issuer bears no liability if it is 
established that he acted without any negligence.  
An e-signature is not always supported by a CA, thus, in this regard the 
common law rules are still significantly involved:177 firstly, the signer may be 
responsible for applying the rules of apparent authority or estoppel, when for 
example, there is a representation or holding out on the part of the signatory, 
rather than on the part of the fraudster.178 Furthermore, it may be established 
that the signer is in breach of an obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill 
owed to the relying party if, for example, the signatory not only acted negligently 
in relation to the theft of the signature but also if there has been any 
representation made by the signatory to, or supposing the liability towards, the 
relying party.179 Robertson et al clarifies that: 
 “the party whose signature it is may be liable applying the principles of 
ostensible authority or, estoppel, or may be found to be in breach of a duty 
of care owed to the other party. The former will depend on there being a 
representation or holding out by the signatory, as opposed to by the 
fraudster. The latter will depend not only on whether the signatory was 
careless in relation to the theft of the signature but also on whether there 
has been any representation made by the signatory to, or assumption of 
responsibility towards, the relying party, which may well not be the 
case.”180   
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Nevertheless, within common law rules the party’s e-signatory has no liability for 
any misuse or unauthorized use of the signature if the party’s e-signatory has 
no duty to exercise reasonable care and skill. 181  In contrast, the party’s e-
signature liability may be included in the contracts’ terms.182 Secondly, the TTP 
who had certified the signature is subject to the rule in Hedley Byrne and Co v 
Heller and Partners.183 In this case, the defendant bank (the representor) was 
aware that the negligent misstatement, about the financial stability of one of its 
customers, would be relied upon by the claimants (the relying party), who 
wanted to know it they could safely extend credit to the bank’s customer in a 
substantial sum. In other words, the defendants had in mind reliance by the 
specific claimants, to whom the statement was made directly, for a particular 
transaction. According to Hedley Byrne and Co v Heller and Partners, a duty of 
care would be owed by the representor to the relying party if the representation 
was made intentionally to consider the representor liable to the relaying party. 
However, the representor who was negligent would be liable to the relying party 
for any monetary or personal damage caused to the relying party, but where the 
representor had expressly excluded liability for reliance on his statement no 
liability arose. Thus, the representation must have been made intentionally to 
consider the representor liable to the relaying party, even if he was negligent. 184 
To consider a TTP who had certified a signature liable under Hedley Byrne and 
Co v Heller and Partners,185 the relying party on the certificate can show both 
the existence of a duty of care and breach. This position will be applied if, for 
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example, the TTP issued or verified the certificate, upon the demand of the 
relying party, after the TTP had been given notification of cancellation, since 
there will then have been a negligent misrepresentation made straight to the 
relying party in circumstances where the relying party was intended to place 
reliance on the certificate.186 Therefore, there is no liability of the certifier who 
has not assumed any obligation towards the relying party, even if the certifier 
acted in a negligent way: for example, the relying party relies on a certificate for 
a purpose outside its stated terms, or the relying party fails to verify a certificate 
which invites him to do so and this would have disclosed that it was no longer 
valid, or the fraud was undetectable by the certifier exercising reasonable care, 
who therefore did not breach any duty by certifying the impostor’s signature.187  
It is submitted that there is apparent authority where, for instance, an employee 
may have the right to access and use the employer’s e-signature for a legal 
transaction, thereby using an e-signature without the customer’s authority, 
giving rise to the employer’s e-signatory liability.188 EFT transactions have not 
been executed, or executed in the wrong way, due to the act or failure of the 
bank or of the banks’ employees. The bank is only liable when losses or risk 
result from its employee’s fraudulent or negligent execution during the course of 
their employment.189  
It is indisputable that an e-signature can function as a representation in legal 
situations; the signer of a document has no right to deny its liability. Moreover, 
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common law rules 190  emphasise that a party who has contributed to an 
unauthorized use of an e-signature has no right to reject its liability for damages 
under tortious liability. There is a duty of care from the CA to the relying party to 
make certain the accuracy of the details in the certificate. If in default, the CA is 
to exercise a duty of care arising from liability for any losses that occur to the 
relying party. Therefore, under tortious liability any losses issuing from 
unauthorized encryption used between the transactions of the parties give rise 
to the liability of the negligent party. Robertson et al191 have argued such a 
point: 
“In the absence of contractual terms to the contrary, it would seem 
probable that the negligent party (or the party whose agent the TTP was) 
would be liable to the other party in tort for reasonably foreseeable losses, 
on the basis of breach of a duty of care (or vicarious liability for the TTP’s 
breach of such a duty)” 
Given the above position, it seems that there are no particular statutory 
provisions determining liability for a CA. However, a relying party has two 
possibilities of an action against a CA. First, based on the contractual 
relationship between the certificate authority and the relying party, a relying 
party has a cause of action resulting from any breach of the contract terms and 
conditions. Secondly, there is an action in tort on the basis that the certificate 
authorities or relying party acted in a negligent way in ascertaining the accuracy 
of the details in the certificate. Where an e-signature or encryption has been 
compromised, the consequence of such a compromise will be that a 
consumer’s payment instrument is used without authorization by a third party. In 
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such a case, unless the third party acted with the customer’s authority the 
customer will be liable to the issuer for any unauthorized transactions under the 
CCA 1974 192  or the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 
2000.193 In addition, under the PSR 2009 one of the bank’s duties, imposed by 
the Regulations 2009, is to protect the customer security procedures for a 
payment device. It also sets narrow rules on the customer’s liability for 
misuse.194  
3.4 EFT parties’ liability for unauthorized transactions 
Fraudulent, stolen cards and PINs and misuse of cards lead to unauthorized 
EFT instructions. In fraudulent payment instructions which are unauthorized 
EFT, the person who initiates the instruction is either the person who is 
authorized to initiate such an instruction or a person who is not authorized to do 
so. This person could be the customer’s employee, the bank’s employee or a 
third party.195 Nevertheless, this person could be the customer himself if he 
acted fraudulently or with fraudulent intent or with gross negligence.196  
The basis of the customer’s action against his bank for an unauthorized 
payment transaction is “founded on simple contract”,197 given that the customer-
bank relationship is a contractual relationship. Thus, if the paying bank debits its 
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customer’s account without the customer’s mandate (unauthorized payment 
order), the paying bank breaches its duty under the contract by making payment 
outside the customer’s mandate. Such a point is demonstrated in National Bank 
of Commerce v National Westminster Bank Plc,198 where the defendant debited 
the claimant’s account with £268,227.08 in respect of eight mail transfer orders, 
(MTOs), purporting to have been signed by two authorized officers of the 
claimant. The claimant alleged, but the defendant denied, that none of the 
MTOs was in fact signed by two authorized officers and that the debits were 
therefore erroneous. In determining whether the customer’s right against his 
bank depended on contract or tort, the court held that the claim for the principal 
funds is not based on an action in tort: it exists only in the agreement between 
the parties. It is, therefore, an action founded on simple contract.199 Thus, the 
customer has two claims against the bank according to this “simple contract”. 
Webster J. held: 
“The points of claim, on their face, contain, apart from the declarations, 
two sets of claims founded on contract: first, a claim to be repaid the 
principal sum in respect of which the defendant is alleged to be indebted 
to the plaintiff following a demand to repay that sum, and a similar claim in 
respect of interest on that sum; and secondly, a claim for damages for 
breach of the obligation, under the “agreement governing the account”, to 
repay each of those two sums.” 200 
By analogy, if the paying bank debited the payer’s account according to the 
unauthorized EFT the payer has the right to make a claim on the bank for a 
breach of the bank’s duty under either the creditor-debtor relationship or the 
agent-principal relationship, as explained in chapter two, and consequently the 
payer has the right to charge the paying bank for the original funds which have 
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been paid and the interest. Furthermore, the payer may be authorized to claim 
for damages, but only if that is in accordance with the account agreement.201 
Currently, with the implementation the PSR 2009, reciprocal obligations and 
liabilities for both the bank and customer in relation to unauthorized transactions 
are covered.202 Regulations 57-58 present reciprocal obligations for both the 
bank and customer in relation to payment instruments. The customer is required 
to use the payment device in accordance with the specific terms and conditions 
of the contract and to take all skill and care to protect the security payment 
device.203 Furthermore, the customer is required to inform his bank instantly on 
becoming aware of the loss, theft, misappropriation or any unauthorized use of 
the payment instrument. In turn, the bank issuing a payment instrument is under 
the following obligations:204 firstly, to protect and prevent any access to the 
security procedures of the cards, other than the customer to whom the card has 
been issued; 205  secondly, to abstain from sending an unwanted payment 
instrument other than as a replacement to a current one;206 thirdly, to guarantee 
that a suitable means is always available to enable the customer to make 
required notifications in case of loss, theft, or misappropriation of the payment 
instrument; 207  fourthly, to cancel the payment device directly after the 
notification.208 Part 6 of the PSR 2009 applies to the authorization of a payment 
instruction and establishes legal norms applying to the EFT parties’ obligations 
and liabilities. Nevertheless, the PSR 2009 provides no solution to a number of 
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problems stemming from unauthorized EFT instructions, for example, those 
relating to the duty to exercise care and skill, ambiguous EFT instructions and 
the duty to take reasonable care to prevent opportunities for fraud. Finding 
solutions to these problems is important: (1) in determining what obligations the 
customer has towards the bank and what obligations the bank has towards the 
customer; (2) in deciding whether it was the bank or the customer who 
defaulted in the performance of their duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill.209 The answer to these problems can be found in the principles of common 
law, namely, contract law and agency law.210 Thus, the common law principles 
will be examined. Accordingly, the following pages will examine the customer’s 
liability for unauthorized EFT transactions and the ambit of the bank’s liability for 
unauthorized EFT transactions under the existing law. 
3.4.1 Customer’s liability for unauthorized EFT transactions 
The customer’s liability for unauthorized payment transactions, lost or stolen 
cards, or default in protecting personalized security features of cards is 
enshrined in regulation 62 of the PSR 2009 in cases where EFT transactions 
fall within its scope. Regulation 57 enshrines the customer’s obligations in 
relation to payment transactions, to abide him by the terms and conditions 
regarding the use of the relevant payment instrument. Although, regulation 
51(3)(a) establishes that where the customer is not a consumer, a micro-
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enterprise or a charity, the parties have the right to agree not to apply regulation 
62. 
CCA 1974, sections 84 and 66 apply on cards subject to the Act 1974, for 
example, credit cards’ and charge cards’ loses. The difference between the 
CCA 1974 and the PSR 2009 is with the applications. To prevent the re-
application repetition, payment transactions covered by the CCA 1974 do not 
apply the PSR 2009, for example, card issued under credit token agreement 
applies CCA 1974. There are salient differences in the liability of cards misuse, 
as will explain. Under the PSR 2009 the customer’s liability for unauthorized 
EFT transactions addresses as follows:  
(1) The customer is liable for loss due to unauthorized transactions up to 
£50 and the card issuer bears any losses that exceed £50. It is worth 
mentioning that this narrow liability runs regardless of the customer’s mistakes 
and regardless of the customer’s lack of knowledge of the unauthorized 
transactions.211  
(2) It is the customer’s duty to inform his bank ‘without undue delay’ upon 
becoming aware of the unauthorized nature of the transaction, and the delay 
can never exceed 13 months from the date debited the customer’s account.212 
Where a customer is a business, the parties (bank-customer) may agree that a 
different time period applies.213  There is no liability of the customer if the 
losses incurred due to an unauthorized payment occur after the customer 
informs the bank, provided that not more than 13 months have elapsed since 
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the charge date.214 While under the CCA 1974, the card holder can make a 
claim of unauthorized payment at any proceeding brought within the limitation 
period, although delay in raising a challenge will undermine credibility.215 
(3) There is no liability of the customer if the losses incurred due to an 
unauthorized payment occur as a result of the bank failing to provide the 
customer with the appropriate means of notification.216  
(4) The customer is completely liable for all losses if he acted fraudulently or 
with “gross negligence” and the paying bank can prove that such was the 
case,217 and this is so even if the CCA 1974 otherwise applies.218 
Given the above position, it appears that the best interpretation of a customer’s 
liability up to £50 and his liability for unlimited losses is that the customer bears 
losses for unauthorized transactions after notification only on condition that he 
has acted in a fraudulent or grossly negligent way. The customer must inform 
his bank ‘without undue delay’ upon becoming aware of the unauthorized 
payment and this delay can never exceed 13 months from the date when the 
payer’s account was debited with the payment.219 Thus, it is debatable whether 
the customer may be considered grossly negligent when there is delay in 
informing the bank about the unauthorized transaction,220 but such a view is 
justified when the customer bears all losses previous to the notification. 221 
However, the reason behind emphasis the PSR 2009 on “gross negligence” is 
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to make the customer’s obligation noticeably lighter.222 Furthermore, regulation 
60 223  places the burden of proof directly onto the bank to show that the 
unauthorized transaction was authenticated, exactly recorded and there was no 
technical breakdown. Even if the bank does this, the PSR 2009 go on to say 
that this is insufficient to proof that the payment was authorized or the customer 
was fraudulent or grossly negligent. 224  
The customer’s liability for an unauthorized payment is determined by the 
conditions and terms of the agreement with the bank, and certainly by the 
general principles of the common law when the unauthorized payment falls 
outside the ambit of the PSR 2009. There are nevertheless a number of issues 
which need to be addressed in order to determine the customer’s liability for 
unauthorized EFT instructions.  
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Table 2: Customer’s liability for unauthorized use of payment instrument under 
PSR 2009. 
Unauthorized use Liability 
Lost or stolen payment card, or card 
misused without permission, before card 
issuer has been informed 
Up to £50 
Lost or stolen payment card, or card 
misused without permission, once card 
issuer has been informed 
No liability 
payment card misused with permission 
(broadly equivalent to fraud or failure 
with intent) 
Unlimited 
Payment card lost, stolen or misused 
because of holder’s gross negligence 
Broadly equivalent to “without 
reasonable care” – unlimited, 
unless the card was used as a 
credit token, for example, credit 
card, in which case £50 limits 
applies 
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3.4.1.1 The duty of exercising care and skill not to facilitate fraud 
To determine the customer’s liability for unauthorized EFT instructions it must 
be considered whether the customer is under a duty to take all reasonable care 
and skill towards his bank. In drawing the cheque the customer is obliged to 
execute reasonable care and skill to not to facilitate of forgery.225 For instance, 
in Young v Grote226 the court held that the customer should bear the losses of 
the cheque forged by one of his employees, since the customer took no 
reasonable care and skill in signing a blank cheque and this negligence gave a 
clerk the opportunity to fraudulently enter a sum in an empty space left on the 
cheque. Thus, in drawing the cheque the customer is obliged to execute 
reasonable care and skill, not allowing for any facilitation of forgery. 227 
Regarding the duty of care and skill, the customer has to take usual and 
reasonable care to prevent cheque forgery.228 But within EFT transactions, the 
picture is different; the payment instruction is issued and “signed” electronically. 
Accordingly, the customer’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in issuing 
and signing the payment instruction takes a different for from drawing a blank 
cheque or leaving a space for words or numbers to be added so as to alter the 
cheque amount.  
As a matter of fact, in the context of EFT, the customer’s default or negligence 
could be participatory in the issue of payment instruction, for example by 
keeping the PIN and the card in the same place, fails to inform the bank 
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instantly of unauthorized payment after receiving notification of fund transfer 
from the bank.229 However, the authorization of payment by cheque, which is 
normally done through a manual signature, is not the same as the method of 
authorizing an EFT and therefore the rules for the customer’s liability for a 
forged cheque cannot apply to the customer’s liability for EFT fraud. Also, the 
clear nature of electronic authentication is different from a manual signature.230 
Consequently, covering the rules of forged cheques to the payer and payer’s 
bank’s liability for fraudulent EFT drives to unpredictability and uncertainty in 
their liability. Geva has provided a convincing argument on this point.231 He 
confirms that apply the rules of handwritten signatures to an electronic 
authentication are fundamentally useless because the nature of electronic 
authentication is different from that of a manual signature.232  
The next issue involving the customer’s duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill is whether the customer is liable for his employees, including the exercise 
of care in the employment of personnel. According to the English cases, the 
customer’s duty to exercise care and skill towards his bank is very narrow. 233 In 
Kepitigalla Rubber Estates v National Bank of India,234 the court emphasized 
the narrow duty owed by the customer to the bank to exercise care and skill in 
the general conduct of business and in the examination and checking of pass-
books, the court held that “there is a duty to use reasonable care in issuing the 
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mandate, but no further.” 235 Furthermore the court held that ‘to afford a defence 
to the banker the breach of duty must be, as in Young v. Grote, in connection 
with the drawing of the order or cheque, and that there is no obligation between 
customer and banker that customer should take precautions in the general 
carrying on of his business or in examining and checking the pass-book.’236 
Regarding the ‘narrow duty’, the customer owed no duty to exercise care and 
skill towards his bank in the execution of business, including choice of 
employees, in order to discover or prevent forgeries. The customer’s duty of 
care and skill towards the bank exists only if there is a term in the contract 
which expressly states such a duty;237 otherwise the bank has no right to debit 
the customer’s account and it will bear any losses resulting from cheque 
forgery. 238  In London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan 239  Lord Finlay 
emphasized that the customer is under no duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill in choosing his employees: 
“Of course the negligence must be in the transaction itself, that is, in the 
manner in which the cheque is drawn. It would be no defence to the 
banker, if the forgery had been that of a clerk of a customer, that the latter 
had taken the clerk into his service without sufficient inquiry as to his 
character. Attempts have often been made to extend the principle of 
Young v Grote beyond the case of negligence in the immediate 
transaction, but they have always failed.”240  
It seems that according to the common law, such as Young v. Grote and 
London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan imposes, the customer’s duty to 
toward his bank to exercise reasonable care and skill is a narrow duty confined 
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to the conduct of banking transactions. As a result of such narrow duty, the 
customer is under no duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in carrying on 
business, including selecting employees, so as to detect or prevent forgeries;241 
secondly, the customer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
drawing the cheque in respect of writing and signing the cheque in order to 
prevent fraud.242  
By analogy, in the EFT context, regulation 62(3) of the PSR 2009, when it is 
applicable as explained above, establishes the customer’s liability for 
unauthorized payment transactions. Although, when the EFT transaction falls 
outside the ambit of the PSR 2009, there is no particular legislation governs the 
customer’s liability for EFT fraud. Therefore, the author’s view is that in the EFT 
context, the customer’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent 
fraud is a very narrow one. However, a customer is under a duty to inform his 
bank immediately once he becomes aware of the fraud.243 Otherwise he may be 
found liable for facilitating a forgery if a customer fails or delays to notify the 
bank about the fraud. A bank may plead that its customer is personally 
estopped from asserting that the bank is not entitled to debit his account.244 
Regarding to the PSR 2009 the customer is under an obligation to inform his 
bank ‘without undue delay’ upon becoming aware of the unauthorized nature of 
the transaction, and the delay can never exceed 13 months from the date when 
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the payer was debited with the payment.245 Furthermore, the customer is under 
a duty in protecting payment instruments and security procedures. Regulation 
60 of the PSR 2009 establishes that use of the agreed security procedure is not 
necessarily a sufficient ground for considering that the payment is authorized 
and that the bank has exercised its duty of care and skill to execute the 
payment instruction.246  When a customer claims not to have authorized an 
executed payment instruction it is the bank’s duty to prove that the payment 
instruction was authenticated, accurately recorded and not affected by a 
software program breakdown or some other form of inadequate security. Thus, 
PSR 2009 exist a very narrow duty of customer to exercise reasonable care and 
skill to prevent fraud. In this regard, if the instruction is amended by one of the 
customer’s employees after the rightful person has initiated the payment 
instruction it is uncertain whether the bank is authorized to debit the customer’s 
account. The author’s view is that the bank should accept the instruction and 
debit the customer’s account as long as the payment instruction is 
authenticated, irrespective of whether it is an authorized payment instruction or 
not. Moreover, the author agrees that in EFT systems it is unacceptable to 
discharge the customer from the responsibility of taking all reasonable steps of 
care in the implementation of its business of preventing the computer terminal 
and PIN from being accessed by an unauthorized person. This view could be 
justified as follows: in EFT systems, an alteration to the payment instruction 
could happen for different reasons, such as a fraudster obtaining access to the 
computer terminal as a consequence of the customer’s negligence. An EFT 
instruction could also be modified by the fraudster as a consequence of the 
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customer’s negligence in keeping a card and its PIN or password in the same 
place. In an EFT transaction, the customer transfers an electronic instruction to 
the bank and the instruction appears on a computer screen. The bank will 
examine the instruction by comparing it with the security data it already has. 
The bank thereby passes the funds from the customer’s account to the payee’s 
account as an authorized instruction as soon as the payment instruction has 
been authenticated. Geva247 argues that it is nonetheless difficult for the bank to 
determine the identity of the person who passed the instruction. Thus, if the 
payment instruction has not been transacted by the rightful person because the 
rightful person did not take all reasonable steps to protect his passwords or PIN, 
the customer would be responsible for the fraudulent EFT instruction and the 
bank would be authorized to debit the account.248  
The customer’s bank cannot debit the payer’s account on a forged mandate, 
particular if there is no breaching of the customer’s duty to the bank. If a bank 
debited its customer’s account depending on forged EFT instruction, the payer 
will be entitled to request a recredit of the account.249 In such case the payment 
is treated as made without authority. Given the above situation, it seems that 
there are insufficient norms applying specifically to EFT transactions. Ahmad 
argues this point:250 
“In the 21stcentury,...fraud is a major and global problem. By nature of its 
being global, its adverse effects are being experienced by all jurisdictions; 
however, it also impacts locally at a national level, for which we require 
legislation that tailors the remedy to the local needs.”251 
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The general principles of law applied to determining the parties’ liability for 
unauthorized EFT instructions are for the most part formulated by analogy with 
the norms governing loss allocation in cases of forged cheques.252 However, 
applying the norms of loss allocation in the case of forged cheques to the 
customer’s and the bank’s liability for unauthorized EFT transactions fails to 
provide predictability and certainty with regard to that liability.  
3.4.1.2. Checking bank statements 
The next issue relating to the customer’s duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill is whether the customer is liable for checking the bank statement. There is 
nothing under the PSR 2009, where it is applicable, referring to the obligation of 
the customer to check periodic bank statements. However, a customer seeking 
redness for an unauthorized or incorrectly executed payment transaction must 
inform his bank ‘without undue delay’ upon becoming aware of the unauthorized 
nature of the transaction, and this can never exceed 13 months from the date 
when the payer was debited with the payment, unless a different this period has 
been agreed. 253  
A bank customer does not have a general duty to check his or her bank 
statements, unless there is an express term in the banker-customer contract 
imposing such a duty on the customer.254 In Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu 
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Chong Hing Bank Ltd,255 Lord Scarman held that if banks wanted to include in 
their contracts with customers an express term imposing a duty to check 
periodic statements, such a term should specify in clear language that the 
customer must check the bank statement and inform the bank of forged 
cheques. Indeed, the bank is not authorized to debit the customer’s account on 
the basis of the forged cheques.256 His Lordship held: 
“If banks wish to impose upon their customers an express obligation to 
examine their monthly statements and to make those statements, in the 
absence of query, unchallengeable by the customer after expiry of a time 
limit, the burden of the objection and of the sanction imposed must be 
brought home to the customer.”257  
Although, it may be argued that the customer is generally in a much better 
position than the bank to check his or her bank statements and verify their 
accuracy. Therefore, it is argued that, as a matter of policy, the risk should fall 
on the customer. 258 Such view could be justified as follows: if a customer is 
under no duty to examine bank statements, then what is the purpose of sending 
a statement including detailed entries? If the aim is only to notify the customer 
of the funds standing to credit of his account, it would be adequate to send him 
periodically a statement of his balance without any detailed entries.259 Here a 
statement without any detailed entries would be meaningless, because such 
statement gives the customer no information or details about his account. It 
gives the balance. But if the customer wants a statement including detailed 
entries, then certainly the customer can be expected to examine the statement 
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with a view to discovering errors or shortfalls.260 This point is well demonstrated 
in the Supreme Court of Canada case of, Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank 
of Canada.261 In this case, Laskin J. is a disunity opinion, held that the customer 
is under a duty to examine bank statements and to report any discrepancies 
within a reasonable period.262  Indeed, in the United States of America, the 
Uniform Commercial Code, in section 4-406 imposes on the customer a duty to 
‘exercise reasonable cares in examining the statement or the items to detect 
whether any payment was not authorized and the customer must immediately 
inform the bank of the relevant facts.’ Accordingly, if the customer fails to 
examine his bank statement and the he sustains loss as a result; the customer 
has no right to recover the loss attitudes to the unauthorized. Nevertheless, this 
estoppel does not apply, if the customer proves that the bank was negligent and 
in all case this can never exceed one year from the date when the customer 
received his statement.263 
The position in English law stands in strong contrast to the position in the United 
States. In the UK, the common law submits that the customer is under no duty 
to check a bank statement unless there is a “verification clause” included in 
clear and unambiguous terms in the contract.264 Although, if a bank customer 
becomes aware that an entry made in his or her bank statement is wrong, but 
remains silent, then he or she will be estopped from asserting the error once the 
bank has changed its position. In other words, by analogy with the rules 
applying to forged cheques, if a customer fails to notify, or delay notifying, the 
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bank about a fraud, the bank can use the defence of estoppel if the customer 
then sues the bank seeking the return of the funds. This point is well illustrated 
in Greenwood v Martins Bank Ltd;265 in this case a customer discovered that his 
wife had been forging his signature on cheques drawn on his account. The 
customer was persuaded by his wife not to inform the bank about the forgeries. 
Several months later, his wife revealed that she had lied to him about the actual 
reason that she had forged his signature. Therefore, he changed his mind and 
decided to tell the bank about the forgeries. The wife then committed suicide 
and after her death he sued the bank for paying the cheques in breach of 
mandate. The bank used the defence of estoppel against the customer on the 
ground that the customer had breached his duty to notify the bank of the 
forgeries as soon as he became aware of them. The Hose of Lords held in 
favour of the bank.266             
But, the difficult issue is whether estoppel should also apply in a case where the 
customer did not have actual knowledge of the wrongful entry, but on the 
ground of any reasonable practice or common sense ought to have identified or 
suspected it. This point is well illustrated in Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc 
by Arden J.267 In this case the plaintiff company brought legal action against the 
defendant bank in respect of cheques drawn on the plaintiff’s account, the 
signatures on which were apparently forged. The bank’s defence was that the 
customer had failed to exercise its duty to notify the bank of forgeries of which it 
had constructive knowledge. In this case Arden J. considered the degree of 
knowledge and held that constructive knowledge in the sense that the customer 
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had the means of knowing of the forgery was not adequate. What is indeed is 
actual knowledge or shutting one’s eyes to an obvious means of knowledge.268 
Furthermore, in Patel v Standard Chartered Bank, 269  the court held that 
‘although a customer was under a duty to inform his bank of any fraud or 
forgery as soon as he became aware of it, which included wilful blindness, that 
duty did not include reporting fraud about which the customer as a reasonable 
person ought to have been put on inquiry. To impose a duty to inquire and 
report based on knowledge of circumstances which would cause a hypothetical 
reasonable customer to discover the existence of fraud was unsound in 
principle and inconstent with authority’. 270  Although, the borderline between 
constructive knowledge and actual knowledge, much depends on the 
circumstances of each case and it remains unclear. For example, in Morison v 
London County and Westminster Bank Ltd, 271  the court supporting the 
proposition that constructive knowledge may be sufficient to raise an estoppel. 
A further example is Brown v Westminster Bank Ltd, 272  in such case the 
customer was an old woman who could not take care of her own business. Her 
servant forged her signature on cheques drawn on her account. The bank 
called the woman several times to ask verification the cheques. Nevertheless 
the woman did not expressly examine the signature on the cheques also she 
refrained from questioning their payment. Therefore, she held to be estopped 
from denying the bank’s right to debit her account. However, Ellinger agrees 
that ‘it is to be doubted whether conduct falling short of that in Brown, which 
                                               
268
 Ibid., at pp. 348-350. 
269
 Patel v Standard Chartered Bank [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 229.  
270 Ibid.; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] A.C. 80; Price Meats Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Plc [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 346.  
271
 Morison v London County and Westminster Bank Ltd [1914] 3 KB 356, per Phillimore L.J. 
272
 Brown v Westminster Bank Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyds Report 187. 
147 
 
acted to lull the bank into a false sense of security about the cheque, will be 
sufficient to found an estoppel’.273                    
In the final analysis, to make the customer liable, the bank must prove that the 
customer has actual knowledge of unauthorized transactions, but initially did 
nothing to inform the bank of the forgery.274 In practice, banks commonly write 
into their contracts with customers a clause specifying the customer’s duty to 
examine monthly bank statements for unauthorized transactions.275 According 
to this clause, the customer is liable for unauthorized payment transactions 
taking place after the receipt of the bank statement, only if such an 
unauthorized payment could have been avoided by informing the bank. 276 
However, if such a verification clause is included in a standard for banking 
contract, it could still be open to challenge on the ground that it is 
“unreasonable” under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or “unfair” under the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999.  
When the customer’s liability to check bank statements exists, the bank is under 
an obligation to dispatch bank statements to the customer, although the 
frequency of the statements depends on the agreement made between the two 
parties concerned. In recent times various options have been established for 
obtaining bank statements. This can now be done by telephone or via the 
internet if the customer has an online account. An online statement is free but 
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some banks may charge for presenting a telephone statement on a weekly or 
monthly basis. In these cases the courts will consider that the customer is not 
negligent if he exercises ordinary care and skill to prevent fraud by checking the 
bank statements. The final question involving a bank statement is whether a 
bank statement should be treated as an “account stated” for the purpose of 
legal proceedings. Normally the argument of considered a bank statement as 
an account stated creates by the party that willing to be free from liability 
against the other. In the strict sense of the term, an account stated clarifies the 
position where an account contains items both credit and debit, and the data 
are adjusted between the parties and a balance struck.277 English courts have 
held that bank statements do not qualify as an “account stated”.278       
In conclusion, unless the contract between the customer and the bank 
establishes the customer’s duty of care, the customer owes the bank only a 
narrow duty to exercise care and skill279 not to facilitate fraud,280 protecting his 
payment instrument and security procedure, and informing his bank 
immediately once he becomes aware of the fraud. When the customer’s liability 
to check bank statements exists he is under a duty to check the bank 
statements otherwise if such duty not exist he is not. Indeed the customer is 
under no duty to his bank in the choosing and selecting of his employees. 
Finally, it is the bank’s duty to prove that the customer acted negligently of 
fraudulently when initiating the payment instruction to make a customer liable. 
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 3.4.2 The bank’s liability for unauthorized EFT Transactions  
The payer’s bank281 is obliged to execute the payer’s EFT instruction only with 
the customer’s consent.282 Within Part 6 of the PSR 2009283 the payer’s bank is 
liable to the payer for redress only when the customer informs the bank 
immediately on becoming aware of an unauthorized or wrongly executed EFT 
instruction. 284  Such notification must be no later than 13 months after the 
charge date. 285  The payer’s bank is also liable to the payer when it has 
executed a payment transaction without the payer’s authorization286 or when the 
customer has cancelled the payment instruction before it is completed.287 In 
these circumstances the bank will be liable for refunding the amount of the 
transaction. Nevertheless, the bank is under no duty to execute its customer’s 
instruction if the payment instruction was issued with an incorrect ‘unique 
identifier’. Furthermore, the bank has the right not to execute the customer’s 
payment instruction when the transaction involves “money-laundering” or any 
other financial crime.288 In these circumstances the bank bears no liability for 
any losses to the customer.  
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Table 3: Banks’ obligations and liabilities under Part 6 of the PSR 2009. 
PSR 2009 
Regulation:61 
Bank’s liability for 
unauthorised payment 
transactions 
Regulation 63: 
The payer’s right to request 
a refund from the bank 
Liability 
 
 Liability of the bank for 
losses from unauthorised 
payment transactions 
already executed 
 Refund for unauthorised 
transactions already 
executed 
 A kind of exception to the 
irrevocability principle of 
the PSR  
Conditions 
 Unauthorised transaction 
 Notification without 
undue delay  
 No fraudulent use 
 Executed and authorised 
transaction  
 Unspecified authorisation 
(transaction’s fund)  
 Unreasonable high found  
 Within eight weeks from 
the debit date 
Burden of Proof 
 Banks  
 Evidence of 
authenticated and 
accurately recorder 
transaction: regulation 
60(1) 
 Payer 
 Provide all the 
requirements: regulation 
63 
Consequences 
 Refund of the 
transaction’s fund: 
regulation 61(a), or  
 Restoration of the 
debited account of the 
former condition: 
regulation 61(b) 
Refunds of the full amount 
of the transaction: 
regulation 63(1) 
Request 
 The customer denies the 
authorisation of the 
payment instruction: 
regulation 60(1)(a)  
 Payer, within 8 weeks 
from the debit date: 
regulation 64(1)  
 Provide the requirement: 
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 The customer claims that 
the payment instruction 
executed wrongly: 
regulation 60(1)(b) 
regulation 63(1)  
 Re-request within 10 
business days: regulation 
64(5)  
 
Limits exceptions 
 £50 Liability of the payer 
until notification: 
regulation 62(1) 
 payers’ liability for all 
losses for gross 
negligence or fraudulent 
use: regulation 62(2) 
 prescription after 13 
months from the debit 
date: regulation 59  
 Refund not valid for 
currency exchange 
reasons: regulation 63(4) 
 Not valid if: 
(1) The payer has transmitted 
his consent directly to the 
bank: regulation 63(5)(a) 
(2) The payer was informed 
on the future transaction at 
least four weeks before 
the due date: regulation 
63(5)((b) 
 Exception for direct debits: 
more favorable terms for 
refunds are possible 
according to the 
framework contract: 
regulation 63(3) 
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According to the principles of common law, one of the main duties of the payer’s 
bank is to employ all reasonable care and skill in the execution of the 
customer’s EFT instruction. 289  The principles of common law apply here 
because, in determining  the bank’s liability for unauthorized EFT instructions, 
there are various issues involving the bank’s duty to exercise care and skill 
which the PSR 2009 fail to clarify. The first of these is when the customer’s EFT 
instruction is ambiguous, which raises the question of whether the bank is under 
a duty to execute such an instruction; the second issue is in respect of the 
bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent the facilitation of 
fraud. A further issue concerning the bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care 
and skill is its liability for any losses or risk resulting from its employees’ 
fraudulent or negligent execution during the course of their employment. 
Moreover, within an EFT transaction the payer’s bank might employ a 
correspondent or intermediary bank which is considered to be an agent of the 
payer’s bank. Thus, the issue is whether the bank will bear the liability of any 
risk resulting from its employment of the correspondent or intermediary bank in 
executing the EFT transaction or whether it is the customer’s liability. Yet 
another issue in regard to ‘the bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill’ 
is its duty to adopt highly sophisticated encryption systems to protect both its 
own and the customers’ interests. Such protection might consist of providing 
security and equipment sufficient to prevent any attack by hackers. The final 
finding is that the bank is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to 
                                               
289
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execute and protect the customer’s transaction.290 These issues will now be 
examined.  
3.4.2.1 Ambiguous EFT instructions 
Problems may arise when the customer’s instruction is ambiguous and the 
bank’s transaction of the payment instruction does not accord with the payer’s 
intention due to that ambiguity. 291  As explained above, the payer’s bank is 
under a duty to take all reasonable care and skill in the execution of the 
customer’s EFT instruction. Therefore, the payer’s bank is obliged to adhere to 
the payer’s EFT instruction and the bank is under no breach of its duty of care 
and skill if it executed the customer mandate complies with current banking 
practices.292 As explained above, the customer under a duty towards his bank 
to prevent facilitates fraud. Therefore, the customer’s order to his bank should 
be clear and unambiguous.293 In Midland Bank Ltd v Seymour,294 Devlin J. held 
that “the instruction to the agent must be clear and unambiguous”. 295 
Accordingly, the bank is under no breach of its duty of care and skill if it can 
prove that it has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the customer’s 
ambiguous instruction.296 
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In an EFT, the payer’s bank is more concerned with security procedures to 
authenticate the instruction than with consent to the payment instruction. 
Therefore, if the payer’s bank debits its customer’s account on the basis of an 
authenticated EFT instruction that has been tested by agreed security 
procedures then, even if the instruction was not authorized, the bank can prove 
that it has exercised its duty to take reasonable care and skill in execution of the 
customer’s mandate. Nevertheless, within common law rules, if the payer 
achieved to prove that the payer’s bank knew or should have known that the 
payment order was ambiguous, the court may hold that the payer’s bank is 
negligent and acted unreasonably if it did not ask for clarification from the 
payer.297 In European Asian Bank AG v Punjab & Sind Bank (No 2) Goff L.J. 
held: 
“a party relying upon his own interpretation of the relevant document must 
have acted reasonably in all the circumstances in so doing. If instructions 
are given to an agent, it is understandable that he should expect to act on 
those instructions without more; but if, for example, the ambiguity is patent 
on the face of the document it may well be right (especially with the 
facilities of modern communications available to him) to have his 
instructions clarified by his principal, if time permits, before acting upon 
them.”298 
the present author’s view is that due to the lack of norms for determining the 
EFT parties’ liability in the execution of ambiguous payment instructions in the 
context of authenticated but unauthorized EFT instructions, there are a number 
of facts which ought to be considered by the courts in order to determine the 
bank’s liability and whether it has exercised reasonable care and skill in 
executing an ambiguous EFT instruction, viz: 
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(A) The customer has the right to prove that the bank knew or should have 
known that the instruction was ambiguous; such proof may lead the court to 
consider the bank acted negligently in not asking the customer for 
clarification.299  
(B) Cox and Taylor present three main questions which must be considered 
in deciding whether the bank was negligent and failed to exercise reasonable 
care and skill in the execution of the ambiguous payment instruction. These 
questions are: (1) how clear was the ambiguity? (2) Are there any 
communication methods available to the bank to communicate with the 
customer? And (3) did the bank have time to communicate with the customer 
before the execution of the payment instruction?300  
These questions, however, do not address the issue of the unpredictability and 
uncertainty of the banks’ liability for authenticated but unauthorized payment 
instructions. This is because this liability depends on the court’s understanding 
as to whether the bank has acted with reasonable care or not.  
3.4.2.2 The bank’s duty to prevent the facilitation of fraud 
The second issue in respect of the bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care and 
skill is its duty to prevent the facilitation of fraud on occasions when it becomes 
aware that the customer’s agent is misappropriating the customer’s funds. The 
bank is under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent the 
facilitation of fraud whenever the bank is on notice that the customer’s agent is 
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misappropriating his principal’s funds. 301  The difficulty lay in the conflict 
between the bank’s duty to take all reasonable care and skill to prevent the 
facilitation of fraud and its duty to execute a payment instruction issued with the 
customer’s mandate. 302  This duty was examined in Barclays Bank Plc v 
Quincecare Ltd,303 where Steyn J. held that a bank must reject execution of an 
order if it is “put on enquiry,” in the sense that the bank has a reasonable basis 
for believing that the order involved misappropriation of the customer’s 
money.304 But in this particular case, the court held that the bank’s execution of 
the payment instruction issued from a valid and authenticated instruction, 
therefore no breach in the bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill was 
involved. 305  Nevertheless, in determining the bank’s liability to execute 
authenticated but unauthorized payment instructions, each case is to be 
evaluated according to the particular set of facts. For example, in Barclays Bank 
Plc v Quincecare Ltd the chairman of the company fraudulently misappropriated 
the company’s funds by ordering the company’s bank by phone to transfer 
£344,000 from the company’s bank account to the account of a firm of solicitors. 
The bank refused to execute the order and subsequently the chairman sent a 
payment order signed by his own hand. In accordance with this handwritten 
order, which was accepted as the customer’s mandate, the bank executed the 
instruction. The funds were subsequently transferred from the account of the 
firm of solicitors to the chairman’s personal bank account in the United States of 
America. The chairman than disappeared. The company sued the bank and 
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claimed that the bank had made the payment in breach of its duty to exercise 
care and skill. In this case, the court held the bank was not in breach of its duty 
to exercise reasonable care and skill to prevent the facilitation of fraud, because 
the chairman was identified to the bank for 16 months and was thought to be 
trustworthy and dependable. Furthermore, the chairman notified the bank that 
the solicitors were the company’s solicitors and the funds transfer was clarified 
by the fact that the company had just entered into a transaction whereby it 
bought four shops.306  
Various types of criminality have emerged in connection with the growth of EFT 
systems. In Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd,307 the court held that if the 
bank suspects that the customer’s transaction involved money laundering as 
defined in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the bank has the right not to 
execute the payment transaction without having to demonstrate that there are 
reasonable grounds for such a suspicion.308 The bank is only under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care and skill to execute its customer’s EFT instruction if 
such execution will not place it in breach of legal provisions.309  
The author’s view takes account of the fact that in the EFT transactions the 
bank receives the instruction electronically and so a massive number of 
instructions need to be executed in nearly-real time. Thus, the bank has no 
capacity for determining whether an EFT instruction issued from the rightful 
customer or whether there is misappropriation of the payer’s funds, and at the 
same time the bank is more concerned with the authentication of the instruction 
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than with its consent. Therefore reasonable to consider the bank not liable for 
the execution of payment instructions issued on behalf of the customer or for 
the misappropriation of the payer’s funds, as long as the execution of such 
instructions depended on the use of the agreed authentication procedures. 
However, the customer will have the right to sue the person who acted on his 
behalf or who misappropriated his funds on the basis of the contractual 
relationship between them. Finally, the question of whether the bank has 
exercised its duty of care and skill is open to interpretation on the part of the 
court. 
As explained previously, the customer is under a narrow duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill to not facilitate fraud. Indeed, the customer is under a 
duty to protect and save the physical card but not the card data, for example, 
the card number and PIN. An offender can obtain the card data very easily, and 
it is not reasonable to consider a customer is liable when an offender copies 
such data when the customer is undertaking a perfectly lawful transaction, such 
as using the card in a supermarket, café shop or restaurant.  
Furthermore, when the customer makes a transaction over the telephone or on 
the internet, he must provide the card holder name, number of the card and the 
three digit security number. The purpose of security number is to prove and 
confirm that the card is in the possession of the customer, assuming that only 
the customer who must know such number.310 But if the third party obtains of a 
photocopy of the card without the knowledge of the customer, the third party will 
be in possession of all the card data, and if the third party then uses the card 
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over the internet, there is no proof that the person conducting the transaction is 
the customer himself or the third party.311 In this regard, in Halifax Union v 
Wheelwright,312 Baron Cleasby held:  
“a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong, a man cannot complain 
of the consequence of his own default, against a person who was misled 
by that default without any fault of his own.”313 
Mason believes that such comment has a reverberation to the modern world of 
electronic banking as ever it did when Baron Cleasby wrote it.314 Such comment 
means that when the bank decides to use an encryption system that is 
insufficient by secure, then the bank must bear the liability.315 The bank cannot 
obtain benefit of the flaw in the machinery that customers are required to use, 
such as: the flows of data through a number of third parties; the failure of 
employees that are liable for the machinery; and the failure to fully control the 
complex sub-contracting that takes place within the industry. 316  The bank 
cannot complain of the consequences of their own default against customers 
who are misled by those very defaults of technology and the failure to obey 
operating manuals. 317 Given the above position, it seems that it is reasonable to 
consider the bank liable for authentication but unauthorised transaction when 
the customer denies issuing such transaction and there is no fraud or 
negligence on the part of the customer.         
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3.4.2.3 The bank’s liability for its employees and agents  
EFT is significantly vulnerable to fraud by employees.318 The bank is liable for 
any losses or risk resulting from its employees’ fraudulent or negligent 
execution during the course of their employment.319 In the case of an EFT 
payment initiated by the fraud of a bank employee, the customer whose account 
was debited as a result of the fraudulent instruction has the right to instruct the 
bank to re-credit his account, because the bank’s action was without the 
customer’s mandate.320 An example of employee fraud would be when the bank 
employee changes the customer’s address, issues a new payment instrument 
and sends it to the new address, then later uses the payment instrument to 
withdraw funds from the customer’s account,321 this exactly what happened to 
Emma Woolf, who discovered that £10,000 had been withdrawn from her 
business account with Abbey, a bank later taken over by Santander.322 The 
bank denied that it was culpable on the grounds that everything involved in the 
transactions, including the payment instrument and security procedures used, 
was legal. Subsequently, Thames Valley Police visited the home of one of the 
bank’s employees as part of an inquiry unconnected with Emma Woolf’s case. 
During their inspection of the premises the police found many documents 
pertaining to Ms Woolf’s bank account, include the missing payment instrument 
and bank statements. The employee was arrested because another customer 
had had £150,000 withdrawn from his account in the same way. The fraud was 
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committed by means of changing the address of the customers’ accounts, 
sending new payment instruments to the new addresses, obtaining the PIN 
from customers’ records and then withdrawing the funds from ATMs. Santander 
denied its liability, although it took settlement procedures as follows: first, 
repayment the funds withdrawn from both customers’ accounts; secondly, 
payment all the legal fees involved; and thirdly, as part of a settlement the 
customers signed a privacy agreement, the terms of which allowed the bank to 
avoid either apologising to the two customers or offering them any 
reimbursement.323  
There is no particular evidence of authentication procedures being subject to 
attack, that is because yet there is no published evidence that a chip and PIN 
cards are subjected to cloned.324 Although, recently, Bond325 develops a new 
methodology to proof the card is cloning. Bond states: 
“This protocol requires point-of-sale (POS) terminals or ATMs to generate 
a nonce, called the unpredictable number, for each transaction to ensure it 
is fresh. We have discovered that some EMV (Chip and PIN) 
implementers have merely used counters, timestamps or home-grown 
algorithms to supply this number. This exposes them to a “pre-play” attack 
which is indistinguishable from card cloning from the standpoint of the logs 
available to the card-issuing bank, and can be carried out even if it is 
impossible to clone a card physically.”326        
Accordingly the customer can present evidence to prove that his card is cloned 
and pursue the bank for a refund. 327  There is no doubt that, if security 
procedures were cloned, the bank would be liable for any losses. Thus the 
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banks, eager to minimize their liability for unauthorized transactions, offer no 
means for determining whether there is cloning of security procedures.328 Within 
the PSR 2009, where the customer denies authorizing the instruction it is the 
bank’s responsibility to prove the converse.  
In an EFT transacting, the payer’s bank might employ a correspondent or 
intermediary bank which is considered to be an agent of the payer’s bank.329 
Within common law rules it is the payer’s bank which bears the liability for any 
failure, fraud or negligence of the correspondent or intermediary bank in 
executing the EFT transaction, as the correspondent or intermediary bank is the 
payer’s bank’s agent.330 This is acceptable because it is held that there is no 
contractual agreement between the customer and the intermediary bank and 
thus the intermediary bank owes no liability to the payer. In Royal Products v 
Midland Bank331 Webster J. held that when the bank adopted an intermediary 
bank there are two contracts, the first between the payer’s bank and its 
customer and the second between the payer’s bank and the intermediary, and 
that  both fell within agency law with regard to EFT. Thus, the payer’s bank 
owed to the customer and the intermediary bank owed to the payer’s bank a 
duty to exercise reasonable care and skill.332 The payer’s bank was therefore 
liable to the customer for non-execution of the payment instruction by its agent. 
The intermediary bank, however, had no duty of care and skill towards the 
customer because there was no contract between them. On this point, Webster 
J. held:  
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“in carrying out its part of the transaction Midland (payer’s bank) owed 
Royal (the payer) a duty to use reasonable care and skill…and that they 
would be vicariously liable for the breach of that duty by any servant or 
agent to whom they delegated the carrying out of the instructions. Midland, 
therefore, would be liable to Royal Products for National’s (intermediary 
bank) negligence, if any, in that respect. But in my judgment National 
owed no duty of any kind direct to Royal Products. …In my judgment, 
therefore, National are not to be regarded as having been agents of Royal 
Products and did not, therefore, owe them any of the duties, including a 
fiduciary duty, owed by an agent to his principal”333  
In modern banking practice it has become normal for the banker-customer 
contract to include an express term excluding liability for any default or 
negligence on the part of the intermediary bank.334 Accordingly, in the case of 
the intermediary bank’s non-execution of a payment instruction, the customer 
has no right under any circumstances to claim or request a refund from the 
payer’s bank because of the exclusion terms. In turn, the intermediary bank has 
no liability towards the customer due to the absence of a contractual 
relationship between them. However, although there is no contractual liability 
the issue is whether the customer could sue or make a claim to the intermediary 
bank for any loses caused by it, depending on tort liability. In Calico Printers 
Association v Barclays Bank Ltd,335 the claimant ordered Barclays to insure 
certain goods. However, Barclays’ correspondent bank in Beirut failed to do so. 
The claimant pursued both Barclays and the correspondent bank.336 Wright J. 
held that there was no contractual relationship between the intermediary or 
correspondent bank and the customer, and thus there is no contractual liability 
even if the intermediary bank is nominated in the contract between the 
customer and the payer’s bank since such nomination creates no privity of 
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contract between the customer and the intermediary bank. 337  His Lordship 
dismissed the claim against the correspondent bank under reason that there 
was no privity of contract between the claimant, customer, and the 
correspondent bank. 338  In the absence of contractual liability between the 
customer and the intermediary bank (sub-agent), can the customer sue the 
intermediary bank according to a duty of care in tort at common law? In Calico 
Printers Association v Barclays Bank Ltd, Wright J. held that as a general rule 
the payer has no right against the correspondent bank, as sub-agent for 
negligence or breach of obligation.339 General rules are that a sub-agent owed 
no a duty of care to customers in the EFT,340 since the ambit of such duty 
depends heavily on the direct communications between the customer and sub-
agent which are unlikely to arise in an EFT transactions.341 Thus no tort liability 
exists between them. In this respect the intermediary bank has no duty of care 
whatsoever to the customer.342 Since the customer cannot sue the sub-agent in 
contract or tort it would appear that the bank (agent) remains liable for the 
defaults of the sub-agent.343 Nevertheless, the exclusion of liability could be 
subject to an evaluation under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.344 Where the payer is 
involved in the funds transfer in a business capacity, it is upheld within the 
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Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977345 that the banks have the right to include their 
contracts with the customers term to exclude liability, but only if this term is 
deemed reasonable. In practise, with regard to business customers such 
exclusion is considered acceptable and reasonable, and the paying bank bears 
no liability for the correspondent or intermediary bank’s negligence. This 
interpretation is based on the view that the payer’s bank has no control with 
regard to its agent’s actions, and that a business customer expects and accepts 
this and insures against the risk. Conversely, it is held that a payer who is 
involved in the funds transfer as a customer has the opportunity to depend on 
both the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations1999, 346  because both statutes cover all contractual 
terms that have been not subject to the negotiation.347 Within these statutes, if 
the contract includes an ‘unfair’ term the customer shall not be liable for non-
execution of that term. As long as the payer’s bank is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill and has selected the intermediary bank as its agent it 
is reasonable to consider the exclusion of the bank from liability as ‘unfair’. 
However, it is difficult for the customer to establish the claim that his bank failed 
in its duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in selecting the intermediary 
bank, particularly when the intermediary bank is a reputable one.  
Within the PSR 2009 the position is different. The payer’s bank is liable to the 
payer until the transactions funds are actually credited to the payee’s 
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account.348 Thus, it seems that where the customer is a consumer there is no 
opportunity for the payer’s bank to avoid its liability for any defaults or 
negligence on the part of the intermediary bank. While in the case of business 
customers the bank can avoid such liability if there is an existing agreement 
between the parties for not applying the regulation.349 If the payer’s bank failed 
to make the payment, the payer has the right to claim against his bank,350 and 
the payer’s bank in turn has the right to claim against the intermediary bank.351 
Furthermore, both the payer and the payer’s bank have the right to claim under 
tort liability. It makes no difference whether or not the payer is a customer of the 
bank: within the PSR 2009 the payer’s bank owes a duty to exercise all 
reasonable care and skill both to the customer of the payer’s bank and to the 
payer who is not a customer.352 Under common law rules such a duty arises 
from the contractual agreement between the customer and the bank and the 
bank is also under a duty in tort.353 The payer’s bank has no duty of care to the 
payee,354 either under contract liability or tort liability,355 except when the payee 
has an account in the same bank as the payer.356 
                                               
348
 PSR 2009, regulations 70 and 75.  
349
 Ibid., regulation 51 (3)(a). 
350
 Ibid., regulation 120. 
351
 Ibid. regulation 78.  
352
 Ibid., regulations 33 and 51; Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, section 13. 
353
 Further details, see chapter six.  
354
 Cox, and Taylor, op.cit., pp. 150-152. 
355
 Wells v First National Commercial Bank [1998] P.N.L.R. 552 at pp. 557-560.  
356
 Laemthong International Lines Co Ltd v Artis [2005] EWCA Civ 519; Prudential Assurance 
Co. Ltd v Ayres [2008] EWCA Civ 52. 
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3.4.2.4 The bank’s liability for adopting adequate security systems  
Regarding the bank’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, banks must 
adopt sufficient encryption systems to protect both its own and its customers’ 
money also to prevent unauthorized access to the customers’ accounts by 
providing security and equipment sufficient to prevent fraud. The bank is under 
strict liability to employ reasonable and secure software programs for executing 
its intended purposes and such liability does not depend on proof that the bank 
was negligent.357 If such liability is not expressed by a term in the contract there 
will be an implied term under the common law rules stipulating that the system 
is required to be capable of achieving its intended purpose.358 Furthermore, 
within PSR 2009 it is the bank’s liability to prove that the customer instruction 
was accurately executed and not affected by a technical breakdown or other 
security problems.359  Thus, the bank will be liable to the customer for any 
defaults or inadequate in the security system employed by the bank to protect 
and pass the funds transfer. A question which arises is: who should bear the 
risk for unauthorized transactions when neither the customer nor the bank has 
acted negligently? A second question is: who should bear the risk for 
unauthorized transactions when both the customer and the bank have acted 
negligently? The answer could be found in the Regulations 2009: the customer 
who acted without gross negligence or fraudulence bears no liability unless he 
is not apply the Regulations 2009 requirements here bears up to £50 for any 
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 St Albans City and DC v International Computers Ltd [1997] F.S.R. 251. 
358
 Cox, and Taylor, op.cit., pp. 145-146.  
359
 PSR 2009, regulation 60. 
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losses resulting from unauthorized transactions.360 However, if EFT transactions 
fall outside the ambit of the PSR 2009, the question of determining liability when 
both the customer and the bank are negligent or neither of them is negligent is 
unpredictable and uncertain. 361  The author’s view is that when both the 
customer and the bank are negligent or neither of them is negligent than the 
bank is liable to bear the risk of unauthorized transactions, because one of the 
bank’s duties to the customer is to exercise reasonable care and skill to execute 
the customer’s transaction, while the customer is not obliged to exercise 
reasonable care and skill, unless such duty is specified in the banker-customer 
contract. Even more, the author’s view is the bank is obliged to provide 
sufficient security system and thus an offender who obtains the customer’s 
security procedures, such as PIN and card data, without the knowledge of the 
customer, the bank is liable for any losses resulting from using the card by the 
offender, and it is the bank liability for authentication but unauthorised 
transaction. The bank bears the losses because such authenticated but 
unauthorized transaction accrued as a result of the technology that the bank 
makes its customers use. The customer bears no liability for failing to deal with 
such risks, because these are risks under the control of the bank. The bank 
wishes to challenge the customer association with a transaction was 
unauthorized, it must prove that the customer used the agreed security 
procedure and the legal payment instrument, and that there was no inadequacy 
in the software programs.           
                                               
360
 Ibid., regulation 62(2). 
361
 Geva, Bank Collections and Payment Transactions, op.cit., p. 398. 
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Indeed, both the banks and the customers’ liability for unauthorized transactions 
are uncertain and unpredictable in the context of EFT unauthorized 
transactions. Therefore, there is a need to regulate the EFT parties’ liability to 
make them more certain and predictable would mark a significant improvement. 
Any such regulation, however, should take into account the uncertainties cited 
above. 
3.4.2.5 Banking practice in guarding against unauthorized EFT 
transactions  
Because internet systems are available to all users fake websites designed to 
capture card information are outside the control of the bank. This poses the 
question of how card issuers such as Visa and MasterCard actually guard 
against fraud and how they protect themselves. 
Visa and MasterCard have established different types of safeguard to protect 
both themselves and their customers from unauthorized use of payment 
instruments. First, banks request the customer to refrain from providing bank 
account information by email. If a bank customer receives an email claiming to 
come from the bank and requesting account information, the customer should 
never provide such information without contacting the bank to enquire whether 
the email was genuine. Visa provides an email address through which the 
customer can contact them for further investigation. 362  A second safeguard 
                                               
362
 http://www.visa.co.uk/en/security/online_security/online_fraud.aspx 6 September 2012. 
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intended to protect customers from online fraud is ’Verified by Visa.’363 This 
operates by issuing the customer with a ‘Verified by Visa’ password which is 
known only to the customer. The online procedure for ‘Verified by Visa’ is the 
same, no matter which bank issued the card.  
A third and significant safeguard against fraud provided by the issuers is in the 
form of “chargeback”. “Chargeback” is a procedure whereby a card issuer 
charges the funds transaction back to the merchant acquirer in accordance with 
a contractual relationship between the card issuer and the merchant. It is the 
issuer’s right to request from the merchant a ‘chargeback’ for invalid 
transactions according to the contractual agreement between them. 364  The 
question thereby arises of whether there is any legal issue regarding such 
schemes. Within section 75 of CCA 1974, if a customer pays with a credit card 
only and subsequently disputes a transaction against the seller, the card issuer 
has the right to request a refund. However, section 75 covers only transactions 
from £100 up to £30,000. The Court of Appeal in Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds 
TSB Bank Plc365 held that section 75 applies to credit card schemes regardless 
of the number of parties, which may be three or four when a merchant acquirer, 
is involved, and regardless of whether the transaction takes place in the UK or 
abroad. Section 75 applies when there is misrepresentation or breach in credit 
card schemes. There is no regulatory protection which applies to debit card 
transactions. However, as explained above, according to the PSR 2009 the 
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 http://www.visa.co.uk/en/security/online_security/verified_by_visa.aspx 6 September 2012.  
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 The National Archives, Department for Business Innovation and Skill 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.govuk/+/http://www.bis.govuk/policies/consumer-
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cardholder has the right to request refunds for unauthorized transactions.366 In 
practice, chargeback is deemed to be part of Visa and Master card’s internal 
principles. Visa’s chargeback is not limited by the value of the transaction, but 
MasterCard’s chargeback is limited to a minimum of £10. The cardholder must 
request chargeback for the disputed transactions’ funds within 120 days of 
recognising a problem.367  
Finally, the common safeguard used by banks against fraud and preventing 
unauthorized transactions is to include another form of communication between 
the bank and the customer, for example, a text message or telephone call. 
When a customer issues a fund transfer order, the bank will send a text 
message to the customer’s mobile telephone, requesting them to enter an 
authorization code in the browser that is provided in the text message. This kind 
of guard does not provide the customer with sufficient protection against the 
offenders, because this process does not prevent the offenders from 
circumventing the security. Such circumventing could be accrued when the 
offender persuades the customer telephone company to supply him with an 
extra SIM card so he can use the customer telephone, possibly by claiming that 
the SIM card has failed, so the offender can impersonate the customer mobile 
telephone. Another flaws with this method of protection is not all the bank’s 
customer has mobile telephone, thus this method cannot consider sufficient to 
protect the customer from unauthorized transaction.    
         
                                               
366
 PSR 2009, regulation 63.  
367 
www.visa.com 6 September 2012. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The existing law of EFT systems locates some of the risk for unauthorized 
payment with the bank. The conclusion drawn in this chapter is that the parties’ 
obligation to take reasonable steps of care and skill in the issue and execution 
of EFT instructions occupies an important role in determining the liability for 
unauthorized EFT. Nevertheless, such an obligation to determine the parties’ 
liability has led to uncertainty and unpredictability. The uncertainty of liability 
exists due to the rules governing cheque forgery being inappropriately applied 
to EFT fraud. The payment instruction for a cheque is issued and authenticated 
by means of the holder’s handwritten signature, whereas an EFT instruction is 
issued electronically and authenticated by security procedures. In this respect, 
the customer is in more control of writing out a cheque, but the crucial 
difference between the cheque and the card and the PIN is that the card and 
PIN can only be considered to be in the relative safe keeping of the customer, 
and when the card is used, it is exposed to the weaknesses of the technology. 
For these reasons it is difficult for the bank to identify the person who used the 
security procedures and to ascertain whether he is the authorized person. 
Finally, an examination and evaluation of the rules of agency law and contract 
law which are applied to unauthorized transactions in the EFT context fails to 
provide sufficient determination of the parties’ liabilities in unauthorized EFT 
instructions.  
PSR 2009 imposes on the bank obligations and liabilities to protect the 
customer in cases of unauthorized EFT payments. The payer’s consent to the 
execution of an EFT instruction can be either express or implicit. Nevertheless, 
173 
 
PSR 2009 involves authorization of payment instruction only if there is express 
consent from the payer. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that the PSR 
2009 is unhelpful in defining those situations where the customer might be 
taken implicitly to have authorized a transaction. The author’s view is that the 
existing laws, regimes and private card network principles provide an 
insufficient number of incentives to both customers and banks for adopting 
practices which would reduce the incidence of unauthorized EFT. It seems 
therefore that in the context of EFT that the focus of the approach ought to be 
more comprehensive and take the form of a Consumer EFT Act which would 
determine the liability of all parties involved in an unauthorized payment 
instruction. Finally, this chapter argues that the bank is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill towards its customer, while the customer under no 
such duty. Regarding to the bank’s duty of care and skill, it is the bank liability 
for authentication but unauthorised transaction.   
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Chapter Four 
EFT Parties’ Liability for Insolvency Risk  
4.1 Introduction 
With regard to EFT payment, ‘completion of payment’ can have more than one 
meaning. Firstly, it means that the payer loses the right to cancel or revoke the 
payment instruction, principally in cases of insolvency. Secondly, it means the 
point at which the payee’s bank has the liability to credit the payee’s account. 
This chapter focuses on these two meanings. It is concentrated on determining 
which party bears the risk of EFT non-payment. Addressing the exact time of 
completion of EFT payments between the payer and the payee is helpful in 
identifying the party which bears the risk of non-payment. Further, the legal 
nature of the payment, namely, whether it is conditional or absolute, is treated 
as a significant issue in relation to the finality of the EFT. This chapter will 
therefore deal first with the completion of EFT payment between the payer and 
the payee. Secondly, it will examine the legal nature of payment. Finally this 
chapter will determine which of the parties bears the risk of insolvency in the 
EFT context. 
The completion of EFT payment is a significant factor in the systemic stability of 
payment systems. It defines the liability of the final destination bank, the point at 
which the EFT is considered to be final and cannot be reversed under any 
circumstances, such as default or insolvency of the participating parties. In a 
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debit transfer the payer’s bank is liable, while, conversely, in a credit transfer 
the payee’s bank is liable.1 The absence of particular rules in locating precisely 
the time of payment completion in the context of EFT exposes the transactions’ 
parties to unpredictable and ambiguous liability for non EFT payment. Thevenoz 
confirms:  
“The absence of a well-defined body of law applicable specifically to 
paperless funds transfer, both in Common Law and in several Civil Law 
countries, has created much uncertainty, especially with regard to the 
finality and revocability of a payment order,…, error and insolvency. These 
uncertainties became a major concern to banks experiencing the lack of a 
statutory ‘‘safety net’’ as soon as some of their largest clients refused to 
accept disputed contractual provisions allocating losses.”2 
This chapter analyses current rules and suggests recommendations for the 
future of EFT regulation. Different rules and principles for determining the exact 
time of payment completion will be assessed, and the comparable and 
conflicting points will be analysed. Finally, an attempt will be made to formulate 
appropriate rules in order to address the deficiencies in the current regulations.3 
Identifying the time of EFT completion assists in demonstrating which of the 
parties bears the risk of non-payment in the context of EFT. This chapter 
discusses applicable provisions of the PSR 2009 in dealing with the time when 
the transaction’s funds must be delivered to the payee. Furthermore, it 
investigates the issues involved in both debit and credit transfers, and focuses 
on the principles of contract and agency law by analysing those rules. This 
chapter advocates the regulation EFT payment completion in one body of law, 
covering the liability of parties involved in EFT transactions, and duties and 
                                               
1
 Geva, B., ‘Payment finality and discharge in funds transfers’, (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 633 at p. 634. 
2
 Thevenoz, L., ‘Error and fraud in wholesale funds transfers: U.C.C. Article 4A and the 
UNCITRAL harmonization process’, (1991) 42 Ala. Law Review 881 at p. 883. 
3
 See chapter seven, section 7.3. 
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obligations in case of non-payment. Section 4.2 will investigate the provisions of 
the PSR 2009, beginning with the execution of payment transactions. It then 
argues that the PSR 2009 do not address the exactly time when the EFT 
becomes final. Although the PSR 2009 establishes clearly that the funds have 
to be available to the payee before the payment is considered final, it fails to 
provide the exact definition of availability in relation to funds. Section 4.3 of this 
chapter is dedicated to analysing the common law rules. This section 
summarizes the arguments favouring the establishment of basic rules governing 
the finality of EFT in order to identify which of the parties bear the risk of non-
payment. It argues that the EFT should be final at the destination bank in the 
system chain.  
4.2 Execution of EFT instructions under the PSR 2009 
Regulations 65-79 of the PSR 2009 set out instructions for the execution of 
payment transactions without presenting any definition of the term ‘execution’. 
The term ‘execution’ refers to the completion of the payment transaction and not 
to the execution of the instruction delimited in the EFT transaction. Elsewhere in 
the Regulations 2009, however, the term execution is used to refer to the 
execution of payment instructions.4 Use of the term ‘execution’ within the PSR 
2009 is therefore inconsistent and the Regulations need to be amended in this 
respect.  
                                               
4
 For instance, PSR 2009, regulation 66 applies in case of refusal of payments orders. 
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Part 6 of the PSR 2009 governs the execution of payment orders and funds 
transferred; both sent and received,5 execution time and value date,6 and finally 
liability.7 
4.2.1 Execution of EFT payment instructions 
PSR 2009 deals with the receipt, refusal, or revocation of payment instructions.8 
The payer’s bank has to execute the payer’s instruction once it is received. The 
different time-limits are generally considered from the ‘time of receipt’, which is 
the time at which the payer’s bank receives the order to execute the fund 
transfer transmitted to the payer’s bank either by the payer directly, as in a 
credit transfer; by the payer indirectly via the payee’s bank, as in a debit 
transfer; or indirectly by or via the payee, as in a direct debit.9 If the payer and 
his bank agree a specific time to make the payment then the ‘time of receipt’ will 
be taken as the agreed time, for example, for a standing order.10 In both cases, 
the ‘time of receipt’ will be the next business day if it is received on a holiday.11 
Furthermore, the payer’s bank has the right to set a deadline so that the ‘time of 
receipt’ is the next working day for orders received after that time. 12  It is 
compulsory for the paying bank to carry out the payer’s order within the time-
                                               
5
 PSR 2009, regulations 65-68. 
6
 Ibid., regulations 69-73. 
7
 Ibid., regulations 74-79. 
8
 Ibid., regulations 65-68. 
9
 Ibid., regulation 65(1). 
10
 Ibid., regulation 65(4); Regulation 70(4) set out one limitation to such freedom: ‘where the 
payment order is to be carry out within the EEA, the paying bank must be certain that the funds 
of transaction is available to the payee’s bank by the end of the fourth business day after the 
‘time of receipt’ of the payment order’.   
11
 Ibid., regulations 65(2) and 65(5). 
12
 Ibid., regulations 65(3). 
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limits set out in the PSR 2009, where it is applicable.13 Although, where the 
payer’s order is originally given by paper-based means, rather than electronic 
means such as over the telephone or internet, a different rule applies. In such 
case the payer’s bank must ensure that the payee’s bank account is credited by 
the end of the next day following the ‘time of receipt’ of the payer’s order.14 
Even where these different time-limits explained above do not have compulsory 
application; the paying bank and the payer however may agree that they shall 
apply.15 The payer and his bank are free to agree that some other specific time 
should apply to their payment instruction, but there is one limit upon that 
freedom: where a payment instruction is to be completely carried out within the 
EEA, the paying bank must be certain that the funds of transaction is available 
to the payee’s bank by the end of the fourth business day after the ‘time of 
receipt’ of the payment order.16           
The payer has the right to withdraw his consent to the transaction,17 but as a 
general rule he has no right to cancel the payment instruction once it has been 
delivered to the payer’s bank.18 A different rule applies to the cancelation of 
payment instructions for direct debits, as the payer may not cancel his 
instruction after the end of the working day preceding the day agreed for the 
debiting of the funds.19 In other cases where the payment instruction is initiated 
by or through the payee, it is completed once it is either communicated, or 
                                               
13
 Ibid., regulation 69(1). 
14
 Ibid., regulation 70(3)(a) and 70(3)(b). 
15
 Ibid., regulation 69(2).  
16
 Ibid., regulation 70(4). 
17
 Ibid., regulations 55(3). 
18
 Ibid., regulations 65(1) and 67(1). Taking into consideration regulation 51 (3)(a) which 
provides that where the customer is a business the parties have the right to agree not apply 
regulation 67.  
19
 Ibid., regulations 67(3).  
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transmitted, or the payer’s approval is given; 20  it is equivalent to prior 
authorization introduced by the payer to the payee to create the debit transfer 
instruction. Thus, for example, the payer has no right to cancel the payment 
instruction after inserting the PIN on a card transaction. Where there is an 
agreement between the payer and the payer’s bank that the payment instruction 
is to be carried out on a specific day, for example, the day when the payer 
credits his account, or on the last day of a certain period, for example, a 
standing order, the payer loss his right for cancelation the payment after the end 
of the working day preceding the agreed day of payment. 21  However, and 
regardless of the transaction type, whether it is a consumer or business 
transaction, the payer has the right to cancel a payment order outside the 
different time-limits recognised by the PSR 2009 only if he obtains his bank’s 
approval to such cancelation.22 When the payment instruction is initiated by the 
payee such as direct debits, the payer must also obtain the payee’s approval 
before the payment order can be cancelled out of time.23 Where the payer 
cancels a payment order that is initiated according to the terms in the contract 
with his bank, the bank may charge the customer for revocation 24  if it is 
stipulated in their agreement and must reasonably correspond to the actual 
costs incurred by the payer’s bank.25  
The general principle is that the payee’s bank must accept the payment 
instruction. While the PSR 2009 carries no reference to any such compulsory 
                                               
20
 Ibid., regulation 67(2). 
21
 Ibid., regulation 67(4).  
22
 Ibid., regulation 67(5)(a).  
23
 Ibid., regulation 67(5)(b).  
24
 Ibid., regulation 67(6).  
25
 Ibid., regulation 54(1). Taking into consideration regulation 51 (3)(a) which where the 
customer is a business the parties has the right to agree not apply regulation 54(1). 
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acceptance, it seems that receipt and acceptance of a payment instruction by 
the payee’s bank for the benefit of the payer’s payment instruction refers to the 
finality of funds transfer. Therefore, the author’s view is that acceptance by the 
payee’s bank of the payment order indicates the finality of the EFT. Moreover, 
acceptance of the payment order by the payee’s bank refers to the payment by 
the payer to the payee, in this sense, liberating the payer from obligation on the 
underlying transaction of the debt charged by the EFT. Thereby, the payee’s 
bank is liable to pay the transaction’s funds to the payee. Basically, the payment 
is considered to be made when the payee’s bank has credited the payee’s 
account and no condition or provision is placed on the receiver’s funds. 
Although, the Regulations 2009 contain no reference to rules governing the 
acceptance of a payment order from the payee’s bank, they do address the 
rules dealing with refusal of payment orders. These grant the bank no absolute 
right to refuse execution of the payment order and include an obligation on the 
part of the bank to notify its customer of reasons for the refusal and of the 
method for enabling any possible refund. 26  Accordingly, if the payment 
instruction is issued properly, applying all the agreement’s requirements, and 
there is no lawful reason for non-execution, then the bank has no right not to 
execute it.27 
                                               
26
 Ibid., regulation 66(1). 
27
 Ibid., regulation 66(5). 
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4.2.2 Execution time and value date of EFT transactions 
The term ’execution’ refers to the finality of a payment instruction, either by 
crediting the funds transfer in the payee’s bank account or by crediting the 
payee’s account.28 In this sense, as long as the time of crediting the payee’s 
bank with the transaction is the time when the payment is to be considered final, 
it is not clear why crediting the funds in the payee’s account is essential to 
considering the payment final. It might be considered that finality of payment 
occurs when the payer’s account is debited by his bank. As explained above, 
Regulations 2009 require that the funds transfer must be credited to the payee’s 
account by the end of the working day following the time of receipt of the 
payment instruction.29 However, the Regulations offer no definition of what is 
meant by ‘funds availability’. As a general term, ‘funds availability’ must refer to 
the absolute use of the transactions’ funds by the payee, as with cash. The 
authors’ view is that ‘funds availability’ does not have to be equivalent to cash 
for the payment to be considered final. It is sufficient that the funds are credited 
to the payee’s bank account. Therefore, if the payee’s bank account is credited 
with the transactions’ funds, and at the same time his account was overdrawn, 
the bank has the right to deduct the overdraft funds from the transaction’s funds 
and the payment is considered to be final, despite not being available to the 
payee in the same way as cash.30  
                                               
28
 Ibid., regulation 70. 
29
 Ibid., regulations 73, this regulation apply to payment discharged by the currency of any other 
EU member States. 
30
 For example, Lloyds TSB, Personal Banking terms and conditions, October 2012, section 
C[10.3], [10.4] 
http://www.lloydstsb.com/media/lloydstsb2004/pdfs/personal_banking_terms_and_conditions.pd
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The PSR 2009 obliges the payer’s bank to ensure that the transaction funds are 
credited to the payee’s bank account by the end of the working day following 
the day the payment instruction was received.31 However, there is no remedy 
for the payee in the case of breach by the payer’s bank, such as a delay in 
executing the transfer. It appears that the only available remedy would be the 
payee’s right to sue the payer, and in turn the payer claiming reimbursement 
from his bank. The payee’s right against his bank is established in case of a 
default on the part of the payee’s bank after having received the funds from the 
payer’s bank. The payee’s right is indicated to be the actual time of crediting the 
payee’s account. In addition, the payee’s bank must guarantee that the funds 
for the transaction are in the payee’s account once the amount has been 
credited to the payee’s bank. This period of time is applicable whether the 
payee is a customer of the bank or not.32 Notwithstanding these provisions the 
payee is still without any remedy for a delay in funds credited to the account of 
his bank in breach of this rule.33 Credit value for the payee’s account must not 
be delayed more than one working day following the time of receipt of the 
payment instruction. The author’s view is that to stipulate that the funds 
transaction must be credited in the payee’s account by the end of next business 
day is to create the possibility of a number of issues which banks will need to 
address The first issue arises when the EFT transaction involves merchant 
acquirers. 
                                                                                                                                         
f; HSBC, General Terms and Conditions, Current Accounts Terms and Conditions, April 2012, 
section 4 http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/PA_esf-ca-app-
content/content/uk/pdfs/en/General_Current_Accounts_Aprl1.pdf 6 October 2012; Further 
details about overdraft facility see section 4.4.2. 
31
 PSR 2009, regulation 70(1). 
32
 Ibid., regulation 70. 
33
 Geva, B., ‘Payment transactions under the EU payment services directive: A U.S. 
comparative perspective’, (2009) 27 Penn State International Law Review 713 at p.727. 
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A hypothetical case might involve merchant acquirers holding different payment 
accounts on behalf of their merchant customers. Here the execution of the 
provision of credit value for the payee’s account where no delay is involved 
should not create any issue. This is because when a payment instruction 
executes, the merchant acquirer will request the funds from the payer’s 
account. The funds must cross the merchant acquirer’s account for the 
merchant the following day. Consequently, the merchant acquirer orders a 
payment for the account it keeps on behalf of the merchant to the merchant’s 
bank account. In such transactions the fund must cross the merchant’s account 
on the day following day one.34  
The second hypothesis, however, is that the merchant acquirers do not hold 
accounts on behalf of the merchant. There are a number of issues for the 
merchant acquirer to overcome in order to ensure that the transaction fund 
credits the payee’s account on behalf of the merchant receipts by the 
merchant’s bank account at the end of the business day.35 The author agrees 
with Brandt and Graham’s view that there is no doubt that the first approach is 
preferred because it achieves the aims of Regulations 2009 as well as reducing 
disruption to the payment services market. The second approach, involving the 
claim that merchant acquirers do not operate accounts on behalf of merchants, 
depends on the argument that the merchant acquirers passed payments to the 
merchants before they had credited the funds from the payee. However, such 
an argument has been rebutted on the following grounds: that the merchant 
acquirers passed payments to merchants before they had credited the funds 
                                               
34
 Brandt, P. and Graham, P., ‘An update on the UK's implementation of the Payment Services 
Directive’, (2009) 64 Compliance Officer Bulletin 1 at p.27. 
35
 Ibid. 
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from the payee does not mean that the merchant acquirer did not hold an 
account on behalf of the merchant.36 It means that the account operated by the 
merchant acquirer on behalf of the merchant had a debit balance until the 
payee transferred the funds and the account was credited with the transaction 
fund.  
The second issue concerns internal payment transactions. Indeed, it is difficult 
for the bank to ensure that the transactions funds are credited in the payee’s 
account at the end of business day, particularly when the payer and the payee 
have accounts in different banks. Finally, the provision that the funds 
transaction must be credited in the payee’s account by the end of the next 
business day leaves the payer without the right to revoke the payment 
instruction as long as the payment is passed once the instruction is issued. 
4.2.3 Liability for non-execution of EFT transactions 
The bank is liable for non-execution or deficient execution of payment 
transactions.37 However, these rules are not absolute; a bank has the right not 
to execute a payment instruction employing an incorrect ‘unique identifier’.38 A 
‘unique identifier’ is defined as ‘a combination of letters, numbers or symbols 
specified to the customer by the bank and to apply by the customer in relation to 
a payment transaction in order to identify unambiguously the other user and/or 
                                               
36
 Ibid. 
37
 PSR 2009, regulations 74 and 76. Regulation 51 (3)(a) allows to the parties to agree not 
apply regulation 76 in case of business customer. 
38
 Ibid., regulation 74. 
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the customer’s account for a payment transaction’. 39  The best examples of 
unique identifiers are a sort code of the bank and the customer’s account 
number. Accordingly, the bank’s obligation to execute correctly the payment 
instruction to the particular payee is dependent upon the employment of a 
correct unique identifier, 40  and in cases where the customer provides an 
incorrect unique identifier the bank is under no liability for non-execution or 
deficient execution of the payment instruction. 41  Thus, at first sight, the 
customer bears the losses of non-execution or deficient execution of the 
payment transaction when it is due to his negligence in providing an incorrect 
unique identifier. Furthermore, the customer bears the losses if the incorrect 
unique identifier provided by him leads to the wrong account being credited. 
However, a bank that employed an incorrect unique identifier bears liability, 
limited by their having made reasonable efforts to return the funds involved in 
the payment instruction.42 Even so, a bank may charge the customer for its 
reasonable efforts to return the funds if so agreed in the banker-customer 
contract.43 
The author’s view is that, in practice, the parties’ liability for using incorrect 
unique identifiers are: first, the bank bears no liability for any losses if it proves 
that it made all reasonable efforts, even if such efforts failed to recover the 
transaction’s funds, so that here the customer bears the losses for non-
execution or deficient execution of the payment instruction. Secondly, the 
customer will bear all losses if the bank proves that the customer acted with 
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 Ibid., regulation 74(1). 
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 Ibid., regulation 74(2). 
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 Ibid., regulation 74(2)(a). 
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gross negligence in providing an incorrect unique identifier.44 Thirdly, the bank 
bears all losses if it executes a payment instruction employing an incorrect 
unique identifier knowing that the unique identifier is incorrect. The PSR 2009 
does not include rules for dealing with the execution of payment instructions for 
a payee who does not exist or is unidentifiable. It seems that the PSR 2009 
could be amended by establishing new provisions relating to execution of 
payment instructions for a non-existent or unidentifiable payee by ruling that the 
payee’s bank must reject any such instruction.  
Liability for non-execution or defective execution of the credit 45  and debit46 
transfer instructions is addressed as follows: first, liability of the payer’s bank to 
the payer to execute the payment instruction correctly. The payer’s bank is 
liable to debit the exact amount of the transaction and at the same time must be 
certain that the payee’s bank credited the payee’s account with the transaction 
funds by the end of the working day following the time of receipt of the payment 
order.47 Thus, the payer’s bank is liable for any losses, and must refund the 
payer the amount of the transaction if necessary, and also re-credit the payer’s 
account.48 However, the payer’s bank has no liability to the payer when it is 
proved that the payee’s bank received the transaction fund by the end of the 
working day following the time of receipt of the payment order. In debit transfer 
                                               
44
 More details about customer’s duty to exercise reasonable care and skill, see chapter three, 
section 3.4.1. 
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instructions, the payee’s bank is liable to the payee for correct transmission of 
the payment instruction to the payer’s bank within the time limits agreed 
between the payee and the payee’s bank, enabling payment to be made within 
the agreed time.49 The payee’s bank must instantly re-transmit the payment 
instruction in question to the payer’s bank.50 
Secondly, the payee’s bank will be liable to the payee for the transaction 
payment when the payer’s bank has proved that the payee’s bank received the 
transaction fund. Otherwise, thirdly, under the payer’s request,51 the payer’s 
bank is obliged to investigate the whereabouts of the payment and notify the 
payer of the outcome.52 If the outcome of the investigation is that the payment 
instruction was executed incorrectly, then the payer’s bank will be liable to the 
payer and must re-credit the payer’s account with the transaction fund without 
undue delay.53 Furthermore, if the payer’s bank fails to execute the required 
investigations to trace the whereabouts of the payment funds, an action for 
breach of a statutory requirement may be instigated and the payer’s bank will 
be liable to the payer for any losses resulting from such a breach. 54 
Nevertheless, the payer’s bank obligation to investigate the whereabouts of the 
payment and notify the payer of the outcome can be excluded against business 
customers.55 Fourthly, a bank is liable to its customer if it failed to follow due 
procedure. Such failure may also be evidence of negligence. Moreover, if a 
bank fails to comply with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) rules, a strict 
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liability action can be brought against them under section 150 of the FSMA 
2000. According to the FCA rule a bank ‘must not seek to exclude or restrict, or 
rely on any exclusion or restriction of, any duty or liability it may have to a 
banking customer unless it is reasonable for it to do so and the duty of liability 
arises other than under the regulatory system’.56   
This position is in contrast to the common law principles, wherein the law of 
agency is the main source of law applicable to the EFT parties’ relationship. The 
agent owes to its principal a duty to exercise all the reasonable care and skill 
which a bank ought to exercise in execution of its customer’s instructions. 57 In 
this context, the payer’s instruction must be clear and unambiguous. Thus, if the 
payer’s instruction to the bank is ambiguous, it is held that the payer’s bank is 
under no liability for non-execution of the payer’s instruction so long as it has 
taken all reasonable measures to execute the payment instruction.58 On the 
subject of funds transfer instructions, the doctrine of strict compliance was 
rejected when Webster J in Royal Products59 held that the doctrine of strict 
compliance cannot be applied to instructions of funds transfer. In this sense, as 
long as the payer’s bank exercised all reasonable care and skill in executing the 
payment instruction it was not in breach of its mandate, and thus not liable for 
non-execution of its customer payment instruction. Therefore it is clear that the 
PSR 2009 changed common law principles.  
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 http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/BCOBS/1/1 28 November 2013.  
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 Royal Products v Midland Bank [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 194, at p. 198; Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) 
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It seems that under the Regulation 2009 the main obligation of the payers’ bank 
is executed the payment instruction given to it. The payer’s bank may be liable 
even if it acts with all reasonable care and skill and was not negligent in the 
execution of the payment instruction. Furthermore, the payer’s request to 
investigate and trace the whereabouts of the payment funds is not required to 
be handwritten. Thus, any action or saying from the customer could be 
interpreted as an implied request for investigation. In this regard, the customer 
could claim that he asked the bank for investigation in an implied request, such 
as asking for justification for the unavailability of his funds and then waiting for 
the bank to provide an explanation. The author’s view is that subject to the 
potential liability of the payer’s bank for non-execution or defective execution of 
the payer’s orders, the strict liability is deemed to provide more protection to the 
payer and to make the payer’s bank more circumspect in exercising its duty to 
execute the payment instruction.60 However, the point of weakness with strict 
liability is that the customer will be in a powerful position and, as long as the 
bank bears the losses, the customer may not exercise reasonable care and skill 
in providing the bank with the EFT instruction. The PSR 2009 provisions fail to 
define the exact time of EFT finality. The author’s view is that the payer’s bank 
is liable for any losses as a result of non-execution or defective execution of the 
payment instruction even if it takes all reasonable steps with care and skill (strict 
liability). Thus, the payer’s bank is required to refund and if necessary to re-
credit the payer’s account with the transaction funds. However, the payer’s 
liability arises if the payer provided the bank with an incorrect unique identifier,61 
or wrongdoing is proved by the bank. In banking practice the bank will not be 
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liable for any EFT instruction sent to the wrong payee if the payer gave the 
wrong details; nevertheless, the bank will exercise reasonable skills to recover 
the payment while imposing reasonable costs for such a service.62 However, if 
the payer gave the correct details and the EFT payment was sent to the wrong 
payee it is the bank which is liable for the recovery of such losses. 
It seems at first sight that the PSR 2009 cannot release the payer’s banks from 
liability in the case of non-execution of the payment instruction. But this view 
can be rebutted. The payer’s bank has no liability to the payer in the following 
cases: First, when the payer failed to inform the bank on becoming aware of 
any incorrectly executed payment instruction. Accordingly, the payer must, 
without delay and within a maximum of 13 months after the debit time, inform 
his bank of any incorrect instruction.63 Secondly, when the execution of the 
payment instruction places the bank in breach of existing national law, such as 
anti-money laundering legislation. Thirdly, when there were abnormal and 
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the bank’s control, with consequences 
which were unavoidable despite the bank’s best efforts.64 Finally, the bank has 
no liability to the payer for non-execution of the payments order if it is able to 
pass liability to the payee’s bank or to a correspondent or intermediary bank, 
thus making its liability attributable.65 The PSR 2009 potentially changes the 
common law rules by enabling the bank to pass its liability to the correspondent 
or intermediary bank.  
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The author’s view is that the PSR 2009 offers new rights to the customer with 
regard to the countermanding of payment instructions, implementation time and 
charges. Furthermore, it answers the question of when the payment is 
considered to be final by stipulating that the funds must be available to the 
payee by crediting the payee’s account. However, the Regulations raise other 
problems without providing answers to them. For example: (1) the meaning of 
availability with regard to funds. (2) The issue of acceptance of the EFT 
instruction by the payee’s bank and the extremely important question of when 
the inter-bank EFT payment is deemed final. (3) The meaning of defective 
execution, (4) funds discharged, (5) wrongful or non-exist payee. Consequently 
an attempt has been made to analyse the common law rules to find answers 
which will resolve these problems. The next section will investigate the 
principles of common law with regard to determining the finality of EFT 
transactions. 
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Table 4: Banks’ Liability for non- execution payment instructions under Part 6 of 
the PSR 2009. 
PSR 2009 
Regulation 75: 
Non-execution or 
defective execution of a 
credit transfer 
Regulation 76: 
Non-execution or 
defective execution of a 
debit transfer 
Liability/ Obligation 
Liability for non-execution 
or defective execution of 
the payment instructions 
Liability for correct 
transmission   of the 
payment order 
Conditions 
 Non-execution or 
defective execution 
 Correct unique identifier 
provider by the payer: 
regulation 74(1) 
 Not transmission   of 
the payment 
instruction: 
regulation 76(1) 
 Correct unique 
identifier provider by 
the payee: 
regulation 74(1) 
Burden of proof 
 Banks  
 Accurate record, 
execution and entrance 
in the accounts of the 
transaction: regulation 
75 
 Banks 
 Accurate record, 
execution and 
entrance in the 
accounts of the 
transaction: 
regulation 76 
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Consequences 
 Refund of the 
transaction’s funds to 
the payer due to the 
non-execution or 
defective execution:  
regulation 75(4)  
 Restoration of the 
debited account of the 
former condition: 
regulation 75(4) 
 Refund of the 
transaction’s funds 
to the payer due to 
the non-execution or 
defective execution:  
regulation 76(5)(a) 
 Restoration of the 
debited account of 
the former condition: 
regulation 76(5)(b) 
Request 
 
Not specified Not specified 
Limit exceptions  
 Payment instructions 
executed according to 
the unique identifier 
deemed as correctly 
executed: regulation 74  
 In correct unique 
identifier provided by 
the customer: no 
liability of the bank: 
regulation 74(3) 
Force majeure, Community 
or national law, such as 
money laundering, no 
liability of the bank: 
regulation 79 
 Payment 
instructions 
executed according 
to the unique 
identifier deemed as 
correctly executed: 
regulation 74  
 In correct unique 
identifier provided by 
the customer: no 
liability of the bank: 
regulation 74(3) 
Force majeure, 
Community or 
national law, such 
as money 
laundering, no 
liability of the bank: 
regulation 79 
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4.3 Revocation and completion of EFT payment under 
common law rules 
4.3.1 Identifying the problem 
There is a good case for the claim that an EFT instruction has been executed 
when payment has been made and the time available for revocation has 
elapsed.66  In this regard ‘completion of payment’ can have more than one 
meaning. Firstly, it means the point where the payer loses the right to revoke 
the payment instruction. Secondly, it means the point at which the payee’s bank 
has a liability to credit the payee’s account. Consequently, it is important to find 
a method of defining the exact time at which the funds are credited. The 
problem is that there are differences between one EFT transaction and another 
and so it is not possible to define a single point at which the EFT becomes final. 
First of all, it is necessary to consider the legal nature of the money transfer 
process in question. For example, the time at which a funds transfer via BACS 
becomes irrevocable is different from the time that a bank giro credit is 
completed. In some cases, however, the time of completion of an EFT payment 
is determined in the banker-customer contract. 67  Secondly, the number of 
parties involved in the transaction and the function assumed by each party 
could affect the time of payment. There are intra-branch transactions in which 
the parties’ bank accounts are held in the same branch of the same bank; and 
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 Arora, A., Electronic Banking and the Law (1988), p. 53; Cox, R. and Taylor, J., ‘Funds 
Transfers’, in Brindle, M. and Cox, R., (eds) Law of Bank Payments (2010), p.163. 
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there are inter-branch transactions in which the parties’ bank accounts are held 
in different branches of the same bank. Then there are fund transfers involving 
accounts held in different banks (inter-bank). These inter-bank transactions can 
employ as many as five parties: the payer, the payer’s bank, the correspondent 
or intermediary bank, the payee’s bank, and finally the payee. For example, the 
payer’s bank may request, by means of a telex from its correspondent, a credit 
to the payee’s bank account. It is arguable that the payment is completed when 
the intermediary sends a message to the payee’s bank. Nevertheless, the 
payee’s bank may consider the payment incomplete until the transaction funds 
are actually credited to its account. Thus, the question of when the EFT 
payment is completed has different answers. In each case, a court would be 
dealing with a different point. It would be difficult indeed for the courts to 
establish a uniform principle defining the exact time at which the EFT is made.  
In reaching a decision, the courts must take into account several points in time 
at which a payment may be considered as completed. These points could be: 
(1) when the payer’s bank transmits the payer’s instruction; ( 2) when the 
payee’s bank, or its agent, receives the payment instruction;68 (3) when the 
payee’s bank acts on the payment instruction by crediting the payee’s account 
on its computerised records;69 (4) when the payee’s account is actually credited 
with the transacted fund;70 (5) when the payee is informed of the receipt of the 
                                               
68
 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia (The Laconia) [1977] A.C. 
850 at p. 880 and 889 per Lord Salmon and Lord Russell. 
69
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transaction funds;71  and (6) when the payee expressly or implicitly accepts 
receipt of the transaction fund.  
4.3.2 Revocation of EFT payment 
In the EFT contractual agreement the bank acts as agent to the customer.72 
Thus, the bank has to apply its customer mandate to transfer (credit transfer) or 
collect (debit transfer) a fund from one account to another. 73  However, the 
following points require clarification: First, the payer has the right to revoke the 
payment order as long as it has not been executed by the payer’s bank. 
Second, the payer loses his right to revoke the payment order from the moment 
the bank acted on the payment instruction and transmitted the instruction to the 
payee’s account. Thirdly, for a debit transfer order the payer loses his right to 
revoke the payment order from the moment the payer’s bank acted on the 
payment instruction. Finally, the payee has the right to the money transferred 
after the payment order is executed. There is concern about revocation 
payment instruction with EFT. Cranston74 presents general rules of revocation 
of payment instruction which apply in the non-existence of explicit agreement. 
He states:  
“In the absence of express contract, the authorities seem to establish the 
following propositions … Firstly, a customer who instructs its bank to hold 
funds to the disposal of a third party can countermand at least until the 
time when the funds have been transferred or credit given to the 
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transferee. Secondly, a customer who instructs its bank to transfer funds 
to a third party cannot revoke from the moment the bank incurs a 
commitment to the third party. Thirdly ─ and this is the typical case ─ a 
customer who instructs its bank to pay another bank to the order of a third 
party cannot revoke once the payee bank has acted on the instructions. 
This may be a point prior to crediting the payee’s account. In all cases, it is 
irrelevant, from the point of view of revocation, whether the third party has 
been informed.”75 
According to the Cranston rules, in the usual case where there is a paying bank 
and collecting bank in the EFT transaction, the customer’s mandate is final and 
cannot be countermanded from the moment the collecting bank accepts the 
paying bank’s payment instruction,76 even though, to prevent any doubt as to 
the customer’s right of revocation of the EFT instruction, the paying bank’s 
agreement with the customer may consist of an express provision which 
prevents the customer from revoking the payment order after an exact point in 
the settlement procedures.77 Otherwise, the customer must comply with the 
rules of the payment system used to make the funds transfer where those rules 
are applicable according to banking usage. Therefore, countermanding of 
payment orders will typically be a matter governed by explicit or implicit rules of 
the payment system involved in affecting the transfer.78 
The EFT is completed only when the funds are actually credited in the payee’s 
bank.79 On the question of general rules, and with an absence of statutory rules, 
the common law has investigated ‘payment finality’ and seems to have 
recognised different, apparently incompatible positions. 
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4.3.3 Completion of EFT payment 
It has previously been explained that a credit transfer instruction is initiated by 
the payer ordering the bank to transfer funds to the payee’s bank account, while 
a debit transfer instruction is initiated by the payee ordering his bank to 
withdraw the funds transaction from the payer’s bank account. In a debit 
transfer, where the payee’s bank withdraws funds from the payer’s bank 
account, there is no doubt that the payee’s bank acts as an agent for the 
payee. 80  Nevertheless, in credit transfers this position is uncertain. In this 
context, Cox and Taylor agree that the payee’s bank collects the funds in a 
manner similar to that of any other settlement into a customer’s account, thus 
the payee bank is acting as an agent to the payee. 81  This point is well 
demonstrated in Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia 
(The Laconia) where the House of Lords held that a bank which has no actual 
or ostensible authority from the payee to accept a payment order cannot accept 
the transfer and credit the payee’s account.82 Although this case concerned the 
charter of a ship, it has general application to the law of agency. The creditor’s 
bank received a telex message requesting it to credit the shipowner’s account 
with the transaction funds under a charter party. The telex message was 
received at the creditor’s bank after the date arranged in the charter party. The 
bank nevertheless began the process of crediting the ship-owner’s account 
before it had received an order from the ship-owner to reject late payment. On 
receiving the order, however, it rejected the payment and returned the funds to 
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the payer’s bank without carrying out the actual entry. The House of Lords held 
that the owners’ bank had only limited authority to receive the payment and 
obtain instructions from the owners; it did not have authority to accept the late 
payment on behalf of the owners and had no authority to waive the owners’ 
rights to withdraw the vessel.83 Nevertheless the bank had taken delivery of the 
payment order and had begun to process it, these were held to be purely 
ministerial acts and, as such, provisional and reversible.84  
The Laconia demonstrated that the finality of payment between the payer and 
the payee occurred only when the payee’s bank has the payee’s actual or 
ostensible authority to receive and accept the funds transfer on the payee’s 
behalf. In this case, the ship-owners bank had no absolute authority; it had the 
authority to receive the funds transfer but not to accept the later payments on 
behalf of the owners.85 King however has expressed disagreement that view, 
and explained that in credit transfer orders the contract between the payee’s 
bank and the payee is not one of agency but one of banker and customer 
relationship.86 King argues:87 
“it is inappropriate to say that the bank receives money paid by the 
customer into his own account as agent for the customer it is also 
inappropriate to say that the bank receives money paid by a third party for 
the account of the customer as agent for the customer.” 
                                               
83
 The Laconia [1977] A.C. 850 at p. 871. 
84
 Ibid., at p. 872. 
85
 Ibid., at pp. 871-872. 
86
 King, R., ‘The receiving bank’s role in credit transfer transactions’, (1982) 45 the Modern Law 
Review 369 at p. 369. 
87
 Ibid., at p. 373. 
200 
 
Furthermore, King affirmed that in credit transfer orders the payee’s bank is the 
agent or sub-agent of the payer.88 According to this interpretation, in credit 
transfer orders the payee authorizes the bank to receive the payment not as 
payee’s agent but according to normal procedure with its customer, the payee, 
as it would any other payment into a payee’s account.89 But King has been 
criticized by other legal authors90 who have presented arguments to justify an 
assumption that the payee’s bank should be regarded as an agent of the payee 
in the credit transfer order.91 The reasoning is as follows: First, it is made clear 
that there are two contracts, the first contract between the payee’s bank and the 
paying bank, and the second contract between the payee’s bank and the payee. 
Therefore, when the payee’s bank has received the funds transfers from the 
paying bank it is under duty of contract with the payee, so that the payee’s bank 
ought to be constituted as an agent for the payee.92 Secondly, the absence of 
an agency relationship between the payee’s bank and the payee may lead to 
unauthorized fund transfers. If the payee’s bank is not the payee’s agent but the 
paying bank sends funds to the payee’s bank without the authority of the payee 
then such a transfer would not discharge the payer’s underlying indebtedness to 
the payee. Thirdly, one of the principles for the completion of payment between 
the payer and the payee is that the payee’s bank should act as the payee’s 
agent in receiving the funds before a credit is addressed to the payee’s account. 
Fourthly, the absence of an agency relationship between the payee’s bank and 
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the payee results in an unsure distinction between different types of funds 
transfer so far as finality of payment is concerned.93 The common law rules hold 
that in credit transfer payments the payee’s bank acts as an agent of the 
payee.94 The standing instruction in credit transfers is an order by the payer to 
the bank, as agent, to transfer a sum of funds from the payer’s account to the 
payee’s account. When the payee accepts payment by funds transfer it means 
that he accepts a right of action versus his own bank instead of his right of 
action versus the payer.95 Such replacement of one debtor by another is similar 
to payment in cash and the payment between the payer and the payee is 
considered final.96 However, there is too much ambiguity in identifying the exact 
time of replacement, when the payee’s bank becomes the payee’s debtor 
instead of the payer, for this to be the point where payment is final. In The 
Brimnes,97 the charterers’ bank in London, Hambros, had an account with the 
shipowners’ bank in New York, MGT. The charterers by Telex instructed their 
bankers, Hambros, to credit the owners' account with a MGT, with the amount 
of the hire due. Hambros sent a Telex instruction to MGT to debit their account 
with the amount of the hire and credit it to the owners' account (to make an 
intra-branch funds transfer). The Court of Appeal held that the payment was 
complete when MGT decided to debit the account of Hambros, the payer’s 
agent, and credit the account of the shipowners, the payee. 98 Accordingly, it is 
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not necessary to inform the payee about the transfer, nevertheless, a decision 
to transfer need not have been executed, in whole or part, before the payment 
is considered final.  
Even though, in the early stage of the same case, Brandon J. had that in 
“modern commercial practice”99 this expression included: 
 “any commercially recognised method of transferring funds the result of 
which is to give the transferee the unconditional right to the immediate use 
of the funds transferred.”100 
The concept of “unconditional” was broadly interpreted in The Chikuma where 
the House of Lords referred to unconditional to mean “unfettered and 
unrestricted”, and that “the transferee's right to the use of the funds transferred 
is neither subject to the fulfilment of a condition precedent nor defeasible on 
failure to fulfil a condition subsequent.”.101 
It appears that EFT payment is considered final only when the payee is granted 
an absolute and unrestricted right versus the payee’s bank to the direct use of 
the funds transferred. The question thus raised is: at what point does the payee 
obtain unfettered and unrestricted right versus the payee’s bank? 
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4.3.3.1 EFT finality in transactions between bank accounts held in 
the same branch of the same bank (intra-branch) 
The completion of an EFT payment between the payer’s account and the 
payee’s account when both have an account in the same branch of the same 
bank occurs directly when the bank agrees to make the transfer,102 assuming 
the payee’s bank has an actual or ostensible (payee’s) authority to accept 
payment on behalf of the payee,103 regardless of whether the payee’s account 
is credited with the money transferred and regardless of whether the payee has 
been informed of the transfer.104 If the payee was informed of the transfer or if it 
was credited to the bank account this indicates to the court that the bank had 
decided to carry out the transfer. Nonetheless, there is nothing to prevent the 
payer and the payee from including in their contract the provision that payment 
is not considered final unless either of these circumstances has happened. 
Eyles v Ellis105 was one of the initial cases dealing with intra-branch transfer. In 
this case the payer ordered his bank to transfer funds to the payee, whose 
account was in the same bank, in payment of rent. The bank executed the 
transfer and sent a letter to the payee informing of it. Meanwhile and before the 
payee received the letter, the bank became insolvent. The Court of Common 
Pleas held that the payment was final. The court’s held Best C.J. judgment 
which was that payment occurred when the funds were actually transferred and 
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credited in the payee’s account. Informing the payee was not directly related to 
the payment issue.106 
Nonetheless, in Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko AO107 the Court of Appeal did not 
refer to the Eyles v Ellis case. The absence of such a reference could be 
justified as it was not cited by counsel nor referred to in the judgments delivered 
in the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal which could mean that the case 
did not become a judicial precedent. In Rekstin, the court held that the payment 
was considered final only when notice had been given to the payee informing 
him of the funds transfer. However, in this case the facts are unusual, the 
claimant, Rekstin, had a judgment against Severo, a Russian trading firm, the 
first defendant, who held an account at the bank which was the second 
defendant (the bank). To prohibit Rekstin levying execution upon the funds in 
that account, Severo instructed their bank to transfer the balance of their current 
account to another customer account of the same branch, and to close their 
account, this account being that of a Russian trade delegation with diplomatic 
immunity. On receipt of the instruction, the bank made the necessary inquiries 
and interest calculation to close Severo’s account. Nevertheless, before a credit 
record could be placed in the trade delegation’s account, the bank was served 
with a garnishee order nisi in regard of Rekstin’s judgement versus Severo. The 
bank contended that, because of Severo’s payment order and its own action, no 
debt existed as between them (the bank and Severo) at the time the garnishee 
order was served, therefore there was nothing on which the garnishee order 
could affect.  At the time the garnishee order was served on the bank, Severo 
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did not owe any debt to the trade delegation, thus the trade delegation neither 
knew of, nor agreed to, the funds transfer which evidently made the bank under 
no liability to Severo.108  
In Rekstin the Divisional Court 109  and Court of Appeal 110  it was held that 
Severo’s payment order could be countermanded at the time when the 
garnishee order was served, and that service of that instruction functioned in 
law as a revocation. The courts111 held that the payment should be considered 
complete when the payee has been informed that the funds had been posted to 
his account. Talbot J. held: 
“But in truth the bank never ceases to owe the money to the transferor 
until they have actually disposed of it according to his instructions; that is, 
paid it to the transferee and borrowed it from him. It is quite clear that this 
cannot be done by mere entries in the bank’s books without 
communication with the transferee; if it could, there would be an interval 
during which the bank would owe the money to no one, not to the 
transferor, because the debt to him would on the hypothesis be cancelled, 
nor to the transferee, because there would be no privity between him and 
the bank.”112 
Lord Hanworth113 held this view but nonetheless presented another reason to 
justify this opinion, based on Gibson v Minet, 114  where it was held that 
countermand of a payment order was acceptable as long as the payer’s 
account was not debited and the payee’s account was not credited with the sum 
transferred. Therefore Lord Hanworth M.R. held that Severo’s payment order 
was countermanded at the same time as the bank was served with the 
garnishee order due to the fact that ‘nothing amounting to a payment to the 
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delegation or an appropriation to their credit’. 115  According to Talbot J. the 
payment was to be considered final only if there was ‘communication with the 
payee’. The author’s view is that a typical communication method with the 
payee would be a letter from the payee’s bank to the payee, or by any method 
agreed between them, such as telex or telephone message, informing the 
payee that the funds had been credited to his account. But what would happen, 
for example, if the payer ordered the bank to cancel notice of the payment to 
the payee by telex or telephone between the time the notice was posted and the 
time of receipt? Kerr J. in Momm v Barclays Bank International Ltd held that ‘as 
a matter of law, the payer’s bank would not have accepted revoking instructions 
from the payer after the process of crediting the payee’s account had been set 
in motion pursuant to the payer's telex instructions’.116 It can therefore be said 
that payment becomes final and cannot be countermanded at the time it is 
delivered to the payee’s bank.117 However, there is uncertainty at which point in 
time the payee’s bank accepts transfer of the transaction’s funds on the payee’s 
behalf. 118 Kerr J. in Momm v Barclays Bank International Ltd119 presented a 
response to the issue of the exact time at which payment has made to the 
payee, enabling the payee to use such funds in the same way as cash. In this 
case the claimant and the Herstatt Bank, a German bank, both had an account 
in a London branch of Barclays, the defendant. In accordance with the contract 
between the Herstatt and the claimant, on 25 June Herstatt ordered Barclays to 
pay £120,000 from their account to the claimant’s account as part of a currency 
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exchange transaction. On 26 June 1974 the payment was duly made, and set in 
motion the appropriate computer processes to execute it in spite of the fact that 
Herstatt’s account had insufficient funds. Later on the same day it became 
known by Barclays that Herstatt suspended payment. However no action was 
taken by Barclays and therefore the transfer from Herstatt to the claimant was 
completed by the bank’s central computer at the end of the day. Although the 
final transfer was shown on the bank’s central computer Barclays did not 
reverse certain transactions until the following day. When the claimant later 
discovered what had occurred it claimed that the transfer had been irrevocable 
and that Herstatt Bank had wrongfully debited its account with £120,000.120 The 
judgment was for the claimant. Kerr J. held that the payment between the 
Herstatt and the claimant became final at the moment Barclays accepted 
Herstatt’s orders to credit the claimant’s account and the computer processes 
were set in motion.121 In Momm, the court held that the finality of payment 
between the payer and the payee was not conditional upon the payee being 
informed.122 Kerr J. held: 
“although the defendants did on occasion reverse certain transactions 
when the final balances had been produced by the central computer the 
day following the transactions, their transfer … was not a conditional 
transfer; that, accordingly, the transaction was completed on June 26 
when the defendants accepted H's instructions to credit the plaintiffs' 
account and the computer processes were set in motion; and that, 
therefore, after the close of working hours on June 26, the defendants 
were not entitled to debit that sum from the plaintiffs' account even though 
the original transfer had not been notified to the plaintiffs.”123 
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Kerr J. distinguished Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko AO as a case where decided on 
its special facts.124 Kerr J. emphasised that what was significant in Rekstin was 
that the payee had no knowledge of the proposed transfer, that there was no 
underlying transaction between the payer, Severo, and the payee, the trade 
delegation, and that the payee’s account had never been credited with the 
funds that were supposedly transferred to it.125 Indeed, in Rekstin the bank had 
no authority from the payee to receive the funds on its behalf. The bank had no 
actual authority to receive the funds because the payee knew nothing of it, nor 
could they have expected that it would be made. Moreover, there was no 
ostensible authority to receive the funds because the payer was aware that 
there was no reason for the transfer to be passed, apart from the protection of 
its own interest. Thus the payment to the payee, (the trade delegation), had not 
been made because it had not received notice of the payment. By contrast, in 
Momm there was a currency exchange contract between Herstatt and the 
claimant by which the payment should have been transferred into the claimant’s 
account at Barclays. Thus, the bank obviously had the claimant’s authority to 
receive the funds on the claimant’s behalf. 
It is suggested that the most significant point of Kerr J.’s decision is that the 
time of payment finality was when the payee’s bank agreed to credit the payee’s 
account.126 Moreover it is suggested that Kerr J.’s reference to the fact that the 
bank had begun the computer operation for affecting the transfer is additional 
evidence of the bank accepting to credit the payee’s account. Although, Cox 
and Taylor argued that evidence of the bank accepting to credit the payee’s 
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account could be available from different resources, for example, the bank’s 
own authorization slips or other internal memoranda.127 Nonetheless, the bank 
must accept the transference of an absolute credit right to the payee’s account 
in order for the payment to be considered final. Consequently, the granting of 
conditional or provisional credit would argue for subsequent reversal. 128  In 
Momm such a point was not considered problematical because the transfer of 
funds took place in the same branch of the same bank. In other cases, 
nonetheless, it is clear that there could be a problem, since the bank may be 
uncertain of being put in funds and so agrees to make only a provisional credit 
to the payee’s account pending the receipt of the transactions’ funds. The 
question thus arises: must the payee’s account be credited to indicate that the 
payment is completed? 
In Momm the court considered the finality of payment to be at the moment the 
bank agreed to credit the payee’s account, the actual credit being no more than 
a report of the earlier payment. Although, this view conflicts with Eyles v Ellis, it 
is consistent with the approach taken in The Brimnes by Brandon J. and 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal,129 which held that the payment was complete 
when the payer’s bank decided to debit the account of the payer’s agent, 
payer’s account, and credit the account of the payee.130 Within such case, it 
appears that informing the payee is not important, and also that a decision to 
transfer need not have been executed, in whole or in part, before the payment 
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is considered final.131 Geva132 has argued that designating the posting of a 
credit to the payee’s account as the time of payment creates two uncertainties. 
These are: ‘First, the credit posted to the account may be provisional or 
conditional upon arrival of funds, the posting of a provisional credit to a payee’s 
account cannot be viewed as conferring upon him an ‘unfettered and 
unrestricted’ right, as required. Second, the exact time of finality or irreversibility 
in the internal system of posting a credit to an account may not be definitely 
established.’133 
Nevertheless, considering the time of crediting the payee’s account as the time 
of completion of payment raises difficulty as same as which may arise in 
practice,134 since a court has to determine the exact moment when the bank 
made a decision to debit the debtor’s account and credit the creditor’s account. 
Cox and Taylor agree that in practice, it is very difficult to determine the exact 
moment of the decision to make the transfer.135 In Momm Kerr J. introduced 
rules which could be useful to apply when it is impossible to define the exact 
time of the bank’s decision to make the transfer. Kerr J. held that: 
“a payment has been made if the payee’s account is credited with the 
payment at the close of business on the value date, at any rate if it was 
credited intentionally and in good faith and not by error or fraud.”136 
According to this view, it seems that, while it is impossible to point to an exact 
moment when a ‘decision’ has been made by the bank to make a transfer, it is 
to be expected that the transfer will have been made at the end of the business 
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day on which the transfer note is processed.137 In Momm the court found it 
unnecessary to define the exact moment in the day at which the payment was 
made. The important issue in the case was to determine whether the payment 
was final on 26 June before it was reversed on the following day. By contrast, in 
Rekstin the exact time of payment was not required because the court 
concentrated on the moment the actual credit was made to the payee’s account 
and this focus possibly provided the court with positive evidence that the 
payment was final. Mann138 considers it unacceptable for the finality of payment 
to be the moment when the bank accepts to debit the payer’s account and to 
credit the payee’s account without actual credit. His view is that the payment is 
to be considered final when the payee has the right to use the funds as an 
equivalent to cash. Mann states: 
“it is submitted that such result [the payment is final when the bank agreed 
to debit the debtor’s account and credit the creditor’s account without 
actual credit to the payee’s account]139 are unacceptable, for so long as 
the recipient’s account has not been credited he is unable to dispose of 
the money. The possibility of immediate and unconditional use of the 
money should be the test of effective payment. Nothing short of a credit 
entry achieves this.’’140 
Hapgood, et al,141 Cox and Taylor142 agree against Mann’s approach for the 
following reasons: first, Mann’s approach does not take into account that a 
chose in action can arise in the payee’s favour without actual credit to his 
account. If it were otherwise, the bank could allege that it was not indebted to 
the payee whenever, as a result of the bank’s computer mistake, it fails to credit 
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a fund to the payee’s account. Secondly, Talbot J. in Rekstin considered that 
the ‘mere closing of an account does not discharge or cancel the bank’s debt to 
the customer; the bank owed the customer the funds until it paid’, such fact 
being considered as evidence for the underlying debt. Ultimately, considering 
the payment is made between the payee and the payer only when the payee’s 
account is actually credited, it would cause the payer to owe the payee until the 
payee’s bank’s procedure is completed, that is, to owe the payee during the 
period between the time when the payee’s bank decided to make the payment 
and the time of the actual crediting of the payee’s account.143 In conclusion, 
intra-branch fund transfers are considered final when the bank agrees to make 
the payment, regardless of whether the funds have been credited to the payee’s 
account. However, any agreement between the payer and the payee for 
allowing a particular time for the completion of the payment must be taken into 
account. 
4.3.3.2 EFT Finality in transactions between bank accounts held in 
different branches of the same bank (inter-branch) 
Momm defined the finality of payment in cases involving intra-branch fund 
transfers. However, there is no obstacle to applying Momm’s rules in cases of 
inter-branch fund transfers.144 Thus, according to Momm’s rules, payment is 
final when the bank agrees to credit the payee’s account absolutely, supposing 
that the bank has the payee’s actual or ostensible authority to accept the funds 
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transfer on the payee’s behalf. Inter-branch fund transfers, however, are subject 
to particular problems, for example, when the payer’s bank has agreed to make 
an inter-branch transfer on behalf of the payer but the payee has ordered his 
bank to refuse all transfers from that payer. The answer could be simply that, 
unless otherwise agreed, the customer has the right to request refunds only at 
the branch where his account is located. 145  Therefore, the most significant 
branch in determining the finality of an inter-branch EFT is the payee’s branch 
where the latter’s account is held as the payee and the payees’ bank 
relationship is concerned.146 On this ground, the payment between accounts 
held in different branches of the same bank is considered final when the 
payee’s branch agrees to make the payment and to credit the payee’s 
account.147  
4.3.3.3 EFT Finality in transactions between bank accounts held in a 
different banks (inter-bank) 
EFT transactions may involve accounts held at different banks. The finality of 
payment between the payer and the payee takes place when the payee’s bank 
accepts the payment instruction from the payer’s bank and agrees to make 
unconditional credit to the payee’s account with the transaction fund, assuming 
that the payee’s bank has the payee’s actual or ostensible authority to accept 
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payment on the payee’s behalf.148 Regardless of whether the payee’s bank has 
actually credited the payee’s account and regardless of whether it has informed 
the payee of the transfer.149 Nevertheless, the actual crediting of the payee’s 
account or notice to the payee of the transfer will be significant evidence for the 
claim that the payee’s bank has agreed to make the payment on the payee’s 
behalf.150 However, any agreement between the payer and the payee must be 
taken into consideration. Therefore if the agreement establishes that the 
payment is considered final only when the payee’s bank has actually credited 
the payee’s account or when the payee has been informed of the transfer then 
the payment is considered final only when such conditions have been 
executed. 151  Consequently, as soon as the payee’s bank has accepted 
unconditionally a payment to credit the payee’s account, it confirms that the 
payee is one of its creditors and such an agreement makes it a substitute for 
the payer as the payee’s debtor. Payment between the payer and the payee is 
then constituted as final.152 Receive of funds on the part of the payee’s bank to 
make the payment and to credit the account with the funds transfer is 
insufficient to consider that the payment has been made.153 The payee’s bank 
must accept these funds for the payee’s account which is vital. There are many 
significant legal circumstances which permit the bank to decline the transfer of 
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funds to the payee’s account. For example, the bank may have no authority 
from the payee to accept the payment order, or the bank cannot accept the 
payment order to credit the payee’s account without breaking some existent 
law, the existing law may prohibit credits being passed to the account of certain 
foreign nationals.154 Consequently, until the payee’s bank has agreed to make a 
funds transfer to the payee’s account it acts as agent for the payer. However, 
funds transferred from the payer’s bank account to the payee’s bank constitute 
final payment between the payer and the payee only if it is credited in the 
payee’s bank, which has the payee’s actual or ostensible authority to receive 
and accept the payment, and the payee’s bank was informed of the details of 
where the payee’s funds were to be credited.155 
The next issue is whether acceptance of the funds transfer by the payee’s bank 
is designated as the point of finality of payment. The answer is that once the 
payee’s bank agrees to credit the payee’s account unconditionally, it accepts a 
credit risk so that it becomes indebted to the payee and payment between 
payer and payee is final.156 As explained above, payment as between payer 
and payee will be final only when the funds are credited to in the payee’s bank 
which has the payee’s actual or ostensible authority to receive and accept the 
payment on the payee’s behalf. In some cases, the payee may give the payer 
actual notice by informing him not to pass further payments. Therefore, any 
further payment from the payer would be outside the terms of the underlying 
agreement between them. In such case the payee’s bank itself has no actual or 
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ostensible authority to receive and accept this payment on the payee’s behalf. 
In this respect the payee has the right to exert his authority to make the bank 
accept that payment. This extension of authority has to be imposed before the 
payee’s bank rejects the payment. In the Laconia, Lord Salmon held that: ‘the 
ship-owners could have been considered to have accepted the payment if their 
bank had kept it for an unreasonable time. EFT finality occurred when the 
payee’s bank accepted the payment on behalf of the payee and credited the 
funds to his account.’157 Ultimately, in the inter-bank transfer the legal nature of 
transfer is conditional, and thus, the EFT is completed only when the funds are 
actually credited to the payee’s account and can be used by the payee as 
equivalent to cash.158 Thus, the payee must has ‘unfettered and unrestricted’ 
rights to use the transaction funds for the payment to be considered final. Geva 
confirms that, so far as the execution of rules is concerned, English courts have 
failed to provide a fully consistent scheme for determining the ‘finality of 
payment’.159  therefore, it is the delay prior to the point at which funds are 
credited to the payee’s account which led courts to find an earlier point of 
finality, for example, the receipt of a payment instruction by the payee’s bank, a 
concept that later fell out of favour; or the point at which the payee’s bank 
decides to credit the payee’s account.160 
Given the above exposition, it seems that banking practice has developed over 
the years and such development leads to the requirement of rules subject to the 
payer’s right to revoke payment or to demand a reversal of entries. The author’s 
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view is that the absence of any particular rules to apply to EFT finality leaves 
the courts with no option except to draw an analogy with the finality of the 
clearing cycle of cheques, which is determined exclusively by banking practice. 
The analogy, however, must be taken from cases which determine the time at 
which payment by cash is completed between the payer and payee.  
The author’s view is that, first of all, an EFT between banks, or between a bank 
and its customer, is to be considered final when the transaction fund is 
irrevocably available to, and accepted by, the payee’s bank.  
However, in this context, it is worth noting the banker’s right to “set off” or 
“combine” accounts.  Where a customer keeps more than one account with his 
bank, the bank has a general right to set off a credit balance on one account 
against a debit balance on another account.  The existence of the right of set off 
does not depend on any express term in the banker-customer contract. 161  
However, it may be excluded by an express term in the contract prohibiting the 
bank from combining its customer’s accounts.  In the absence of any exclusion, 
the bank can transfer money from an account that is in credit in order to make 
payments due on another account.162 Where a customer has an overdrawn 
account, the bank can also use the right of set off to apply any funds received 
on behalf of the customer in reducing the overdrawn balance. In the context of 
EFT “set off” is important because it gives the payee’s bank some control over 
what happens to funds received on the payee’s behalf.  So, if a payee has an 
overdrawn current account and a savings account with a credit balance and the 
bank then receives funds on the payee’s behalf, the bank can use the right of 
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 Garnett v M’Kewan (1872) LR 8 Ex., at pp. 10, 13, and 14; Cinema Plus Ltd v ANZ Banking 
Group Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 1. 
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 Further details, see Ellinger, et al., op.cit., pp. 248-266. 
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“set off” to apply the funds in reduction of the overdraft (regardless of whether 
the payee has directed the funds to be applied to the savings account). 
Financial Ombudsman Services clarifies that there must be certain conditions 
before a bank can exercise its right of “set off”. These conditions are: first, the 
account from which the bank transfers funds must be held by the customer who 
owes the bank money; secondly, the debt must be due and payable.163 
In this regard, it is important to explain that “netting”164 and “set off” are really 
significant issues in the context of bankruptcy/insolvency. Suppose A owes B £1 
million and B owes A £1 million.  In the absence of any “netting” or “set off”, 
these would be treated as separate liabilities.  This is important and can have 
dramatic consequences.  If B were to become bankrupt, then A would still be 
liable to pay £1 million to B’s trustee in bankruptcy, for example, the official 
responsible for administering B’s affairs following his bankruptcy, but A would 
have to compete with all of B’s other creditors to get any of the £1 million owed 
to him by B.  If B’s total assets amount to £5 million, but his total debts amount 
to £100 million, then each creditor is going to receive 5% of what they are 
owed.  Therefore, A will end up having to pay his debt to B of £1 million in full, 
but receiving back only with £50,000 of the total debt of £1 million from B’s 
bankruptcy.  So, without any netting or set off, A would effectively lose 
£950,000. In contrast, if A can set off his debt to B against the debt owed to him 
by B, then A does not have to pay anything at all to B’s trustee in 
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 Financial Ombudsman Services, issue 40,  
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bankruptcy.  In this example, the £1 million debts will effectively cancel each 
other out.    
Finally, “set off”, which applies between banks and their customers, may 
therefore be important for a bank in cases where its customers become 
bankrupt. This is quite different from the concept of “netting”, which is 
concerned with the settlement of reciprocal payment obligations between 
banks,165 is likely to be even more important, because of the amounts involved, 
for a bank in cases where another bank becomes insolvent.   
Secondly, the EFT between the payer and the payee is to be considered final 
when payment acts as an unconditional order of the payee. It appears that there 
is a need to regulate the EFT completion principles by means of a statutory 
instrument, or at least to find a general principle applicable to all the cases in 
question.166  
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 Further about “netting” see chapter one, section 1.2. 
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 See chapter seven, section 7.3 for the author’s proposal model of EFT finality rules. 
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Table 5: Comparison points between the PSR 2009 and Common law in the EFT 
finality. 
Attributes PSR 2009 provisions Common law rules 
Revocation The payer has the right to 
revoke as long as the payee’s 
account is not credited 
The payer has the right to 
revoke as long as the payer’s 
bank did not execute the 
payment instruction 
Accepting the 
payment instruction 
by the payee’s bank 
Not applicable The payee’s bank must accept 
the payment instruction 
Finality of payment  Credited the payee’s 
bank account; or  
 Credited the payee’s 
account and there is no 
place to make any 
condition or provision on 
the receiver funds 
 Debited the payer’s 
account; or  
 Accept the payee’s bank 
the transaction funds 
Value available Equal to cash Not actually is available to the 
payee similar to cash 
Liability of the 
payer’s bank 
Strict liability Exercise all reasonable care 
and skill 
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4.4 The legal nature of payment devices  
If the payer makes a payment to the payee using one of the EFT devices, for 
example, a debit card or a credit card, and all goes well, the outcome will be a 
debit of the payer’s bank account and a credit of the payee’s bank account. All 
significant stages of the transaction between payer and payee will have been 
completed. But assume that between the time the payment instruction was 
issued and the time that it would have been completed, one of the banks 
participating in the EFT operation became insolvent. The problem then is to 
decide whether the payment instruction has continued to the point where the 
payer’s responsibility to the payee has been settled, or whether the payee can 
still proceed against the payer according to the underlying agreement regarding 
responsibility. The legal nature of the funds transfer and the legal nature of 
payment methods serve to determine which party bears the risk in cases of 
bank insolvency. Earlier, the legal nature of the funds transfer was explained. In 
the next sections the legal nature of the payment devices will be examined in 
order to determine which party bears the risk of non-payment in the context of 
EFT transactions. 
4.4.1. The conditional payment  
Generally, payment by cards is one of the EFT transactions which are 
described as a debit transfer. As a result of a debit transfer order the payee’s 
bank account is credited and the payer’s bank account is debited. In this 
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settlement operation the payee’s bank is acting as an agent for the payee.167 It 
is difficult to determine whether an EFTPOS payment (debit card payment) is a 
debit transfer order or a credit transfer order. The point is best clarified by 
answering the following questions, viz: did the payer order his bank to debit his 
account and transfer the fund to the payee's bank account? Or did the payee 
order his bank to credit his account by collecting the funds from the payer’s 
bank and the payer’s bank debiting payer’s account? The answer could be 
either credit transfer or debit transfer. In practice, payer and payee issue a 
communication that goes to a data processing unit which is acting on behalf of 
both the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank. 168  That data processing unit 
contacts the payer’s bank and establishes whether the card is authorized and 
whether the payer, the cardholder, has sufficient funds to pay for the 
transaction. The normal outcome of the data processing is that the cardholder’s 
account will be debited and the payee’s account credited. Normally there is an 
underlying obligation between the cardholder and the payee. Thus, the issue is, 
after the payment transaction order takes place how has the underlying 
obligation has been affected, assuming that the payment order was rightly 
executed by the payer. What if, however, the transaction’s funds did not credit 
the payee’s account so that the payment is not made? Does the payee have the 
right to claim payment due to the underlying obligation? The main right of the 
contract between the payer and the payee is the supply of goods and services 
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 Particularly, see The Laconia [1976] Q.B. 835 at p. 847, per Lord Denning; Royal Products v 
Midland Bank [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 194 at pp. 198-199 and pp. 201-203, per Webster J. 
168 Rogers, J. S., ‘Unification of payments law and the problem of insolvency risk in payment 
systems’, (2008) 83 Chicago Kent Law Review 689 at p.709. 
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to the payer, and the main obligation is payment at the same time.169 If the 
obligation is not fulfilled the answer could be that the payee has the right to 
claim the payment due to the underlying obligation. Nevertheless, to answer this 
question it is necessary to analyse the legal nature of payment by debit card.  
There is a legal view which considers payment by debit cards as an absolute 
payment.170 Ellinger, et al.171 Smith and Robertson172 strongly support such a 
view and they agree that payment by debit cards is dissimilar to payment by 
cheque. There is dissimilarity in legal nature, however, when the debit card 
holder does not have credit.173 According to Smith and Robertson’s view it can 
reasonably be argued that the payment order took place once the payer and the 
payee issued the payment order and the payer’s bank debited the payer’s 
account. They also argue that any agreement between the cardholder, the 
payer, and the payer’s bank has to be taken into account, so that if the 
agreement establishes that the payer’s bank guarantees payment by debit 
cards by issuing an authorized overdraft facility the bank will be liable to make 
the payment. Consequently, the payer and the payer’s bank may consider 
payment by debit card absolute, as a result of which the payee has no right to 
demand the cardholder to pay again under any circumstances,174 such as in the 
event of the insolvency of the payer’s bank. Ellinger175 et al. state that under 
debit cards schemes the bank and not the holder is liable to the payee for 
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payment. He stated: ‘in case of the risk of bank insolvency the payee has no 
right to claim the card-holder (payer) to pay again.’ But such an argument 
depends on the transaction having been affected’. 
It should be noted here that the legal nature of payment by debit card is 
conditional, although it could have an absolute nature: in cases where there are 
insufficient funds in the customer’s account and there is no authorized overdraft 
agreement. The bank is under the duty to make payment with regard to the 
customer’s mandate176 only if the customer has enough money in his account or 
has obtained an overdraft facility from the bank by prior agreement. Therefore, if 
there is insufficient credit or there is no overdraft facility the bank is not obliged 
to pass payment and has the right to reject the payment mandate on the basis 
of inadequate funds. 177  In this regard, it has been submitted as a general 
principle of law that a payment by debit card is conditional. Therefore, if the 
bank failed to pay it by reason of insolvency the drawer who is under obligation 
has to pay and the risk will be on him.178  
Nonetheless, the conditional nature of payment by debit card applies if there is 
no overdraft facility and the funds are withdrawn from the payer’s current 
account.179 Therefore, if there is an overdraft facility, payment by debit card is 
considered absolute and the bank will be liable to make payment to the 
payee.180 Overdraft is one of the bank's facilities to customers who open current 
accounts and it authorizes the customer to withdraw even when his balance is 
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in debit.181 The customer’s balance will be owed to the banker. The banks grant 
the customer an overdraft according to an agreement between the bank and the 
customer, which is a planned overdraft; however, the customer may have such 
a facility even if there is no agreement, which is an unplanned overdraft.182 The 
planned overdraft puts the bank under an obligation to make the payment on 
behalf of the payer,183 whereas if the overdraft is unplanned the bank can refuse 
to make the payment.184 In practice, even if there is no agreement allowing 
customers to obtain an overdraft they may, with the bank’s approval, be 
provided with an unauthorized overdraft to cover the payment.185 The bank is 
free to choose whether or not to allow such a facility. Nevertheless, the 
customer must be aware of the interest charges and know that payment will 
have to be made to the bank if the overdraft occurred without authorization.186 
The unplanned overdraft is considered as an implied request from the customer 
to the bank to grant an overdraft facility.187 If the overdraft facility was arranged 
between the parties then the bank must make the payment and the customer is 
indebted to the bank. 
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http://www.lloydstsb.com/media/lloydstsb2004/pdfs/personal_banking_terms_and_conditions.pd
f; HSBC, General Terms and Conditions, Current Account Terms and Conditions 2012, section 
3 http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/PA_esf-ca-app-
content/content/uk/pdfs/en/General_Current_Accounts_Aprl1.pdf; Barclays, Customer 
Agreement 2012, section 5 
http://www.barclays.co.uk/ImportantInformation/TermsandConditions/P1242575350746 9 April 
2013. 
182
 Ibid.; Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National [2008] C.T.L.C. 1. 
183
 Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] Q.B. 677 at p. 699 per 
Goff J. 
184
 Barclays Customer Agreement, section 4(4.5) 
http://www.barclays.co.uk/ImportantInformation/TermsandConditions/P1242575350746 9 April 
2013. 
185
 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National [2010] 1 A.C. 696. 
186
 Ibid., at p.755. 
187
 Lloyds Bank Plc v Independent Insurance Co Ltd [2000] 1 Q.B. 110 at p. 118. 
226 
 
Where there is an unauthorized overdraft facility the bank may not immediately 
grant such a facility but may undertake various processes in order to determine 
whether or not to allow such a facility. It is well known that when a customer 
requests overdraft facilities, whether implicitly or explicitly, the bank is free to 
grant or disallow such a facility without being in breach of banker-customer 
contractual duties.188 However, to protect the customer the bank must prove 
that it is acting in accordance with banking practice and the banking code.189 
Arora190 agrees that the bank has discretion to pay in accordance with the 
customer mandate an order that will enable the customer to obtain an overdraft 
facility. But, he argues that the bank will be in breach of the contractual 
relationship with the customer if, in not granting an overdraft facility, it acted 
arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.191  In this sense, the bank has the right to 
refuse to grant any overdraft on reasonable grounds. Furthermore, in practice 
the banks protect themselves by establishing that they are absolutely free to 
allow or disallow unauthorized overdrafts, while being under no obligation to 
present justifications for their decision. Therefore, the legal nature of payment 
by debit card is conditional.192 In this regard, if the payee’s account was not 
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credited with the transaction funds he can request the payer/ cardholder to pay 
again. It is reasonable and fair to grant customers overdrafts to make payments 
for their transactions. In this respect, the debit card payment is absolute. 
4.4.2 The absolute payment  
It is the general rule that, when the payer pays with a plastic card, the payer's 
account is responsible, directly or indirectly, for payment in the transaction. The 
legal nature of payment by credit card in English law constitutes unconditional 
payment because of the contractual schemes explained below (figure 8, page 
229). Thus, it is considered a convenient method of payment from both the 
payee’s and the payer’s perspective.193 The legal nature of credit cards has 
been established in English courts through the decision in Re Charge Card 
Services194 which held that the legal nature of payment by credit cards is an 
absolute payment.  
In this case, Charge Card Services Ltd ran a credit card scheme by which, 
under a subscription agreement, the card holder could obtain petrol and other 
services from approved garages and make payments with the charge cards 
issued by Charge Card Services Ltd. The card scheme operated as follows: 
under a master agreement the card holders obtained fuel or other services 
which were paid for by charge card and the use of signed vouchers. The garage 
would send the vouchers to the company for settlement. The card holders 
would then pay the company monthly for the goods and services they obtained. 
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The company provided the cardholders with goods and services. When the 
company went into liquidation it owed garages about £1.9 million. 
Consequently, some card holders owed monthly payments to the company. The 
liquidators collected about £2 million from the card holders. The problem was 
not who was responsible for the payment but whether it was the company or the 
garages which were entitled to the funds.195 The case was disputed on the 
grounds of whether payment by credit card was absolute or conditional 
payment. Millett J. held that whether payment by card was considered absolute 
or conditional payment essentially depended on the contract between the holder 
and the seller. However, that contract did not explicitly cover this question. 
Moreover, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. held that there were three 
agreements: first, between the payee and the card issuer; second, between the 
payee and cardholder; and, finally, the agreement between the cardholder and 
the card issuer. In particular, the three agreements were based on the terms 
and conditions of the underlying agreement. So each agreement was 
independent of the others. In the contract between the payee and the 
cardholder, the payee takes no information from the cardholder, because the 
payee is certain that he would never return to the holder for the payment and 
claim only from the card issuer for payment. Therefore payment by credit cards 
are the same as payment in cash and function as absolute payment.196 
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Figure 8: the Credit Card Schemes in Re Charge Card Services Ltd. 
 
 
 
 
This point was disputed by counsel acting for the garages, who tried to establish 
that payment by credit card works as conditional payment in the same way as 
cheques. Counsel took the view that there was no general rule, so when the 
payment could not be transacted by a third party it would be considered as a 
conditional payment.197 The court, conversely, held that, because there is prior 
agreement between the seller and card issuer, the card holder expected, when 
paying by credit card and signing the receipt, that the company or bank would 
be liable to the seller when it had received notice of the purchase. Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson V.C. held:198 
“To my mind, all these factors point clearly to the conclusion that the 
transaction was one in which the garage was accepting payment by card 
in substitution for payment in cash, i.e. as an unconditional discharge of 
the price.” 
Accordingly, payment by credit card is equivalent to payment by cash, and thus 
the payee has no right to demand the cardholder for any risk, and demand the 
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card issuer directly.199 In this regard, if the card issuer becomes insolvent the 
payee has no right to request from the payer to pay, because it is not 
reasonable for the payer to pay twice; first to the card issuer due to the issuer-
holder contract and second to the payee due to the issuer’s insolvency. 
Furthermore, the payee agrees that payment by credit card is absolute that it is 
the card issuer's duty to make the payment. 200  Thus, before any EFT 
transactions a payer bears the risk of the insolvency of the paying bank, while, 
after the funds transfer transactions and compilation of payment, a payee bears 
the risk of the insolvency of the payee’s bank. To achieve the purpose of this 
chapter, section 4.5 will aim to determine which party bears the risk of 
insolvency in the context of EFT transactions. 
4.5 Allocating risk of EFT non-payment 
The findings of this study suggest that the question of which party bears the risk 
of insolvency is best answered by considering first the time at which the EFT is 
regarded as completed and, secondly, the payment devices employed. The 
positive argument is that the payment instruction is executed when the payment 
is final, in the sense that there is no time or opportunity for a countermand, and 
this argument applies these rules on payment with reflections on suitable 
responses to the risk of payment provider insolvency. The present author 
considers that the EFT is completed for the payer when the payer’s bank takes 
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any action to execute the payment instruction. The author further considers that 
the EFT is completed for the payee when the payee’s bank takes the decision 
to accept the payment orders on the payee’s behalf. The reasoning behind this 
view is that the customer’s bank (payer’s bank and payee’s bank) is chosen and 
appointed by the customers themselves. In this regard, it is reasonable for the 
law to allocate relevant risk to the customer who accepts the risk of his bank’s 
solvency. Accordingly, the party which bears the risk of non-payment in EFT 
transactions should be as follows:  
1. If the payer’s bank accepted the payment instruction and debited the 
payer’s account it bears a legal obligation for the benefit of the payee, as with 
transaction funds. The payee, in that case, has no right to request the payer 
to pay again in the event of the payer’s bank’s insolvency. By contrast, if the 
payer’s bank did not accept the payment and afterwards became insolvent, 
the payer is liable to the payee for the transaction funds. In other words, 
before a payment transaction is made the payer bears the risk of his bank 
becoming insolvent. 
2. If the funds transfer is credited to the payee’s bank account and later the 
bank becomes insolvent, the payee’s bank bears its insolvency and the 
payee cannot demand that the payer pays again. In other words after transfer 
of payment transaction, the payee bears the risk of the payee’s bank’s 
insolvency.  
3. In banking practice, the duty of the payee's bank is to receive the fund 
transfer from the paying bank and credit it in the payee’s account. Thus, in a 
case where the payer’s bank debited the payer’s account but the payee's 
bank defaults to collect the funds transfer from the payer's bank, and later the 
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payer’s bank becomes insolvent, it would not be logical to say the payee's 
bank could impose on the payee the risk of the insolvency of the payer’s 
bank, considering that the payee's bank was part of the payment transaction, 
which makes it owe a duty to the payee, and that there were sufficient 
controls to credit risk. Therefore it is not reasonable to accept the liberation of 
the payee's bank from the liability to the payee from the risk of the payer’s 
bank’s insolvency, since the payee did not choose or appoint the payer bank 
and therefore has no option but to accept the credit of the paying bank.201 
4. When the payer's bank becomes insolvent between the time of accepting 
the payment order and debiting the payer’s account but before the time of 
crediting the payee’s account. Indeed, the payee's bank has a right versus 
the payer's bank as to when to credit the payee’s account. But assuming 
there is agreement between the payer's bank and the payee's bank, 
establishing that if the payer's bank defaults before actually crediting the 
funds in the payee’s account the payee’s bank has no right versus the 
payer's bank, that clause would be unreasonable because the payee's bank 
cannot exempt itself from its duty of collecting the payee’s fund from the 
payer’s bank. In addition, there is no justification for absolving the payer's 
bank from the risk of insolvency and making the payee liable for such 
failure.202  
The customer is not bound by any agreement between the banks unless the 
banker-customer agreement includes the terms and conditions established in 
the bank’s agreement. Nevertheless, to protect the customer’s rights any 
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unfair term in the agreement between the customer and the bank will be 
subject to the rules of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, or the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.203  These rules apply to 
ensure the lawfulness and equity of the standard terms and conditions of the 
banker-customer agreement. Thus, the customer has the right to depend on 
both the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 in case of any unfair terms and conditions. The 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 enshrined that 
customers are under no obligation to comply with any unfair term in their 
agreements.  
5. The payer’s bank may use a correspondent or intermediary bank when it is 
incapable of transferring funds to the payee’s account directly. In such cases, 
the correspondent or intermediary bank acts as agent to the payer’s bank.204 
However, the problem arising with the intermediary bank’s insolvency is as 
follows: assuming that a fund transfer transaction order is initiated but due to 
the insolvency of one or more of the correspondent or intermediary banks the 
funds transfer transaction is not final, which party involved in the EFT 
transaction will bear the risk of insolvency?  
The correspondent or intermediary bank acts as agent to the payer’s bank, 
thus, it is liable to execute the payer’s bank instruction.205 This fact will make 
the payer’s bank bear the risk of the insolvency of the correspondent or 
intermediary banks, since it owes the paying bank an implicit contractual 
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obligation to take all reasonable care and skill. The paying bank in turn, as an 
agent to the customer, is liable to the payer for losses due to any defaults or 
negligence on the part of the correspondent or intermediary bank. 206 
Furthermore, one of the paying bank’s duties towards its customer is to 
refund any payment that it has not transacted. In modern practice, however, 
banks involved in funds transfer transactions and employing a correspondent 
or intermediary bank normally establish a term in their contracts with the 
customer stating that the correspondent or intermediary bank is employed at 
the customer’s expense and risk. The customer has no right to pursue the 
intermediary bank because there is no privity in the contract between them 
and thus the intermediary bank owes no liability to the payer.207 Exemption 
terms of this sort could be subject to an evaluation under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act, 1977, and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 
1999, since both statutes cover all contractual terms that have not been 
subject to negotiation.208 It is upheld within schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act, 1977, that the banks have the right to include in their contracts 
with customers an express term excluding liability, but only if this term is 
deemed reasonable. Within these statutes, if the contract includes an ‘unfair’ 
term the customer shall not be liable for non-execution of that term. 
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Wright J. who held that there was no contractual relationship between the intermediary or 
correspondent bank and the customer, and thus there is no contractual liability even if the 
intermediary bank nominated in the contract between the customer and the payer’s bank since 
such nomination creates no privity of contract between the customer and the intermediary bank. 
Also, see Royal Products v Midland Bank [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 194 at p. 198 per Webster J. 
and in Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v National Bank of Abu Dhabi [2008] 1 C.L.C. 399 at [175].  
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 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, regulation 3(1). 
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Under the PSR 2009, the correspondent or intermediary bank has no liability 
to the payer bank in a case in which the payer gave the wrong information 
about the transaction209 or in a situation of force majeure.210 It seems that 
there are two significant differences between the common law and the PSR 
2009 principals. First, under the PSR 2009, a correspondent or intermediary 
bank is liable if any default has been accrued and this is ‘attributable’ to the 
action of a correspondent or intermediary bank in carrying out the payment 
instruction, even if there is no wrong action in the  execution of the payment 
instruction.211 But it is not reasonable that the correspondent or intermediary 
bank bears the risk of non-execution of the payment order, even when there 
was no wrong action. However, the common law principle is, conversely, that 
the correspondent or intermediary bank has no liability to bear the risk of 
non-execution of the payment order unless it was negligent. Ellinger, et al. 
argue this point and explain that the correspondent or intermediary bank 
seems to be strictly liable under the PSR 2009,212 because the PSR 2009 
makes the correspondent or intermediary bank liable to the payer’s bank for 
any losses when the payer’s bank instruction is not executed, without looking 
to the reason for such defaults. Secondly, the common law principle 
determines the paying bank’s rights for restitution from the bank that it 
ordered to act as its correspondent.  
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 PSR 2009, regulation 74. 
210
 Ibid., regulation 69. 
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 Ibid., regulation 78. 
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 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 618. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Insolvency risk refers to the possibility of settlement not being passed at full 
value. The legal issues in EFT finality do not arise directly with funds transfers 
as long as payments are made and funds directly transferred. They arise when 
one of the banks involved in the transaction does not execute its obligation to 
make the payment. Payment is presumed to be final for the payer when the 
payer’s bank obligates itself irrevocably to that payment, while payment is 
presumed to be final for the payee when the payee’s bank obligates itself by 
accepting the payment. In this chapter it has been argued that a customer who 
opens an account with a bank necessarily bears the risk of that bank’s 
insolvency. Thus the payer will be liable for the payment before the fund 
transfer transaction in the case of his bank’s insolvency after the fund transfer 
transaction is made it is the payee who bears the risk of that insolvency.  
One significant finding of this chapter is the existence of a need for a 
comprehensive legislative framework to regulate the rules and principles 
covering the risk of insolvency in EFTs within the banking system, thus 
replacing the practice of following precedents set by court cases. The 
advantage of formulating basic rules governing the finality of payment is their 
use in identifying the party which bears the risk of insolvency. The rules model 
suggested in this thesis213 could be helpful in defining the finality of EFT’s and in 
identifying the party which bears the risk of insolvency. 
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Chapter Five 
Privacy in the Context of EFT  
5.1 Introduction  
EFT systems deal principally with information in the form of a continuous 
exchange of banker-customer messages. The impact of EFT in this area has 
been both large-scale and efficacious. However, there have been concerns over 
confidentiality in the context of EFT, in relation to both the customer’s financial 
affairs and the interests of the bank. There is also a problem as to whether 
banks employ adequate protection systems for keeping customers’ information 
confidential and protecting electronic transactions. Further problems relate to 
liability and customer protection, particularly where a hacker gains entry to 
accounts. The chapter examines and analyses these problems in the light of the 
existing laws and proposes recommendations for future approaches to 
protection and disclosure of customer data in the EFT context. 
The great concern about confidentiality in the EFT context compared with non-
electronic payment systems is because, first, there are now numerous bank 
records full of customer information in the form of easily accessible electronic 
data. Secondly, electronic data in EFTs are easy to collect, organise and save 
and offer large amounts of information. Thirdly, the growth of EFT systems 
makes it possible in practice for banks to execute increasingly sophisticated 
analyses of their customers’ financial affairs and saving and spending habits, 
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which enable banks to market their own products more effectively, but also 
provide a potentially very valuable source of information for third parties, such 
as Credit Reference Agencies (CRA’s). One of the objectives of this chapter is 
to reflect the ambiguities surrounding the disclosure of customer data to CRA’s 
and to investigate whether or not this disclosure is in the bank’s interest. 
Fourthly, the internal procedures of EFT are invisible to customers who have no 
idea about the data collected about them, who is using that data, and for what 
purpose. 
Banks have a duty of confidentiality to their customers and this duty is a 
necessary part of the banking system’s requirements with regard to accuracy of 
information.1 There are differences in the provision of confidentiality, which vary 
from one bank to another, depending on the terms and conditions detailed in 
the contract. On this basis, banking confidentiality has no rules common to all 
banks, hence a prevailing absence of unity and conformity. Nevertheless, 
confidentiality is an implied term in the banker-customer contract and it exists in 
order to prevent disclosures of customer data beyond the four permitted 
exceptions.2  To achieve the purposes of this chapter, the bank’s liability to 
protect customer’s confidential information is divided into six main sections. The 
first four are devoted to an analysis and assessment of the rules applied in 
Tournier v National Provincial Bank.3 Section 5.5 devotes to analysing the legal 
issues surrounding disclosure of customer credit data to the CRAs. Section 5.6 
of this chapter is devoted to analysing the existing legal rules pertaining to 
                                               
1
 Alqudah, F., ‘Banks’ duty of confidentiality in the wake of computerised banking’, (1995) 10 
International Banking Law 50 at p. 50. 
2
 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461. 
3
 Ibid. 
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confidential information in the EFT context. The section outlines the motive 
forces behind the application of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 to the protection of customer data in the EFT context. Lastly, 
section 5.7 is devoted to determining which party bears the losses and damage 
resulting from breaches in the bank’s duty of confidentiality in the EFT. This 
chapter demonstrates that the bank is liable to the customer for any losses or 
damage resulting from disclosures of confidential information or data without 
legal provision or beyond what is justified by law. In contrast, the customer is 
shown to be liable for any disclosure due to his negligence or approval. The 
conclusion reached is that the Tournier principles fail to provide a sufficient 
remedy when applied to the bank’s duty of confidentiality in the EFT context. 
Further, there is a lack of uniform or harmonized legislation regarding 
arrangements for data exchange in an EFT context. The model rules 
suggestions in this thesis could be of help in regulating a bank’s duty of 
confidentiality in the EFT context. 4 
5.2 The legal nature of confidentiality 
The EFT banker-customer relationship is an agency contract, thus the nature of 
privacy 5  stems from this contract. Generally, an agent is under a duty of 
confidentiality to his principal. 6  Diplock L.J. in Parry-Jones v Law Society 7 
                                               
4
 See chapter seven, section 7.4. 
5
 For the meaning and defining privacy term, see Koutsias, M., ‘privacy and data protection in 
an information society: who reconciled are the English with the European union privacy norms?’, 
(2012) 18 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 261 at pp. 262-267. 
6
 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46. 
7
 Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch.1 at p. 9. 
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explained the duty of confidentiality between the agent and his principal, Diplock 
L.J. held: 
“What we are concerned with here is the contractual duty of confidence, 
generally implied though sometimes express, between a solicitor and 
client. Such a duty exists not only between solicitor and customer, but, for 
example, between banker and customer, doctor and patient and 
accountant and client.  Such a duty of confidence is subject to, and 
overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law 
of the land. If it is the duty of such a party to a contract, whether at 
common law or under statute, to disclose in defined circumstances 
confidential information, then he must do so, and any express contract to 
the contrary would be illegal and void.”8 
There are two motivations for the agent’s duty of confidentiality, economic and 
historic.9 Both these motivations justify the obligation of confidentiality in the 
banker-customer contract. First the economic motivation. From the customers’ 
viewpoint, a duty of confidentiality encourages them to involve others in their 
businesses, given that such an obligation will protect them from unjustified 
external attempts to investigate their business or commercial secrets, and 
confidentiality therefore may persuade them to enter an especially competitive 
area of trade in which they might not otherwise have been involved.10 From the 
agents’ viewpoint, on the other hand, there are some types of business that 
could not be completed unless the principal discloses some information. The 
contract of lawyer and client well demonstrates such a point. 11  Thus the 
economic motivation justify the duty of confidentiality in the banker-customer 
relationship, for example, an individual is encouraged to involve into a banking 
agreement by the fact that he may conduct his business dealing with the bank 
secreted family or commercial competitors; and the services that the bank 
                                               
8
 Ibid., at p. 9 
9
 Reynolds, F.H.B., Reynolds on Agency (2001), para. 6-032. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ellinger, E., et al., Modern Banking Law (2011), p. 172. 
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supplies are subjected to the fact the customer in more willing to disclose his 
financial information if this is done on a confidential ground. Historically, the 
agent always attempts to gain the customer’s trust.12 
Confidentiality is of such a nature that it is implicit, and begins the moment the 
banker-customer relationship is initiated. This point is well documented in 
Tournier v National Provincial Bank13 when the Court of Appeal held that the 
bank's commitment to maintaining confidentiality regarding the affairs of the 
customer is a legal and moral obligation arising from an implied term in the 
banker-customer contracts. 14  Prior to Tournier a duty of confidentiality was 
considered a moral duty only. In the banking sector, banks seeking to make a 
profit amid intense competition depend on their reputation and need to attract 
customers by inspiring confidence in their activities if they are to optimize their 
profits. However, the bank’s obligation of confidentiality is a legal one, and most 
banks have recently started to include in their contracts with customers terms 
dealing with confidentiality under different titles, for example, the use of 
information about customers,15 personal information,16 or confidentiality.17 Thus, 
confidentiality is currently an explicit legal term in many banker-customer 
contracts. 
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 Alhosani, W., ‘Banking Confidentiality Against Disclosure’, (2012) Durham Law Review 1 at 
p.3  
http://durhamlawreview.co.uk/files/Banking_confidentiality_against_disclosure.pdf 20 August 
2012.  
13
 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461. 
14
 Ibid., at pp. 471-472. 
15
 Barclays, Barclays Terms: Your Agreement with Us, 2013, section G 
http://www.barclayswealth.co.uk/Images/IBIM1000.pdf 22 April 2013. 
16 
Lloyds TSB, Personal Banking terms and conditions, 2012, section D (14) 
http://www.lloydstsb.com/media/lloydstsb2004/pdfs/personal_banking_terms_and_conditions.pd
f 6 April 2013. 
17 
HSBC, General Terms and Conditions, Current Accounts Terms and Conditions, 2012, 
section 2(34)[34.2] http://www.hsbc.co.uk/1/PA_esf-ca-app- 
content/content/uk/pdfs/en/General_Current_Accounts_Aprl1.pdf 6 April 2013. 
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5.3 Ambit, duration, and termination of the bank’s a duty of 
confidentiality 
It is an observable fact that the bank’s duty of confidentiality is activated from 
the moment a banker-customer contract is initiated as, for example, by the 
opening of a bank account. There is no banker-customer relationship before the 
opening of a bank account.18 Further, there is no duty of confidentiality to non-
customers regarding the information obtained from the negotiations between 
the bank and an individual where no contract has been signed. There is a duty 
of confidentiality to non-customers, however, when the bank presents an 
express obligation to keep the information secret. Accordingly, in the EFT 
context the question arising is whether a bank’s duty of confidentiality is 
protected and limited to information obtained from the customers and their 
account or whether it extends to information obtained from any sources other 
than the customers or their account. 
The answer to this question has two aspects. The first was expressed in 
Tournier by Bankes L.J. and Atkin L.J. who held that the bank’s duty of 
confidentiality covered all customers’ information about themselves and their 
accounts obtained by the bank, irrespective of the information source and for as 
long as the banker-customer relationship existed.19 In contrast, Scrutton L.J. 
held that the bank’s duty of confidentiality is limited to account transactions 
information only, and that the duty did not cover any information received by the 
                                               
18
 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461 at p. 481 per 
Scrutton L.J. 
19
 Ibid., at pp. 473-474 per Bankes L.J. and p. 485 per Atkin L.J. 
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bank from sources other than its customers or their account transactions.20 In 
fact, the present author agrees with the first view, the same view held by the 
Court of Appeal, which is authoritative and reasonable due to the fact that the 
information is given to the bank in regard to the contractual agreement between 
the bank and the customer.  
That aspect of a bank’s duty of confidentiality exists if there is a contractual 
agreement between the bank and the customer.21 However, there is also the 
question of information received by the bank before the initiation of such a 
contract. The answer is provided by Tournier. The first view was put forward by 
Bankes L.J. and Atkin L.J., who held that the bank’s duty of confidentiality does 
cover the information received by the bank before the beginning of the banker-
customer contract.22 Scrutton L.J. held a contrary view arguing that the bank’s 
duty of confidentiality does not cover this information.23 Nevertheless, there is 
agreement that the bank’s duty of confidentiality does not extend to the 
information received after termination of the banker-customer contract.  
Given the above exposition, it seems that there are many reasonable and 
logical reasons for obliging the banks to keep customers’ confidential data 
private before, during, and after their relationship. These reasons are: first, 
information provided to the bank before beginning the contractual agreement is 
possibly the same information that is provided by the customer after beginning 
                                               
20
 Ibid., at p. 481-482 per Scrutton L.J. 
21
 Barclays Bank Plc v Taylor [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1066 at p. 1070, Lord Donaldson M.R. held: “The 
banker-customer relationship imposes upon a bank a duty of confidentiality in relation to 
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banker.”.  
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 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461 at pp. 473-474 
per Bankes L.J. and p. 485 Atkin L.J. 
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 Ibid., at p. 481 per Scrutton L.J. 
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the contractual agreement; consequently such information falls under the duty 
of confidentiality. Secondly, information provided to the bank at any period 
during the banker-customer relationship does indeed fall under the bank’s duty 
of confidentiality according to the common law definition of confidence. 24 
Thirdly, in practice, there is nothing to prevent banks from assuming an explicit 
duty to the customer to inhibit the disclosure of specific information, even if such 
information theoretically is not within the ambit of the bank’s duty of 
confidentiality. Fourthly, the customer’s right of privacy must certainly be 
respected and a most important aspect of the person’s right is the right to keep 
his information private. Therefore, there is a possibility that disclosure of any 
confidential information after the termination of the banker-customer relationship 
causes loss or damage to the person. 25  Finally, customer’s confidential 
information could be commercially sensitive and the customer would not wish 
for disclosure because his new business could be adversely influenced by such 
information. The present author’s view is that the bank’s duty of confidentiality 
should be kept indefinitely, even after the customer’s death, as long as the law 
does not indicate a specific time for the termination of the duty. 
According to Tournier, the implied duty of confidentiality exists if there is a 
contractual agreement between the bank and the customer. However, in the 
EFT context, banks supply their customers with a wide range of transactions 
services going well outside the classical functions of deposit-taking and lending, 
and often not all transactions include a contract between the bank and a 
particular person, for instance when the creditor has an account in another 
                                               
24
 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at p. 281-282 per 
Lord Goff.  
25
 Hapgood, M., Paget’s Law of Banking (2007), p. 158. 
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bank. There may be no express term from the bank to the person to keep the 
information secret, and so there is no duty of confidentiality, and therefore the 
problem exists as to whether the bank’s implied duty of confidentiality covers 
information that it obtains when acting beyond its classical deposit-taking role.26 
Therefore, it seems that this problem can be answered only by addressing the 
bank’s duty of confidentiality within the general rules of breach of confidence, 
rather than by covering the bank’s duty of confidentiality by a separate area of 
law. 27  In Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) Lord Goff 28 
addressed the general rules covering breach of a duty of confidentiality, where 
Lord Goff held: 
“A duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has 
notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with 
the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be 
precluded from disclosing the information to others….To this broad 
general principle, there are three limiting principles to which I wish to refer. 
The first limiting principle…is that the principle of confidentiality only 
applies to information to the extent that it is confidential… The second 
limiting principle is that the duty of confidence applies neither to useless 
information, nor to trivia… The third limiting principle is of far greater 
importance. It is that, although the basis of the law's protection of 
confidence is that there is a public interest that confidences should be 
preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless that public interest may 
be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest which favours 
disclosure.” 29 
It seems that Lord Goff’s approach is comprehensive, and there is no obstacle 
to making this approach cover the bank’s duty of confidentiality.30 Generally, the 
confidant’s liability for breach of confidential information exists by virtue of a 
                                               
26
 Cranston, R., Principles of Banking Law (2002), p. 171-174; Ogilvie, M. H., ‘From secrecy to 
confidence to the demise of the banker customer relationship: Rodaro v Royal Bank of Canada’, 
(2003) 19 Banking and Financial Law Review 103 at pp.112-113. 
27
 Ibid. 
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 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 A.C. 109 at p. 281-282. 
29
 Ibid., at p. 281-282. 
30
 Ellinger, et al., op. cit., p. 179. 
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general equitable obligation imposed by the law on the confidant towards the 
confider, rather than by means of a term implied in the banker-customer 
contract. It presents a legal source for protecting confidential information 
disclosed to a bank by a customer in a non-banking context, for example, when 
a bank offers investment advice or asset management services, or by a non-
customer, for example, when presenting a business plan to secure bank 
finance.31 Nevertheless, Ellinger et al. argue that ‘it is difficult to set general 
rules covering breach of confidence with the scope of the implied duty 
recognized in Tournier, since each recognize different circumstances in which 
confidential information may be revealed’.32  
A bank's duty of confidentiality is not an absolute, it exists in varying degrees 
and the most fundamental secrets can be waived in cases where the law 
allows.33 Tournier identified four circumstances where the bank has the right to 
disclose its customer information.34 Bankes L.J. held that: 
“On principle I think that the qualifications can be classified under four 
heads: (a) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where there 
is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank 
require disclosure; (d) where the disclosure is made by the express or 
implied consent of the customer.”35 
                                               
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B; Further, see Haynes, 
A., The Law Relating to International Banking (2010), pp. 166-167. 
34
 Ibid., p. 473 per Bankes L.J. 
35
 Ibid., p. 473 per Bankes L.J. 
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5.4 Qualifications and exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality 
5.4.1 Disclosure by compulsion of law 
Recently there has been an increased amount of legislation authorizing courts 
to order the inspection and revelation of bank documents or otherwise requiring 
bank disclosure in specific circumstances, adding more exceptions to the bank’s 
duty of confidentiality. 36  Court proceedings are the best example of an 
obligation by law,37 for example, when a bank is ordered to disclose information 
about its customer’s account during the legal proceedings. 38  In Bucknell v 
Bucknell39 and Eckmam v Midland Bank Ltd40 the court ordered the bank to 
disclose information about its customer’s account in favour of the public interest 
and the administration of justice. When the court orders the bank to disclose 
customer information, the bank can do so without obtaining the customer’s 
consent.  
A bank must submit information and documents required by the court and 
cannot refuse on the basis of confidentiality because refusing to respond to the 
court’s order would render the bank in contempt of court. 41  For instance, 
                                               
36
 Ogivie, M. H., ‘Banker and customer: the five-year review 2000-2005’, (2007) 23 Banking and 
Finance Law Review 107 at p. 144; Report by the Review Committee on Banking Services: Law 
and Practice, (“The Jack Report”) (1989, London, HMSO, Cm 622), p. 30. This chapter will not 
consider all these regimes, but it will focus on the most common examples relating to the 
banker-customer relationship. 
37
 Charles, P., The Law and Practice of International Banking (2010), p. 681. 
38
 Alastair, H., The Law of Finance (2009), p. 779.  
39
 Bucknell v Bucknell [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1204.   
40
 Eckmam v Midland Bank Ltd [1973] Q.B. 519.   
41
 Ross, C., Principles of Banking Law (2002), p. 176.   
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pursuant to the jurisdiction recognized in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and 
Excise Commissioners,42 a bank may be obliged to make pre-action disclosure 
of confidential information about its customer to a third party who needed that 
information in order to build his case against the customer.  However, in Mitsui 
& Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd, 43 the court required three conditions to 
grant a Norwich Pharmacal order: 
 
“The three conditions to be satisfied for the court to exercise the power to 
order Norwich Pharmacal relief are: i) a wrong must have been carried out, 
or arguably carried out, by an ultimate wrongdoer;  
ii) there must be the need for an order to enable action to be brought 
against the ultimate wrongdoer; and  
iii) the person against whom the order is sought must: (a) be mixed up in 
so as to have facilitated the wrongdoing; and (b) be able or likely to be 
able to provide the information necessary to enable the ultimate 
wrongdoer to be sued.” 44 
According to Norwich Pharmacal the following conditions are required: first, a 
wrongful action must have been committed; 45  secondly, an order must be 
necessary to enable action to be brought against that wrongdoer; and thirdly, 
the person against whom the order is required must be ‘mixed up’ in the acts of 
the wrongdoer so as to have facilitated the wrongdoing and be able to supply 
the significant information for that wrongdoer to be sued. With regard to the third 
condition, banks are possibly to become innocently mixed up in their customer’s 
wrongdoing, such as income from an unauthorized transaction passing through 
                                               
42
 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] A.C. 133 at p.175.  
43
 Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 (Ch) per Lightman J. 
44
 Ibid., at para. [21] per Lightman J. 
45
 Regardless, whether a wrongdoer involves civil or criminal liability, see Ashworth Hospital 
Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2033 at [34-35] and [53]. 
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that account, 46  and consequently banks are mostly subject to the Norwich 
Pharmacal  jurisdiction.47  
A similar application of the Norwich Pharmacal  jurisdiction to the banking 
context can be found in Bankers Trust Co v Shapira,48 although this case has 
been clarified as subject to the exercise of a distinct, but connected, 
jurisdiction.49 In this case two fraudsters obtained a substantial sum of money 
by introducing to the bank in New York cheques allegedly drawn on it by a bank 
in Saudi Arabia. The bank passed the money relating to the cheques to the 
perpetrators of the fraud by whose order the money was to be transferred to 
their account in the bank in London. When the cheques were found to be 
forgeries the bank in New York paid back the money debited to the account of 
the Saudi Arabian bank and attempted to recover its losses from the two 
culprits. In an attempt to find them, the bank asked for an order instructing the 
defendant’s bank to authorize the bank to check and take copies of all 
documents, including the cheques transacted in that account between the 
fraudsters and the defendant’s bank. Mustill J.50 refused to grant this order. His 
reasoning was that the culprits had not been found and that it would be, in any 
case, a mistake to give such an instruction at the interlocutory stage. In 
overturning this decision, the Court of Appeal did however hold that the court 
must be very careful when ordering a bank to disclose data from its customer's 
account and the documents and correspondence relating to it, as it was “a 
                                               
46
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 181. 
47
 Koo Golden East Mongolia v Bank of Nova Scotia [2008] Q.B. 717 at pp. 731-733, per Sir 
Anthony Clarke MR who held that the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction is likely to be particularly 
useful against banks when seeking information to assist in tracing the proceeds of fraudulent or 
criminal activity.  
48
 Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274.  
49
 Ellinger, et al., op.cit., p. 182. 
50
 Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274 at pp. 1274-1275. 
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strong thing to order a bank to disclose the state of its customer's account and 
the documents and correspondence relating to it”.51 Such an order should be 
granted only if there is reasonable and good evidence that the money in the 
bank is the plaintiff's money.52 Therefore, mandatory revelation substituted for 
the customer’s consent. Furthermore, the bank was under no obligation to notify 
its customer that revelation has been made, since a notification may have 
obstructed any investigation.  
Furthermore, in Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim,53 Hoffmann J. emphasised two 
more conditions that have to be considered, by the court, before creating a 
Norwich Pharmacal order: first, the order must be for specific information or 
documents; and secondly, the court has to strike a balance between the duty of 
confidentiality and the disclosure of information order. 54  From the bank’s 
viewpoint, although such an order for information disclosure would be legitimate 
in order to protect a bank from legal action for breach of duty of confidentiality in 
the local courts, a bank might not have similar protection abroad.55 Therefore 
most banks initiated the practice of protecting themselves by including a general 
term in their contract with the customers enabling the bank to disclose customer 
data where it was legally required to do so.56  
The author view is that granting an absolute order to disclose private customer 
information or documents is an unfair practice. Therefore, the court must take 
into account when issuing the order the scope and limitations of such an order. 
                                               
51
 Ibid., at p. 1282 per Lord Denning M.R. 
52
 Ibid., at p. 1282. 
53
 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No.5) [1992] 2 All E.R. 911. 
54
 Ibid., at p.  919. 
55
 Ibid. at p.  920. 
56
 HSBC, General Terms and Conditions, op.cit., [34.2].  
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In this regard, all the documents and the evidence which the bank has the right 
to disclose must be relevant to the case that is subject to dispute. Thereby, 
under the Civil Procedure Rules199857 (CPR hereafter), at the moment that the 
information is revealed in the court it will constitute public information. 58 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate that the court has the right to issue an order 
restraining and prohibiting the use of the information disclosed.59 
The CPR 1998, Part 34, presents a new procedure in which the court has the 
right not only to disclose private information but also to create a ‘witness 
summons’. 60  A ‘witness summons’ means the right of the court to order a 
person to attend the court as a witness and to present all the evidence and 
documentation which could influence the court’s decision.61 Furthermore, the 
CPR 1998 rule 31.18 presented a new system whereby a victim has the right to 
obtain disclosure of documents against a person who is not a party to 
proceedings before proceedings have started.62 Griffiths63 argues that the order 
application must clarify with reasonable particularity the documents or 
identifiable categories of documents to be presented’. 64  Nonetheless, in 
practice, a court is very careful when exercising its discretion to create a 
witness summons or issue an order to enforce parties to reveal information. A 
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fortiori, courts must be very careful when exercising such discretion and the 
same care should be exercised with regard to any third party who is a non-party 
in the case.65 
Section 7 of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 presents another 
qualification to the bank’s duty of confidentiality, although a distinction is made 
between civil and criminal procedures. The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 
section 7 states: 
“on the application of any party to a legal proceeding a court or judge may 
order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of any entries 
in a banker’s book for any of the purposes of such proceedings.” 
‘Legal proceedings’ may mean either civil or criminal proceedings. Civil 
proceedings fall under the Civil Evidence Act 1995, and the CPR part 33. These 
regimes allow for the admission of hearsay evidence, including statements 
contained in documents 66  and business reports, 67  as evidence in civil 
proceedings. Additionally the Criminal Justice Act 1988 allows for hearsay 
documentation to be taken as evidence in criminal proceedings, regardless of 
the source from which it issues.  
In legal proceedings the court has the right to authorize an inspector to obtain 
any copies of the bank’s records.68 The bank however has a right to a period of 
time in which to prepare required documents and in such a period the bank may 
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exercise the right to object.69 When a bank is asked in suitable and acceptable 
cases to supply their relevant records of customers’ information, such records 
will be considered as evidence in the case. 70  Recently, and with EFT 
transactions, customers’ data are recorded electronically and submitting such 
data will be by making an electronic copy (CD) which the court could consider 
sufficient evidence.71 On this basis, Hollander72 agrees that: “it is obvious that 
the use of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 has progressively been 
marginalized by development of civil and criminal procedures.” 
Electronic and internet information records fall under section 9 (2) of the 
Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879. Thus, the courts have the right to grant an 
order to obtain copies of these types of electronic banking data records. 
Nevertheless, the EFT system makes it very hard to disclose the original copy 
of an electronic datum and therefore these disclosures would very likely be 
compiled orally, or in an affidavit attached to a copy of the data record required. 
Moreover, not all of a bank’s documents fall under the Bankers’ Books Evidence 
Act 1879. Documents that are not addressed by the bank’s data, for example, 
messages to the bank’s customer,73 invalid cheques and errors of credit,74 are 
not classified as ‘Bankers’ Books’. 
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The banks have no power to avoid the courts order and so they must disclose 
customer information in accordance with the compiled statutes. This chapter will 
examine the most important statutes associated with banker-customer 
relationship. 
5.4.1.1 Money laundering75 and the financing of terrorism 
EFT systems constitute the best environment for money ‘launderers’ when 
parties transfer funds from one bank account to another.76 Due to the great 
expansion of banking services offered by EFT transactions, funds transfers from 
one country to another have become very easy and very fast. Money launderers 
also take advantage of banking confidentiality which may protect the 
perpetrators of organised crime. EFT transactions have recently been 
associated with a number of crimes, such as money laundering, drugs 
trafficking and terrorism.77 This has led to the establishment of a number of 
statutes to control and deal with such crimes. These regulations are: the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; the Money Laundering Regulations 2007;78 and 
the Terrorism Act 2000. These legislations place important impositions on the 
bank by allowing disclosure of customers’ information when suspicious activities 
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occur within customer transactions. 79  These statutory instruments place the 
person (bank) under an obligation to report any operations that are suspected of 
involving money laundering or other suspicious activities.80 Not reporting such 
activities places the person (bank) in breach of legal provisions. 81  These 
exceptions grant the bank the right to breach its duty of confidentiality.82  
The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 impose on the bank different 
obligations respecting the control, reduction and detection of money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism.83 The first obligation is for the bank to take on the 
routine duty of investigating its customers and their actions after they open an 
account and for the period of its operation, such actions being called ‘customer 
due diligence measures’. 84  The bank is obligated to apply ‘customer due 
diligence measures’ in the following cases: when the customer opens an 
account, which normally initiates a banker-customer contract; 85  when the 
transaction amount exceeds 15,000 Euros;86 and where there is any suspicion 
that the transaction involves money laundering.87 Such provisions allow banks 
to participate in the maintenance and protection of the financial system in 
general. Furthermore, since one of the bank’s duties is to exercise all 
reasonable care and caution, then if it registers any out of the ordinary 
transactions it should examine the indications of suspicious activities and 
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monitor the movement of suspect funds.88 Secondly, the bank must save the 
customer data for no less than five years after the customer relationship is 
terminated.89 However, not all customer data are required to be kept on record, 
only the documents referring to the customer’s identity,90 and data subject to a 
business relationship or occasional transactions which are the subject of 
customer due diligence measures or on-going monitoring.91 Thirdly, the bank is 
obligated to have ‘risk-sensitive policies and procedures’, in all its operations.92 
Fourthly, the bank is under an obligation to train its employees in the skills and 
knowledge necessary for the identification of transactions which may involve 
money laundering or terrorist financing.93 Any bank which fails to fulfil these 
obligations falls under legal accountability, through either civil or criminal 
liability.94 It should be noted that under the 2007 Regulations the bank is liable 
to report the customer’s suspect transaction even if a crime did not in fact take 
place. 
The author’s view is that, while the 2007 Regulations represent an attempt to 
reduce or control the crime of money laundering by imposing on the bank 
several obligations, such obligations create a problematical conflict between the 
bank’s duty of confidentiality and its obligation to inform the legal authorities of 
any suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing. 95  Within these 
provisions a bank must report any suspicions of criminality in the customer’s 
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transactions, otherwise it will be under liability for not reporting the crime of 
money laundering. In practice, there is normally an explicit term in the banker-
customer contract that allows the bank to disclose confidential customer 
information in order to prevent crime, irrespective of whether the disclosure 
takes place in the UK or abroad.96 In addition there is an implied term in the 
banker-customer contract allowing the bank to reject execution of a payment 
instruction where suspicious activities are referenced in the transaction.97 In 
normal practice the bank would not report any suspicious activities on the part 
of their customers unless they have obtained an order from the court ordering 
them to disclose their confidential customer data. Even if there are suspicious 
activities, the bank may not report those activities to the legal authorities, 
justifying such a course by claiming that it did not discern criminality in the 
customer’s transaction. In some cases, however, the bank may disclose its 
customer data, claiming that since there was suspicious activity it bore no 
liability for any such disclosure. The author’s view therefore is that there is a 
need to draw boundaries in order to determine exactly when the bank has the 
right to exchange customer data. That boundary could be when there is clear, 
certain and sufficient evidence that the customer's transaction involves criminal 
activities. 
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5.4.1.2 Disclosure of confidential information to tax authorities 
A bank is under a duty to disclose confidential information relating to its 
customers when ordered to do so by the court in accordance with tax 
legislation. Examples of the relevant legislation are: sections 13, 17, 20 and 24 
of the Taxes Management Act 1970, section 745 of the Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1988, and section 771 of the Income Tax Act 2007. According to 
these statutes the bank is obliged to submit a statement to the legal authorities 
that the financial profit or income of its customer is taxable. In this regard, a 
bank is under no duty of confidentiality when disclosing its customer’s 
confidential information compiled according to the tax authorities’ order, and 
there is no breach of the contract with the customer. Section 17(1) of the Taxes 
Management Act 1970, establishes that every person carrying on the trade or 
business of banking is obliged to disclose if required to do so by notice from a 
tax inspector. Correspondingly, if there is no order for disclosure the bank is 
under no duty to disclose confidential information and any disclosure would be 
in breach of the contract and its duty of confidentiality, any such breach placing 
the bank under a liability. The general approach of the UK tax authorities is to 
obtain information from the bank on its customers for tax purposes by ordering 
the bank via the court to present particular information and documents 
pertaining to the tax cases of particular taxpayers. However, in the UK the legal 
tax authorities are required to follow a specific procedure in requesting a bank 
to disclose confidential information. This procedure requires the agreement of 
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an independent commissioner.98 One question that might have to be considered 
is: if the bank suspected that one of its customers was seeking to evade tax 
liabilities would it be obliged to disclose information to the tax authorities? 
As explained above, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 place important 
impositions on the bank by allowing disclosure of customers’ information when 
suspicious activities occur within customer transactions.99 Section 338 places 
the person (bank) under an obligation to report any operations that are 
suspected of involving criminal activities.100 Not reporting such activities places 
the person (bank) in breach of legal provisions.101 These exceptions grant the 
bank the right to breach its duty of confidentiality. 102  In K Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Plc.103 In such case the court held that a disclosure by a 
banker to the authorities that he suspects he is being asked to facilitate the use 
or control of criminal property is an authorised disclosure pursuant to section 
338 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.104 Furthermore, as explained above, 
Money Laundering Regulation 2007 impose essential obligation on the bank by 
allowing disclosure of customers’ information when suspicious activities occur 
within customer transactions.105  
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In R. v Da Silva106 the term suspicion was defined as ‘a word that can be used 
to describe a state-of-mind that may, at one extreme, be no more than a vague 
feeling of unease and, at the other extreme, reflect a firm belief in the existence 
of the relevant facts’.107 Although, the court held that in order for there to be 
“blind-eye” knowledge, a vague feeling of unease is not enough but suspicion 
must be “clear” or “firmly grounded and goal on particular facts”, or depend on 
“reasonable grounds”.108 Thus, a bank must report any suspicions of criminality 
in the customer’s transactions otherwise it will be under liability for not reporting.  
5.4.1.3 Part XI of the FSMA 2000 
The FSMA 2000109 granted the Financial Conduct Authority powers to require 
the bank to reveal confidential information relating to its customers. 110  The 
purpose of that right is to build upon communications with customers, which 
requires a bank to pay due regard to their data needs. This helps in the 
achievement of the regulatory objectives of consumer protection, market 
confidence and financial stability. Nevertheless, according to the FSMA 2000, 
disclosure of confidential information must satisfy at least one of the four 
conditions addressed in the Act: First, the disclosure must be with regard to the 
appropriate person, such as the person under investigation or a person who 
belongs to the same group as the person under investigation; secondly, the 
confidential information must be information about the person under 
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investigation or one of his group members; thirdly, there must be consent on the 
part of the person in possession of confidential information which is to be 
disclosed; and fourthly, the investigators must have the appropriate legal 
authorization. 
The author’s view is that the exceptions to the principle of obligatory banking 
confidentiality are many and varied. 111  Thus, banking confidentiality has 
become the exception rather than the rule. However, despite the large number 
of exceptions to the principle of banking confidentiality, the bank is still under a 
fundamental duty of confidentiality. In that sense, these exceptions do not 
reduce the importance of banking confidentiality, but rather they try to set limits 
on the rights of the bank and the customer in its maintenance. Nevertheless, the 
government must be very careful when making law which authorize the courts 
to issue any orders for disclosure of a customer’s bank information. Jack 
Committee112 recommended: 
“The government should not further extend the statutory exceptions to the 
duty of confidentiality, without taking full account of the consequences for 
the banker-customer relationship” 
The conclusion drawn in this chapter is that disclosure of a customer’s private 
information under compulsory legal provisions has become general rather than 
exceptional. In this context, the exceptions enable the bank to disclose its 
customer data at any time by reason of the presence of suspicious activity 
without it bearing liability for any such disclosure. This could result in the 
customer losing trust in modern banking practice by reason of the ambiguity in 
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the rules of confidentiality, its scope and its applications. Therefore, there is a 
need for rules regulating the bank’s right to disclose customer’s private 
information. The requirements of these rules are: that they create a programme 
of control relating to the internet; that they address the issues of staff training, 
the identification of agents and, of particular importance, the audit; that the 
principle of verifying customer identity must be included in the banker-customer 
relationship in order to prove the customer’s identity and, if possible, to 
ascertain whether the customer's transaction involved criminal activities. These 
rules will allow both the bank and the customer to recognise clearly the 
circumstances in which the bank has no duty of confidentiality. This view was 
indeed recommended and observed in the Jack Committee Report. It argued 
that the principle of confidentiality is deemed to be an essential element in the 
bank-customer relationship and for that reason that principle should be 
supported by a regime of codification. Jack’s recommendation of regime 
codification, however, has been rejected, inappropriately in the view of the 
author, by the UK Government. The government justified this decision with the 
claim that a regime of codification was needless and likely to create new 
problems.113 
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5.4.2 Disclosure in the public interest 
Duty to the public is the second justification for releasing the bank from the duty 
of confidentiality, and is recognised by Bankes L.J. in Tournier.114 Disclosure 
under the public interest has been expressed as ‘the difficult and 
comprehensive meaning of the Tournier qualification’.115 These difficulties could 
be due to a lack of clarity regarding the circumstances which would create 
exceptions in the public interest. Bankes L.J. in Tournier submitted no particular 
circumstances to define the public interest; he depended on Lord Finlay in Weld 
Blundell v Stephens,116 when he described the public interest as “danger to the 
State or public duty may supersede the duty of the agent to his principal.”117 
Bankes L.J.118 submitted, however that the public interest qualification is not 
fixed; hence it could change from time to time. He presented examples of what 
could be public interest: in time of war a bank may be forced to disclose to the 
government information which it receives about the customer’s dealings with an 
enemy alien. His Lordship further held that the application of the exception 
might be subject to variations at different periods.119  
Generally, there is no particular standard for what could be constituted a public 
interest. Griffiths120 agrees that the qualification of public interest is still not 
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completely clear. This qualification has been rejected by Jack Committee 
Report:121 
“Some light may be shed on what in modern conditions, are the public 
interest considerations likely to justify a bank in departing from the 
obligations of confidentiality, by reference to the circumstances in which a 
journalist can be required to disclose his “sources” under the Contempt of 
Court Act 1980. There circumstances are that the disclosure is “necessary 
in the interests of justice or national security or the prevention of disorder 
or crime”... We therefore conclude that banks should no longer be 
released from their confidentiality obligation on the generalised ground of 
public interest.” 
Jack recommended that such exceptions have to be deleted,122 because it is 
difficult to formulate a definition of the public interest. 123  The government 
however has rejected any such suggestion.124 Effectively there are not many 
cases where the courts allow disclosure under this exception. Libyan Arab 
Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co,125 which constituted the order for freezing 
Libyan assets, fell within the qualification of public interest. Staughton J. held: 
“But presuming as I must that New York law on this point is the same as 
English law, it seems to me that the Federal Reserve Board, as the central 
banking system in the United States, may have a public duty to perform in 
obtaining information from banks. I accept the argument that higher public 
duty is one of the exceptions to a banker’s duty of confidence and I am 
prepared to reach a tentative conclusion that the exception applied in this 
case.”126 
The author’s view is that, for a breach of the bank’s duty of confidentiality to 
accord with the public interest, it has to be specified and not subsumed under a 
general definition. It is reasonable for the government to identify exactly the 
circumstances and conditions by obtaining an order from the court which 
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requires the bank to reveal its customers' information under this exception. But 
since the court already has, under a number of statutes and regulations, the 
right to order the bank to disclose its customers’ confidential information, then it 
is in fact reasonable to consider this qualification redundant. 
5.4.3 Disclosure in the bank’s own interest 
The bank’s own interest is considered to be the third exception to the bank’s 
duty of confidentiality as identified by Bankes L.J.127 The best case for this 
exception is when a legal dispute arises between the bank and the customer in 
relation to the customer's bank accounts, for example repayment of overdraft.128 
Here the bank must evidence the amount of the overdraft on a summons which 
is a public document.129 At first sight, this disclosure in defence of bank interests 
is sanctioned, whereas as a matter of law, certainly this disclosure falls within 
the public interest for the purpose of the effective administration of justice.130  
In Sunderland v Barclays Bank Limited,131 the bank did not pay a cheque drawn 
on it by one of its customers because the funds in the account were inadequate 
to cover the cheque. The customer called the bank to explain the reason behind 
non-payment of the cheque, and then she had handed the telephone to her 
husband who took over the conversation with the bank which she had begun.132 
The manager of the bank informed the husband the cheques were drawn in 
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payment of gambling debts. 133  The customer sued the bank because she 
thought that the bank breached its duty of confidentiality to her by disclosing 
confidential information. Du Parcq, L.J. held that there was no breach of 
confidentiality, because the bank acted to protect its interest and also the 
plaintiff had given her implicit approval to waive her right to confidentiality.134 
In Sunderland v Barclays Bank Limited, however, the appropriate explanation of 
the bank’s right to disclose its customer information was that in order to 
maintain its reputation, nevertheless there was no reasonable justification for 
the bank’s action in informing the plaintiff’s husband that the cheque was drawn 
as a result of gambling debts It would have been sufficient to let the husband 
know that the bank did not guarantee the cheques because there was 
inadequate money in his wife’s account.135 Alhosani believes that the bank’s 
action could be justified, if either it was the husband’s liability to pay his wife’s 
debts or if they had a joint account in the same bank.136  
It seems that this exception was not generally accepted and prefers to keep the 
ambit of this exception within fairly narrow confine. Furthermore, this exception 
accepts when it related to the public interest and not to the bank’s interest 
alone, since allowing such a qualification gives the bank a potential for 
abuse.137 In this regard, the Jack Committee clarified significant two subjects of 
concern. 138 First, the bank considers favourably references from other entities 
of the same banking group. So there is concern about the exchanging of 
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confidential customer data between different entities of the same banking 
group.139 It is obvious that the bank has no right to exchange and share its 
customer’s confidential information between different members of the same 
banking group, and any such revelation would place the bank under liability for 
breach of its duty of confidentiality, 140  that is because each member of a 
banking group has a separate corporate personality,141 nevertheless, there is 
concern that banks might justify all such disclosures as being in their interests. 
In contrast, the Jack Committee recommended that disclosures of confidential 
information within the same banking group should be acceptable even in the 
absence of customer approval.142 It also recommended that such disclosure 
should be accompanied by significant awareness of the particular aim of 
guarding the bank and the damages that it might suffer in presenting standard 
banking services. However, the bank is considered in breach of its duty of 
confidentiality if it exchanges and shares customer information for marketing 
purposes.143The authors’ view is that such a provision might open the gates to 
the banks disclosing its customer information for any reason other than 
marketing and claiming that, since the disclosure was not for the purpose of 
marketing, there was no breach of confidentiality.  
The Lending Code 2012144 clarifies that, for marketing purposes, the bank must 
obtain the customer’s specific consent before providing the customer’s 
information to any firm, whether in the same group or not. Accordingly, most 
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bankers started to protect themselves by including in their contracts with 
customers a term stating that the bank has the right to exchange and share 
customer information with other banks in the same group, irrespective of 
whether that exchange takes place in the UK or overseas. 145  Furthermore, 
some banks have standard terms and conditions in their contracts which include 
the provision that they may share and exchange customer information with a 
third party who is outside the banking group.146 Normally and in practice, these 
standard terms and conditions justify disclosure in the banks’ own interest, and 
the customer has no right to discuss such terms because they are considered 
as a standard in the contract. 
In the final analysis, the author’s view is that as long as the bank is subject to 
the management and control of the banking group, directly or indirectly, it is 
difficult to withhold the transmission of confidential information related to 
customers dealing with that bank. The holding company is in charge of setting 
general policy for the activities of its subsidiaries in various fields, based on 
information received from its subsidiaries. Therefore, it is acceptable to 
exchange and share customer information within the same banking group. The 
author believes that if this qualification is given comprehensive interpretation; it 
could include the bank’s commercial convenience and utility, where the bank 
can justify any disclosure in its own interest. Thus, disclosure in the public 
interest serves as the best justification for disclosing confidential information.147 
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5.4.4 Disclosure under the customer’s authority 
The customer’s consent is considered to be the fourth qualification in 
Tournier.148 The customer’s approval could be either explicit or implicit.149 A 
customer can permit the transfer of particular items of his personal information. 
The bank must disclose only the information for which the customer has given 
explicit approval and no more.150 It is difficult to indicate exactly the point where 
the bank obtains implicit approval. In Tournier, the court held that the best 
instance of a customer’s implicit approval for the revelation of confidential 
information is when that customer authorizes the bank to provide a reference.151 
This approach has been adopted by the banking sector for years.152 However, it 
is sensible not to assume that a customer who provides his bank details when 
applying for a credit card is giving implicit approval for the disclosure of 
confidential information by the bank. Tournier has therefore been exposed to 
criticism in this respect.153 One of the Jack Committee suggestions was that at 
the beginning of the bank-customer relationship the bank should explain and 
describe very clearly how the banking system works and should invite 
customers to give or withhold a general approval for their banks to submit 
opinions on them in response to government enquiries.154 Nevertheless, there is 
nothing to prevent a bank from including in its contract with the customer a term 
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authorizing disclosure of information on a customer’s creditworthiness. 
Furthermore, the Lending Code, 2012 stipulates that the bank can pass 
negative information without the customer’s approval,155 although the customer 
must be given notice that the negative information will be passed at least 28 
days before the disclosure is made. Within this period, the customer must be 
given notice, and the ways in which the negative information may affect his 
ability to obtain credit must be explained.156 This clarification notice will give the 
customer a period of time (28 days) during which there will be the opportunity to 
make repayment or to reach some other settlement arrangement with the bank 
to enable him to try to replay or come to some arrangement with the bank 
before negative information is passed to the third party. 157 Before providing 
positive information in a reference the bank must obtain the customer’s 
approval.158 Nevertheless, the Code 2012 came without any indication of the 
type of prior approval required before the passing of positive information, 
whether explicit or implicit. 
In Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc,159 the defendant bank responded in 
unfavourable terms to a number of status enquiries from another bank about the 
creditworthiness of the claimant, who held both personal and business accounts 
with the defendant. The defendant used confidential information concerning the 
state of the claimant’s account when formulating its response. According to the 
banking practice in that time, the defendant bank did not obtain the customer’s 
express approval before responding to the status enquiries. The customer sued 
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the bank for breached its duty of confidentiality. The Court of Appeal 160 
however, held that a bank could not depend on banking practice to justify the 
assumption of its customer’s implied approval for the use of private details in 
providing other banks with references. Therefore, the theory that the bank could 
pass on its customer’s confidential information on the grounds that the bank has 
its customer’s implied consent is rejected. Hooley argues that Turner’s decision 
presents a clear explanation in the area of implied consent theory.161  
There are, however, double limitations upon the scope of Turner. First of all, 
Turner presents no final norms to determine whether a bank can depend on its 
customer’s general approval in responding to status enquiries, or whether the 
customer’s particular approval is required. Ellinger, et al. agree that a bank can 
depend on its customer’s general approval in responding to status enquiries,162 
but the consequence of allowing a bank to depend on a customer’s general 
approval must be that the bank bears the burden of confirming that the 
customer is informed of the way in which the bankers’ reference scheme 
operates.163 Secondly, Turner surely expands a customer’s right to establish 
liability against a bank for breaching its duty of confidentiality by reporting 
customer private data to a third party with the absence of a customer’s 
approval, albeit the customer may find difficulty in recovering consequential 
damages as a result of that breach.164 Despite the fact that general damages 
will usually be available,165 particular damages are not always easy to recover. 
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If the bank reveals accurate data that is positive to the customer it is improbable 
that the customer will to suffer any adverse consequences resulting in loss. 
Nevertheless this is not an absolute norm: 166  if the data is accurate, but 
negative, it would be difficult for the customer to prove that the disclosures 
without his approval caused such losses.167 The only case where particular 
damages would probably be easily recoverable is where the data provided by 
the bank proves to be inaccurate. In such a case, the customer will also have a 
concurrent claim based upon the breach of the bank’s duty of skill and care.168 
In this regard, it is the author’s strong recommendation that the principles 
governing the bank’s duty of confidentiality should be regulated by statute in 
order to avoid ambiguities. 
Given the above position, it seems that the law has been changed and thus 
Sunderland is no longer suitable to apply. Therefore, the Court of Appeal in 
Turner held that the bank has no right to disclose or exchange customer’s 
confidential information depending on customer’s implied consent. In 
Sunderland, however, the court held that the bank can rely on implied authority 
and further, that the marriage relationship is significant. Thus, when the wife 
authorized her husband to call the bank, the court assumed that the claimant 
gave her implied authority to discuss all related issues.169 Although, implied 
consent may exist in particular cases, its scope is very limited. Therefore, banks 
need to be extremely careful when relying on implied consent as a basis for 
disclosing customer information.  
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In this regard, the author’s view is that the bank has to notify its customer about 
any reference before it is transmitted. Moreover, the bank is required to obtain 
the customer’s written consent before any action is taken with regard to the 
reference. However, a distinction is made between personal accounts and 
business accounts. Thus, some legal authors’ hold that such principles apply 
only to personal accounts and not to business accounts.170 Overall, it is fair 
practice to obtain the customer’s express consent before passing any 
confidential information to another bank and if it fails to do so it will be liable for 
breach of a duty of confidentiality. Moreover, unless there is a legal reason the 
bank has no right to refuse to disclose customer’s information if such disclosure 
is in accordance with the customer’s request. In practice, the bank could give 
advice to the customer, explaining that the bank could not act on the customer’s 
request as long as there are good reasons for not so acting. 
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5.5 Disclosure of customer credit data to the Credit 
Reference Agencies (CRAs): legal issues 
The development of banking and in particular the growth of EFT makes it 
possible for banks to execute increasingly sophisticated analyses of their 
customers’ saving and spending habits, which enable banks to market their own 
products more effectively and also provide a potentially very valuable source of 
marketing information and facts for third parties, including other financial 
institutions, retailers, and the CRAs.171 Disclosure of customer credit data to the 
CRAs is the second concern was recognized by the Jack Committee172 and one 
of the significant issues which needs highlighting is the ambiguity surrounding 
the disclosure and exchange of customer data with the CRAs and whether 
these disclosures and exchanges fall within one of Tournier qualification.173 
CRAs are self-governing institutions which obtain and collect various financial 
data about both customers and businesses.174 They collect and issue records of 
individuals’ financial affairs.175 There is no doubt that disclosure of customers’ 
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private data to the CRAs is not mandatory or obligatory and that it occurs on a 
voluntary basis.176 
No attention has been given to the following issues: first, analysis and 
determination of the actual function of the CRAs and whether they serve a 
public purpose for the benefit of users and the sector, or whether they merely 
supply services in the interest of the banks; second, analysis and determination 
of whether CRA’s falls under The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 and whether 
any defaults should be considered as a breach of statutory duty under the Act. 
Finally, there is a significant need to analyse and determine whether or not 
CRAs owe a duty to act with reasonable care and skill regarding the customers’ 
confidential data.  
There needs to be an examination, based on the results of the first analysis, of 
the actual function of the CRAs in order to discover whether they are 
implements of the public interest or whether they merely supply services in the 
interest of the banks, and; also whether proposals for UK regimes apply to all 
the different subjects that consumer credit recording entails. A connected 
argument is that data credit exchanges through CRA’s are executed in the 
interest of the parties involved. Assuming the validity of CRA services, 
introducing worthwhile business would indeed be in a party’s interest. However, 
the best argument is that if the CRAs evolved procedures similar to those of the 
private sector institutions such as banks, an evaluation of the right compliance 
of consumer credit recording with the necessities of data protection should 
result in better regulation. If CRA services worked in a manner similar to that of 
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government institutions and under the government umbrella then they would 
implement a public interest. Nevertheless, there is no similarity between an 
action which has community interest and an action which one has an obligation 
to execute.177  Thus, it seems that CRA’s do not execute a public interest. 
Furthermore, the bank cannot claim that it is in the public interest to disclose 
private customer information to the CRA’s, because disclosure in the public 
interest refers only to matters involving the safety of the state or the prevention 
of criminal activity.178 It is important to assess the functions of CRA’s in order to 
measure whether the existing law sufficiently defends against one interest 
prevailing over the other; or at least, there should be an attempt to find a 
balance between the interests of the parties involved. In this regard, the banks 
have no right to disclose information to the CRAs on the basis of their own 
interest. This then leaves the banks dependent on the customer’s explicit or 
implicit approval. The White Paper on Banking Services allows the bank to 
exchange its customer’s negative credit data, such as those involving 
bankruptcy, without customer’s approval, on the grounds of the bank’s interests. 
Positive credit data, however, cannot be thus exchanged. The customer’s 
express approval is required to pass positive information and any information 
which is to be used for marketing purposes. 179  There is no reasonable 
justification for making a distinction between positive and negative customer 
data. The author concurs with the view that the customer’s credit data, whether 
negative or positive, should be treated equally and thus this distinction between 
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the two types of data is a flaw in banking practice.180 Another flaw is that it 
opens the gate to the bank disclosing its customer information without the 
customer’s approval for any reason other than its use for marketing purposes. A 
final flaw is the development of electronic data stores and EFT services with an 
absence of any regulations for exchanging, sharing and controlling new 
commercial markets or private sector agencies. This leaves customers with no 
protections and they may discover, for example, that the data provided to the 
CRAs are under the banks’ regulation and control and otherwise unprotected. 
Therefore, there is a need for particular legal rules intervention to strike a 
balance between privacy rights, discrimination concerns, and the need of the 
credit industry.181 
In practice, most banks have a right to pass and exchange their customers’ 
confidential financial data by giving facts on them terms of their capacity to 
enter into and fulfil a specific financial commitment.182 These disclosures and 
exchanges fall completely under the general terms and conditions of the 
banker-customer contract and are subject to the customer’s general approval. 
However, these general terms and conditions of the customer contract leave the 
customer without any real option to accept or reject exchange and disclosures 
of his data, because rejection by the customer of those terms and conditions will 
cause the banks to refuse to open an account with that person. It would be 
salutary to bring the sophisticated electronic technology involved in personal 
data exchange into the ambit of a data protection regime. As a consequence 
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the customer data subject to transfer would not be available to the public and 
transfers would be made using secure encryption. In the final analysis, it seems 
that CRA’s are private organisations working under government regulations.183 
In conclusion, with regard to CRA’s as ‘private organisations’ it is clear that the 
existing law is insufficient to protect customers against disclosure of private 
information and against the interests of the CRA’s. Consequently the law needs 
to find a balance between the interests of the customer and the interests of the 
organisation involved. 
The second issue of whether CRAs fall under DPA 1998184 is based on an 
analysis of the CRA system. Data collected and recorded via electronic means 
falls under the DPA 1998.185 Nevertheless, according to the Act, collecting and 
storing electronic data is not processing, unless the data are first registered with 
a ‘data controller’. 186  So as long as the customers’ data are stored and 
exchanged by electronic methods within the CRAs, then they are considered 
‘controlled’ data’ and fall under the DPA requirements.187 If a CRA is regarded 
as a ‘data controller’ it will owe a statutory duty to apply and comply with the 
DPA in relation to all credit data which it controls, and any defaults would be 
considered a breach of statutory duty under the Act. 188  Consequently, any 
contravention of any of the requirements of the Act from the CRAs which 
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causes damage or losses to the customer entitles the latter to demand 
compensation.189 This provides the customer with a kind of protection, although 
the CRA has the right to attempt to prove that it took all reasonable care and 
took all the necessary steps to protect the customer data. 
The third and final issue is whether the CRA owes a duty of skill and care to 
consumers under common law principles. Certainly there is no contractual 
relationship between the CRA and the customer, and thus there is no 
contractual liability. 
Since there is no contract liability between the CRA and the customer, can there 
then be an assumption of liability according to a duty of care in tort at common 
law? In Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc, 190  the 
Customs and Excise Commissioners, in seeking to recover outstanding VAT 
from two companies, gained freezing injunctions for all their assets. Barclays 
were informed of the injunctions, but later passed payments from the accounts 
in breach of the injunctions. The Commissioners alleged damages for 
negligence against Barclays. The court held that Barclays owed no duty of care 
to the Commissioners, but the House of Lords turnover the decision and held 
that a duty of care is owed in tort liability for economic damage.191 The House of 
Lords held that there was a sufficiently proximate relationship between the bank 
and the commissioners. The parties’ relationship, brought into existence by the 
orders, was closely proximate and akin to a contract. The bank knew or ought to 
have known that the commissioners were relying directly on it to protect their 
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interests and in return the bank was entitled to charge the commissioners the 
reasonable costs of its compliance with the orders.192 Thus, Barclays was liable 
for breached its duty of care. The court held that there are three tests for the 
imposition of a duty of care, viz: the ‘assumption of responsibility’ test; the 
‘threefold test’; and the ‘incremental’ test.  
“Three tests have been used in considering whether a duty of care is owed 
in tort by a defendant for pure economic loss. The first is whether, 
objectively, the defendant assumed responsibility for his words or conduct 
vis-a-vis the claimant, or is to be treated as having done so. The second, 
the threefold test, requires the claimant to show that the loss was 
reasonably foreseeable, that there was a relationship with the defendant of 
sufficient proximity and that imposition of a duty would in all the 
circumstances be fair, just and reasonable. The third is the incremental 
test. That test, that new categories of negligence should be developed 
incrementally and by analogy with established categories, is of limited 
assistance since it does not provide any qualitative criteria by which to 
measure whether a duty should be held to arise.”193 
Regarding the CRA, the issue is whether it assumed a responsibility to the 
customers. Hypothetically, no connection exists between the CRA and the 
customer, thus it is reasonable not to assume the existence of liability under 
tort. This point is held by the Court of Appeal in Keith Smeaton v Equifax Plc.194 
the court states: 
“It would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose such a duty [duty of care 
in tort].195  The judge had erred in concluding that a CRA assumed a 
responsibility to every member of the public simply by choosing to operate 
that type of business. Imposing a duty owed to members of the public 
generally would potentially give rise to an indeterminate liability to an 
indeterminate class. A co-extensive duty of care in tort would also be 
otiose, given that the Act provided a detailed code for determining the civil 
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liability of credit reference agencies and other data controllers arising out 
of the improper processing of data”196 
Thus, CRA’s owed no duty to exercise care in tort, although, as ‘data 
controllers’ they owed customers civil liability under the DPA 1998, such liability 
issuing when there was found to be improper processing of data. 
In conclusion, the rules stated in Tournier are generally accepted and applied in 
the UK courts. Spearman argues that the limitation principles stated in Tournier 
are not obvious, thus, there is nothing to prevent the application of these 
principles and their interpretation in a wider context of substantive law, for 
example, the law of confidence, the misuse of private information and data 
protection.197 He presents three reasons to justify his view: 
“First, because the general law of confidence, misuse of private 
information and data protection provides a framework which is not only 
principled and detailed but also flexible. Second, because this ensures 
consistency. Third,…, because it would enable the law of banker’s 
confidentiality to keep pace with development in these substantive 
areas.”198  
However, with the development of EFT systems these rules have become 
generally less acceptable. Therefore, it seems that Tournier is insufficient to 
cover all issues surrounding bank’s duty of confidentiality in the EFT context, 
and in particular, its qualifications with regard to the public interest are 
subsumed within the first qualification, disclosure by compulsion of law, and the 
third qualification only covers a customer’s express consent and not a 
customer’s implied consent. Furthermore, with EFT system development and 
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the great number of different users it is important to add new qualification 
applying to the circumstance where the customer defaults to protect his data 
and causes disclosure, whether of his own data or those of other users. Thus, 
there is a need to establish clear and predictable rules applicable to the law of 
confidence.199  
5.6 Analysis of the existing legal rules relating to the 
bank’s duty of confidentiality in the EFT context 
In the UK here is no particular regime dealing with the bank’s duty of 
confidentiality. DPA 1998, and the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, are 
considered as the main significant legislations dealing with such duty. 
5.6.1 The DPA 1998 and the protection of customers’ electronic 
data  
The DPA 1998 deals with electronic data and data internet records. 200  It 
provides the right to the protection of personal information while taking into 
account the right to process and transfer an individual’s data. Regarding EFT 
systems dealing with customer data recorded electronically, such data must be 
classified as ‘personal data’ to be protected by the DPA 1998. In Tournier, the 
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court held that all customer information delivered to a bank, regardless of the 
sources of the information, falls under the bank’s duty of confidentiality. 201  
However, not all customer information recorded electronically is protected under 
judiciary authority by the DPA 1998. This point was illustrated in Durant v 
Financial Services Authority, 202  where the court held that the meaning of 
‘personal data’ should not be interpreted widely, and does not essentially 
include all information recorded by a computer. The court recognised that 
personal data, such as biographical information on the customer recorded by 
the computer, fall within the DPA 1998. It presented as examples of personal 
data persons’ names, contact telephone number, and home or work address. 
Auld L.J. held: 
“not all information retrieved from a computer search against an 
individual's name or unique identifier is personal data within the 
Act…“personal data” covered the name of a person or identification of him 
by some other means, for instance by giving his telephone number or 
information regarding his working conditions or hobbies.”203 
He also held: 
“The first is whether the information is biographical in a significant sense, 
that is, going beyond the recording of the putative data subject's 
involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a 
life event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to be 
compromised. The second is one of focus. The information should have 
the putative data subject as its focus rather than some other person with 
whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event in which 
he may have figured or have had an interest.”204 
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Personal data could be identified as information containing an expressed 
opinion about the customer’s personality. 205  Thereby, banking statistics fall 
outside the personal data concept even if such statistics originally result from 
personal data. 206  This is because banking statistics include no personal 
information referring to the customer’s data.   
Recording and storing the bank’s electronic information is not processing unless 
it is first registered with a ‘data controller’,207 a data controller, being defined for 
the purposes of this thesis as a bank.208 The 1998 Act imposes an obligation on 
a ‘data controller’ to comply with the ‘data protection principles’ set out in Part 1, 
Schedule 1(4). These rules require personal information to be used: fairly and 
legally; for precisely the aims for which it was collected without any changes, to 
be sufficient. It should also be relevant and precise, and where important, kept 
updated. Furthermore, suitable procedures must be taken with regard to 
unauthorized or illegal use of information and for any damage or losses. 
Therefore, in the EFT system the bank is considered in breach of its duty of 
confidentiality if the customer’s electronic information is not treated and 
processed fairly. The bank has to satisfy a minimum of conditions under the Act 
1998.209  Inter alia, these conditions are: that the customer approves of the 
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processing of his data; that the data processing is important for the performance 
or initiation of a contract, or to accord with a non-agreement duty, or that the 
processing is important for the achievement of particular public goals, for 
example, the administration of justice. Finally, the processing must be 
‘important for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller 
or by a third party to whom the data is disclosed’.210 The Act211 puts forward 
further conditions that govern the processing of ‘sensitive personal data’, such 
as ethnic origin and religious or political orientation. The customer data will be 
considered processed unlawfully if the bank fails to comply with these 
conditions. Furthermore, any processing which results in infringements of the 
rights of privacy will be considered unlawful processing. The DPA 1998, 
introduces the right to respect for an individual’s data. 212  This involves the 
person’s right of access to his data;213 it inhibits the processing of an individual’s 
data for the goals of marketing; 214  inhibits any processing that may cause 
losses;215 imposes a right to reimbursement where losses result from a breach 
of the Act’s rules,216 and finally, gives a data subject the right to apply to the 
court to correct any mistake or alterations in the personal data.217 
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5.6.2 The Human Rights Act 1998 and misuse of customer’s 
confidential information 
In order to involve the Human Rights Act 1998 in banking confidentiality in an 
EFT context, it must first be proved that the duty of confidentiality falls under the 
European Convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.218   
Article 8 of the ECHR deals with respect and protection for personal life, with 
the aim to protect the individual’s privacy and to prevent any violation of privacy 
under any circumstances, unless there is legal provision allowing for a violation. 
In Niemietz v Germany219 the court held that an individual’s private life in Article 
8 of the ECHR involved certain aspects of an individual’s professional or 
business life, especially where a confidential relationship exists to protect 
individual information, provided the information collected and recorded by a 
bank concerning an individual customer falls under the professional duty of 
confidentiality. Therefore, the right to a private life and the protection of personal 
data addressed by article 8 of the ECHR succeeds in involving a bank's duty of 
confidentiality.220  
The human rights rules and those actions which could cause misuse of 
confidential information are satisfactorily summarised by Tugendhat J. in 
Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd. 221  Tugendhat J. established the 
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circumstances in which the action could cause misuse of confidential 
information as follows:222 
“a. The starting point is the Human Rights Act 1998. By s.6 the court (as a 
public authority) is required to act compatibly with Convention Rights. By 
s.1 (1) the court is also required to take into account judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (“the Strasbourg court”). That is what 
Parliament, not the judges, has decided. The Convention rights in question 
in this case are the rights to freedom of expression of NGN and the right of 
the general public to receive information, which are protected by art.10 
and by the common law, and the right to respect for private life protected 
by art.8.” 
Article 8(2) establishes the different conditions that must be applied by the 
public authorities in order to avoid any misuse of a person’s confidential 
information. Article 8(1) enshrines the principle that any contravention or misuse 
of a person’s privacy is illegal. The bank must apply the conditions enshrined in 
Article 8(2); otherwise it would be in breach of its legal duty. Overall, any 
interference with the person’s rights that falls within Article 8(2) requirements 
will be illegal. Nevertheless, Article 8(2) lists exceptions to the principles. These 
exceptions were interference by a public authority in accordance with the law 
and as deemed necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country; for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The author’s view is that when a bank breaches its duty of confidentiality it 
should reference clearly to the statutory provision which justified this breach, 
otherwise it would be liable for a breach of the duty of confidentiality under the 
HRA. Further, for the present aim of this section it is important to adopt a clear 
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approach to avoid any misuse of customer’s data. This involves applying Article 
8 to a bank’s duty of confidentiality in order to protect a customer’s data from 
any unlawful interference unless it is provided by the law. Consequently any use 
of the power of revelation as, for example, when confidential customer details 
held by a bank are revealed under common law, must take into account its 
proportionality to the legal goal pursued. Finally, with the expansion of the 
general law protecting privacy there is no reason why the HRA 1998 rules 
should not encompass the banker-customer contract.223 
Ultimately, EFT transactions deal with information more than with cash 
transactions. Thus, there are risks from hacking or unauthorized internet data 
being captured. Therefore, there is a need for more clarity regarding the means 
by which banks control, save, and employ the customers’ information and 
further there is a necessity to protect and prevent any misuse of the customers’ 
data. The existing law for determining the legal validity and liability for the 
security procedures in the protection of a customer’s electronic data against any 
unauthorized attack will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
5.6.3 The procedures actions against unauthorized access or 
any attack in the context of EFT 
The confidentiality of EFT systems means the banks have to protect EFT 
transaction information from being accessed by hackers. This protection can be 
done by encrypting information communication by such means as hiding a 
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customer’s identity through the use of certain techniques.224 Azzouni addressed 
two significant problems that could be associated with electronic banking 
confidentiality.225 First, the bank has to provide different methods to protect both 
the customer’s confidential information and the bank’s encryption. Secondly, 
with EFT transactions there is a risk of unauthorized attacks on the customers’ 
data.226 Azzouni believed that these problems could be solved by adopting strict 
laws sufficient to deter hackers.227 Thus, it is significant to look at the laws that 
can be applied to these types of attack. 
The first problem is that the banks need to supply sophisticated encryption 
methods to protect both the customer’s confidential information and the bank. 
Such problems can be solved by adopting a highly secret system to prevent any 
unauthorized access to the bank’s electronic data.228 Nonetheless, the first step 
in protecting a customer’s information could be through the privacy of the 
information about each party involved in the EFT transaction. Neither payers 
nor payees have access to each other's personal transactions, irrespective of 
which type of EFT method is used, thus ensuring their privacy is protected.229 
However, this is not the best solution because of the potential for such 
information being disclosed by the parties involved in the transaction. 230 
Furthermore, with hidden customer identity techniques there is concern that an 
EFT transaction may involve criminal activities such as money laundering. In 
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addition, this solution does not address the issues surrounding unauthorized 
access to the customer’s data via hackers. 
The banks must take all necessary steps to protect customer’s confidential 
information. Within the DPA 1998, as explained above, a person is authorized 
to be known by any data controller when personal information is being passed 
by or on behalf of that data controller. This requirement still does not apply 
clearly. The banks, however, include within their contract with the customer the 
information that they have very strict security systems designed to avoid attack 
from hackers and access to the customer’s details. It is important to include 
within the banker-customer contract the provision that customer data will be 
used only by a legally constituted authority and that the bank will protect the 
data by offering very high security requirements.231 In addition, with an EFT 
system there are different ways by which the bank could send the customer 
information, such as email and the postal services. The bank is obliged to obey 
the customer’s request to send confidential information in a secure way, for 
example by special delivery. Thus, sending the information via email will be 
considered a breach of the banker-customer contract.232 The author’s view is 
that these different options necessitate legal regulation in order to maintain a 
high level of security and to protect customer’s data in the EFT system. Azzouni 
illustrates this point by an example: in July 2000 a number of Barclays’ 
customers obtained access to another customer’s account information; 
therefore Barclays had to lock its website. However, no action was taken 
against the bank for its default in the provision of the security features required 
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under the DPA 1998 and its breach of contract with the customers. 233  He 
argues that under the DPA 1998, the bank would be held liable for such 
disclosure if any action was taken against Barclays in the courts.234 
The second problem is the validity of legal prohibitions against unauthorized 
access to the customer data in the EFT system and the criminalization of such 
action. A legal analysis of the existing laws may help to address the problem of 
attacks on electronic customer data by hackers and determine the legal liability. 
In R. v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex p. Levin235 some answers may be found. 
The facts are: in 1994 a United States bank, Citibank, was exposed to 
unauthorized access to its computer system.  
The issue started when the Citibank provided its customers with unlimited 
online access via telephone from any geographic location. Once such service 
existed customers had the ability to execute different types of transactions, 
including credit transfers between accounts. Consequently, funds were 
transferred from the customer accounts into the offender’s accounts and those 
of his accomplice. 236  Some of the offences are under the criminal law of 
England and Wales: they are the offences of theft, forgery, false accounting and 
unauthorized modification of computer material.237 The case is considered as 
one which identifies the uncertainty of legal issues surrounding the 
unauthorized access to computer data. In this case the court held that: first, a 
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person who gains access to bank computer data in an unauthorized way is 
considered guilty of a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.238 Further, 
section 2(1) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 clarified that unauthorized 
access is a crime if it involves the purpose of perpetrating or facilitating a further 
crime. Therefore any attack against customer data from hackers or any other 
unauthorized person is considered a crime and incurs criminal liability under 
section 2(1) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990.239 
On this ground, a bank or its employee falls within this section in the event that 
they attempt to access customers’ accounts or bank system data without legal 
authority.240 Therefore, there is nothing to prevent the application of such rules 
to any kind of hacker and to the crime of gaining unauthorized access crime to 
an EFT system. Furthermore, the case held that any action with intent to cause 
an unauthorized modification to a customer’s computer data falls under section 
3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Thereby, the court held that ‘the 
introduction of an unauthorized instruction to transfer money from the accounts 
into other accounts would certainly impair the ability of Citibank and its 
customer to depend on data records in the computer’.241 The author’s view is 
that there is no reason to prevent application of the same rules in cases of 
unauthorized access to, or an attack on, a banking computer system. Secondly, 
in R. v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex p. Levin, the court held that the action of 
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issuing unauthorized instructions on the Citibank computer falls under section 
17(1) of the Theft Act 1968.242  
In accordance with the Theft Act 1968 the court held that the applicant made an 
entry in a continuous record stored on the computer’s disk which was 
unquestionably incorrect or misleading. The applicant was therefore involved in, 
and charged with, computer misuse, forgery and falsification of accounts.243 The 
author’s view is that attacks on bank system data and access to them without 
legal authority involve criminal liability and there is no legal obstacle to applying 
the principles of R. v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex p. Levin to such a crime. 
Nevertheless, the EFT system is still in need of regulation in matters relating to 
internet banking security attacks and unauthorized access to security data. 
Azzouni244 argues this point as follows: 
“It can be concluded that although the existing regulations can be applied 
to cases involving internet banking, they may still be diversity in the 
interpretation of these provisions. Therefore, legislations should study the 
current situation of internet banking technology and the provisions that can 
be applied and make the vital amendments in order to respond to the 
challenges that may be faced.”245 
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5.7 Liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality in an 
EFT context 
A bank’s duty of confidentiality could be breached under three main risks: first, 
the bank discloses its customer’s private information without legal authority; 
secondly, through default of the bank in providing the required security 
procedures; and thirdly, through unauthorized attack from hackers or an attack 
without legal authority.246  This section will be devoted to determining which 
party bears the losses and damages resulting from the breaches of banking 
confidentiality. There is an absence of legal regulation covering the liability for 
breach of banking confidentiality in the EFT system. This absence has led 
banks to establish their own contractual agreements, terms and conditions. 
Within these agreements banks are free to use customer data in a 
comprehensive way, without allowing the customer the right to reject the use of 
that data. 
In regard to the first risk, a bank is in breach of its duty of confidentiality if it 
discloses the private information without legal authority. Such a breach 
establishes the bank’s liability for any losses and damage suffered by the 
customer. Nevertheless, if the bank proves that the disclosure was due to the 
customer’s negligence the bank bears no liability towards the customer. 
In regard to the second risk, which is default on the part of the bank in providing 
security procedures, regulation 120(1) of the PSR 2009 provides that any 
breach of the requirement of Parts 5 and 6 gives the customer the right to claim 
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for loss and damages ensuing from a breach of statutory duty. Regulation 
58(1)(a) imposes on the bank a duty to ensure that the personalised security 
features of the payment instrument are not accessible to persons other than the 
rightful holder. Thus, this provision could be applied in a case of a default on the 
part of the bank in providing its computer system with the security requirements 
necessary to prevent unauthorized access. It is relevant to note here that the 
banks have the power to control the EFT system247 and therefore in the case of 
any breach of the bank’s confidentiality, for example, through an attack on the 
bank security system, the bank bears the loss and damage resulting from such 
breach. In contrast, with internet banking the banks cannot control the 
transactions because both the bank and its customers are users of online 
transactions and therefore the technical malfunctions of the system are outside 
the control of the bank.248 Consequently, Lloyds249 and HSBC250 for example, 
have considered the bank not liable for any default or losses due to the 
technical malfunctions of any internet systems beyond their control. However, 
the author’s view is that exempting the bank from liability due to the technical 
malfunctions of the online system is not justified unless the banks have 
presented all the security procedures necessary to prevent the defaults or 
losses. 
Overall, it seems that the bank is liable to the customer for any losses or 
damage resulting from disclosure of confidential information or data without 
legal provision or qualifications outside of the law. The bank’s liability extends to 
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any economic loss, further it could extent to any suffering of injury in feeling.251 
In another words, the bank should be liable to the customer to recover direct 
and indirect damages.252 The bank is liable, also for any disclosure resulting 
from the default of the bank to provide the required security procedures 
necessary for the prevention of any unauthorized access to the customer’s 
data. Also, the bank is liable for any disclosure resulting from its employees; 
such liability arises even if the employees of the bank were negligent. However, 
there is no liability on the bank if such disclosure was due to the customer’s 
negligence. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The EFT system should provide as a minimum the same level of confidentiality 
as cash payment systems. The purpose of the duty of confidentiality is that the 
EFT system information should not be easily accessible for the purpose of 
gaining more detailed or broader data about customers. Hence, in the EFT 
system, a bank’s duty of confidentiality can be assessed according to which 
data they disclose to a particular customer. EFT confidentiality can be achieved 
by providing a very high standard of encryption for internet data and ensuring 
that no one can access such data without authority. However, confidentiality 
within EFT systems cannot prevent the possible transmission outside an EFT 
system between involved parties, such as internet data networks; or data may 
be revealed in subsequent commercial interactions. The author’s view is that 
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the existing confidentiality laws do not provide customers with an adequate level 
of protection and safety to be able to control the recording and exchange of 
data relating to their EFT transactions. Thus there is a need of new legal rules 
to protect customer’s data in the EFT context. Such legal rules would govern all 
the exceptions and limitations with regard to disclosure of customer information, 
and would create a balance between the customer’s right to privacy and the 
third party’s interest. Furthermore, these rules should emphasise the duty of 
employers, for example banks and CRAs, to employ encrypting systems 
sufficient to prevent any unauthorized access to the banks’ data.253  
This chapter concludes that banking confidentiality is not merely a necessary 
obligation for the bank to safeguard customer information. It is, at the same 
time, a positive obligation to ensure that the bank takes all necessary measures 
and steps to maintain the confidentiality of customer information. Therefore, due 
to the development of electronic banking the banks must take all reasonable 
care and have security procedures to prevent any attack or unauthorized 
access to the bank’s accounts, transactions and operations, by every electronic 
means possible. On the whole, banking confidentiality is not confined to 
protecting the customers’ interests: it is also designed to protect the interests of 
the banks themselves as well as to strengthen confidence in the banking 
system. Finally, with all the exceptions explained in this chapter, banks face an 
increasingly complicated task in reconciling and balancing their different 
obligations with regard to details and information on their customers and their 
confidentiality. Customers have significant expectations regarding banking 
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confidentiality. Therefore, in future, both the judiciary and the government 
should not further extend qualifications to the rules regarding the duty of 
confidentiality without taking into consideration all the consequences for general 
law of the advanced technology of the electronic banking sector. Also, they 
have to make reasoned evaluations regarding the misuse of confidential 
information. 
299 
 
Chapter Six 
Recoverability of EFT Transaction Losses  
6.1 Introduction  
The most common disputes arising from EFT’s involve unauthorized 
transactions, failures or delays in transfers, or a combination of both failures 
and delays. Damages attributable to these breaches or delays may include 
losses to the principal amount of the transaction, interest losses and losses 
resulting from foreign exchange rate fluctuations between the expected and 
actual time of receipt the funds transferred. Resolution of these disputes 
requires the determination of which party is liable for the losses.  
Damages in the context of EFT are not covered by statute or case law, except 
the PSR 2009, when applicable, according to which the payer bank is obliged to 
refund the transaction funds when the bank made the payment in response to 
an unauthorized instruction.1 Furthermore, in case of non-execution or defective 
execution of a payment instruction a bank is liable to its customer for any funds 
or interest which must be paid by the customer.2 However, these provisions 
may be disapplied, when the customer is not a consumer, if there is an 
agreement between the parties. 3  If one of the EFT parties breaches its 
contractual duties, such a breach confers a recoverability right on the injured 
                                               
1
 The PSR 2009, regulation 61. 
2
 Ibid., regulation 77. 
3
 Ibid., regulation 51(3)(a). 
300 
 
party.4 Within the basic principles covering actions for breach of contract, the 
innocent party is authorized to recover damages from the party in breach, but 
unless the innocent party has sustained a loss, that party is confined to 
recovering nominal damages.5 This general rule is applicable where the bank 
debited their customers’ accounts without a customer’s mandate or made the 
transfer incorrectly. The bank has no right to debit its customer account without 
the customer’s mandate; accordingly the customer has the right to request the 
bank that acted without customer’s mandate to re-credit the account instead of 
following the funds transferred.  
This chapter is devoted, first, to examining what kind of damages are recovered 
in EFT transactions and, second, to determining the party which bears the 
losses. In modern practice, agreements between a bank and a customer tend to 
relieve the former from bearing any liability towards the customer, thus making 
the damage recovery process for customers almost non-existent. The outlines 
of this chapter are as follows: section 6.2 is devoted to explaining the measure 
of damages for breach of contractual duties and its applicability to EFT 
transactions. This section clarifies the notion of damages; it illustrates that the 
term damages always refers to the money recovered from losses resulting from 
any breach in the contract. Also, this section demonstrates that the general 
principles for the measure of damages for breach of contractual duties could be 
applied to damages for breaches in an EFT transaction. Section 6.3 is devoted 
to examining the categories of damages which could be classified as direct 
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damage and consequential damage. When the bank acts outside the 
customer’s mandate, the customer loses the principal amount of money, the 
interest that the payer might have been be paid if that amount of money had 
been in the account, and possibly that customer may suffer consequential 
damages, such as the loss of a favourable contract. In practice, the bank is 
normally liable for direct damage and avoids or limits its liabilities for 
consequential damages. This section demonstrates that the recoverability of 
consequential damages in EFT transactions is uncertain, and that uncertainty 
may give cause for concern in the banking sector. One of the more significant 
findings to emerge from this chapter is that there is a need for legal rules which 
allocate risk of direct damages and consequential damages. The chapter then 
proposes model rules which should be of benefit in regulating the banks’ liability 
for consequential damages.  
6.2 The measure of damages for breach of contractual duty 
and its applicability to EFT transactions  
Since the banker-customer relationship is contractual, the payer’s bank’s 
accountability for damages can be defined by adopting the general principles of 
contract law.6 There is consensus in the literature that damages are a remedial 
measure in the form of compensation awarded to the innocent party as a result 
of incurred expenditure or losses, caused by a breach of one of the contract 
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duties.7 The measure of damages under common law rules is demonstrated by 
Parke B. in Robinson v Harman.8 Parke B. held that any party in the contract 
who sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract is entitled to obtain 
reimbursement and “so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation with regard to damages as if the contract had been performed”.9 Thus, 
the paying bank which acted outside its customer’s mandate, for example, by 
debiting payer’s account in accordance with an unauthorized instruction as a 
consequence triggers the bank’s liability for damages to the customer,10 and 
that customer should then be returned to the same position he would he have 
been in had the account not been debited or the payment instruction had in fact 
been transferred to the required payee.11 The application of this measure is 
restricted by the test of remoteness initially formulated by the rule in Hadley v 
Baxendale.12 Alderson B. held that the damages were awarded for breach of 
contract either arising naturally or not arising naturally if such losses were within 
the contemplation of both parties when they signed the contract.13 In Hadley v 
Baxendale the plaintiff’s claim for loss of profit was dismissed because “it is 
obvious that, in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts 
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to third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences 
would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these special circumstances 
were here never communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants.”14 
Within EFT transactions, since the banker-customer relationships is contractual 
relationship, the measure of damages is only applicable when the bank 
breached one of its contractual duties.15 In this regard, in the absence of a 
contractual agreement between the bank and the person, bank is under no 
duty, to this person, to execute an EFT transaction.  As such, no damages are 
recoverable if the bank fails to execute a payment instruction. The banks are 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to execute their customers’ 
instructions. Nevertheless if there is no wrongdoing or breach from the bank, 
there are no recoverable damages.16 For example, if the paying bank fails to 
acknowledge the receipt of a payment message so that it is not included in the 
settlement for the day; the paying bank bears no liability to its customer if it has 
acted reasonably in attempting to make payment.17 
6.3 Damage category for recovery of EFT losses 
When an EFT instruction is issued or altered fraudulently the payer loses the 
principal funds, the interest that the customer might have been paid had those 
funds been in his account, and also perhaps consequential damages, for 
example, losing a preferable contract. Such damages are direct damages, 
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consequential damages and loss of interest. At first view it may seem odd to 
assert that there is a difference between direct and consequential damage.18 
When a person has breached his contractual duties, that person will be 
responsible for any damages expected to result from such a breach to the same 
measure of damage, without increase or decrease. 19  Such damages are 
considered direct damages. In reality, there is a difference between damages 
classed as necessary and immediate, and those which are foreseeable and 
consequential. For foreseeable and consequential damages, the injured person 
will face more difficulty in proving the damages.20  
6.3.1 Direct damage  
A bank which defaults in executing its customer’s EFT instruction does not 
create direct damages equivalent to the principle amount of the instruction 
because no funds have been transferred from the customer’s account. The 
customer may nonetheless suffer losses on the service charges payable to 
another bank for processing such transfers since, owing to the failure to make 
the payment, the customer may have to make use of another bank’s services. 
He will also stand to incur losses in the difference between service charges if 
the latter bank applies higher service charges.  
Where the bank executed the EFT instruction incorrectly and thus the funds 
transfer is not completed, a customer may suffer damages. These damages 
                                               
18 
Tettenborn, op. cit., p.181. 
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may include the principal sum of the transaction and loss of the use of such 
money until the bank refunds the transaction funds to his account or corrects 
the funds transfer by executing it in conformity with the EFT orders given. 
Furthermore, except when the funds transfer is corrected, the customer will lose 
any fees, including the expenses paid, in the funds transfer. Also, in the case of 
insolvency, the payee may suffer losses as a penalty for late payment or non-
payment,21 and the payee’s direct damages will be the interest on the principal 
amount for the time of delay. However, in practice the payee will possibly sue 
the payer for such losses. In this case, the principal sum of the transaction or its 
charges or fees is outside the calculation because there is no loss. These are 
the direct damages that a customer would typically lose for a bank’s failure to 
carry out an EFT instruction. In banking practice, such failure results from a 
bank’s error or negligence.  
Whether such damages are recoverable depends on the measure of damages 
applicable. It was argued previously that the measure of damages for breach of 
contract is applicable to the banker-customer contractual agreement in EFT 
transactions. 22  In Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland 23  the House of Lords 
considered the damages that should be awarded against a bank for breach of a 
contractual duty of confidence. The transaction under which that duty arose 
concerned a transferable letter of credit that had been issued by the defendant 
bank to the customer in favour of the claimants. In this case, the claimants 
imported goods from a company in Thailand to sell on to a customer in 
Lancashire. The customer was aware of the name and contract information of 
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the Thai provider but was inexperienced in importing goods and relied on the 
claimants to handle the paperwork, import formalities and delivery of the goods 
to its premises. At the customer’s request, the claimants ordered goods from 
the Thai provider which the claimants sold on to the customer. The claimants 
transferred the benefit of some of the credit to the Thai provider as the means 
by which the claimants would pay the Thai provider. The claimants kept the 
difference to cover their cost and as their profit. The defendant bank, when 
handling one of the letters of credit, mistakenly sent to the customer documents 
which should have been sent to the claimants. One of those documents 
revealed to the customer the amount of the profit made by the claimants on the 
transaction. As a result the customer stopped dealing with the claimants and 
thus, there were no further orders from the customer. Instead he signed a 
contract directly with the Thai provider. The claimants sued the bank for the lost 
opportunity to make further profits from the trading relationship with the 
customer (the consequential damages).24 The House of Lords held that as the 
customer knew the Thai provider and could have made investigations of the 
Thai provider at any time which would have discovered the amount of the 
claimants’ profit, therefore there was no loss suffered by the claimants. One of 
the issues dealt by the House of Lords in this case is whether the damages that 
the claimants claimed was too remote to be predictable at the time of the 
signing the contract, thus it was not recoverable.25  
 Lord Hope held that according to the two rules of Hadley v Baxendale, 
damages are not recoverable except where it has been in the contemplation of 
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both parties at the time they made their contract.26 Therefore, there was no 
argument that the bank was aware of any special circumstances and it 
accepted to bear any special loss which was referable to special circumstances 
at the time of the signing of the contract. 27  Therefore the losses that the 
claimants claimed were within the first rule of Hadley v Baxendale, because the 
damages were predictable, at the time of signing of the contract, to arise in the 
normal course from the bank’s breach of contract in revealing the confidential 
documents to the customer.28  
Arora29 confirms that, when the paying bank fails to execute the customer’s 
mandate correctly because of negligence, the measure of damages recoverable 
by the customer of the paying bank will be similar to the damages recoverable 
in breach of contract, for example, reimbursement for such loss as is 
reasonably predictable as a consequence of a breach of the kind in question. 
The damages recoverable by the customer of the paying bank not only cover 
the funds of the EFT transaction that should have been made, or the funds of 
the transaction which was incorrectly made:30 such reimbursement should also 
cover any injury caused to the customer.31 In this regard, the bank’s customer 
should be put, so far as money can do it, in the same place he would have been 
in, had his payment order been executed as instructed.32 This should take into 
account the remoteness rule of Hadley v Baxendale. In accordance with the 
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rules formulated in Hadley v Baxendale, it seems that the customer is entitled to 
recover from his bank the following damages, which could be identified as direct 
damages ‘arising naturally’, from the execution of a payment instruction outside 
of a customer’s mandate; and that such damages arise “according to the usual 
course of things”;33 firstly, the principal amount lost in the transfer; secondly, the 
expenses and fees the payer paid to the paying bank to make payment to the 
particular payee;34 and thirdly, the interest of the principal amount from the day 
it is debited from the customer’s account until the date the paying bank refunds 
the customer’s account.  
Under the PSR 2009,35 when the payer’s bank executes a payment instruction 
that was not authorized by the payer, the payer’s bank must immediately refund 
the amount of the unauthorized payment instruction to the payer. Furthermore, 
the payer’s bank is liable to restore the debited payment account to the state it 
would have been in had the unauthorized payment transaction not taken 
place.36 It seems that the payer’s bank is liable to the payer to recover the 
principal amount of the unauthorized transaction, the interest of the amount 
debited without authorization and any other fees paid by the payer to make the 
payment.  
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6.3.2 Consequential damage  
Debiting the customer’s account according to an unauthorized transaction may 
deprive the customer of other opportunities, such as the fund that had been 
debited from the account to buy shares at low prices, or result in the nullification 
of an important business contract or a poor credit rating or other damages.37 
According to the second test of Hadley v Baxendale, consequential damages 
are not recoverable except in cases where they were “reasonably to have been 
in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it”.38 From this it could be deduced that when 
the bank is aware of the fact that the failure in funds transfer would lead to 
losses for the customer, the customer is entitled to recover consequential 
damages. 39  The common law rules hold that the defendant’s liability for 
consequential damages issues from the defendant’s awareness of the special 
circumstances that caused the claimant’s losses.40 Conversely, if the defendant 
is not aware of such special circumstances, the customer is not entitled to 
recover consequential damages.41 The claim for the recovery of consequential 
losses will be inadequate unless the customer has shown or proved that the 
defendant, the bank was aware of the consequential damage.42 Therefore the 
bank and the customer must be aware of that damage which might occur as a 
result of the special conditions, and also it must be within the contemplation of 
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the defendant (the bank) that it is taking the risk of being liable for consequential 
losses.43 Arora44 confirms thus: 
“…unless the paying bank is made aware of the essential character of the 
prompt payment when it accepts the customer’s instructions, the bank will 
not normally be liable for special loss which its customer suffers because 
the payment is essential to secure a contract he is negotiating….. If the 
bank is unaware of the need for prompt payment, the paying bank will not 
be liable to compensate its customer for the loss he suffers as a result of 
any special circumstances which necessitated the prompt payment.”45  
It is however extremely difficult for the courts to establish a clear view of 
whether the damages were in the parties’ reasonable contemplation when they 
signed the contract.46 In Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries 
Ltd,47 Asquith L.J. held that the measure of damages recoverable in any case of 
breach of contract must depend upon first, “the loss actually resulting as was at 
the time of the contract reasonably forseeable as liable to result from the 
breach”.48 Secondly “what was at that time reasonably so foreseeable depends 
on the knowledge then possessed by the parties or, at all events, by the party 
who later commits the breach”. 49 Accordingly, the defendant’s knowledge of the 
special circumstances is of two kinds; one imputed, the other actual. Imputed 
knowledge is the knowledge of the reasonable person who is taken to know 
what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in ordinary circumstances.  
This loss is the subject matter of the first rule of Hadley v Baxendale. But, the 
actual knowledge is the knowledge of special circumstances outside the 
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“ordinary course of things” where losses resulting from a breach of contract are 
subject to the second rule of Hadley v Baxendale.50 Thus one can conclude that 
in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd, the court reached a 
result similar to that which was held in Hadley v Baxendale, namely the 
recovery for those losses that were foreseeable by a reasonable person as 
arising naturally in the usual course of things from the breach.51  
In the context of consequential damages for recoverable EFT losses, since EFT 
is usually issued to settle commercial transactions, the paying bank, therefore 
might be considered to be cognizant of the possibility that the customer will 
sustain some commercial damages if the EFT instruction is executed 
incorrectly.52  Moreover, Arora argues that the customer must be entitled to 
recover the losses which normally issue due to commercial payment not being 
made. Finally, he confirms that “usual commercial loss” is difficult to determine 
by the courts because as yet there is no method for calculating such 
damages.53  
Given the above position, it seems that in EFT transactions, although the paying 
bank identifies that the main aim of payment instruction is to pay for the 
customers’ commercial business, this is not an indication that the payer’s bank 
acknowledges the consequential losses the customer may suffer if the EFT 
instruction is not executed correctly. Furthermore, with the growth of EFT 
transactions, a vast number of instructions are received every day by paying 
banks. These instructions should be carried out at high speed, thus it is very 
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difficult for the bank to expect the consequential losses for each payment 
instruction. Therefore, to consider the bank is liable for the consequential losses 
that the customer may suffer if the EFT instruction is not executed properly, the 
bank should be aware of such losses, and the matter falls within the second rule 
of Hadley v Baxendale. Furthermore, the bank must be aware of such potential 
consequential losses at the time of starting the contract, if the consequential 
losses of some EFTs exceed the losses which are brought to the attention of 
the bank at the time of signing the contract.54 Accordingly, the customer should 
bring to the attention of the bank any potential consequential losses that may 
result if his transaction is not executed correctly. Currently, most banks include 
in their contract with the customer an express term to exclude their liability for 
consequential damages, such as delays or failures caused by industrial action, 
problems with another system or network and data processing failures.55 
6.3.2.1 Recoverability of Currency Exchange Damages  
Within EFT systems, currency exchange losses may happen in electronic credit 
transfer transactions, 56  while no such losses arise in EFTPOS and ATM 
transactions. Damages result from foreign exchange rate fluctuations between 
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the time at which an amount should have been transferred and the actual time 
taken for the transfer, where there is a delay or failure in execution of the 
payer’s EFT instruction.57 The risk is known as ‘Herstatt risk’.58 As explained in 
chapter four, there are several points which must be taken into account 
between the time the transfer is executed and the time when the payee receives 
payment that might be considered time of completion of payment. These points 
are: first, the time the payer’s bank transmitted the payer’s instruction. 
Secondly, the time the payee’s bank receives the payment instruction. Thirdly, 
the time when the payee’s bank acts on the payment instruction and the 
payment becomes irrevocable. Fourthly, the time when the payee’s account 
actual credited with the transaction funds.  
The problem of the finality of EFT extends beyond the determination of losses 
to the question of which party is liable to the payer. Determining the time of EFT 
payments is considered to be an important element in allocating an EFT party’s 
liabilities for exchange rate fluctuation losses under a uniform rule. 59 There is 
an association, in calculating exchange losses, between the exchange rate at 
the time of the expected funds transfer and at actual time of the funds transfer. 
Determining EFT finality alone prescribes only the actual amount paid. 
However, since the exchange rate is different between the time of expected and 
actual payment, the exchange rate must still be determined.60 As a result of the 
determination of the time at which the EFT is considered completed, the court is 
directing attention to the obligations of each of the EFT parties throughout the 
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course of the transfer. One question that needs to be asked, however, is 
whether the customer who suffers losses as a result of a subsequent variation 
in the exchange rate is entitled to claim damages for the loss sustained. Foreign 
currency loss recovery depends on the contemplation of the parties. Under 
English law where such loss was predictable, at the time of signed the contract, 
it is allowed to be recovered.61  
President of India v Lips Maritime (The Lips)62 is considered to be the case 
which dealt with the issue in the most comprehensive manner. In this case, 
Greek owners chartered their vessel to the charterer under a charterparty which 
provided that if the ship was detained beyond the lay days, demurrage should 
be paid at the rate of U.S. $6,000 per day (clause 9 of the charterparty). The 
amount of demurrage was to be paid in British Sterling at the exchange rate 
ruling on 1 July 1980 (clause 30 of the charterparty). The vessel completed 
discharge of the cargo on 11 October 1980. The owners claimed to recover, as 
damages for late payment of the outstanding demurrage, the loss suffered by 
them by reason of Sterling having depreciated by the date of the award.63 At the 
arbitration stage, the umpire's decision, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal, 
was that the currency exchange loss suffered by the owners was “special 
damage” recoverable under the second rule of Hadley v Baxendale, and that 
the owners’ claim for damages was not precluded by the determination of the 
rate of exchange provision in clause 30.64 The Court of Appeal based on the 
issue that the clause 30 did not apply when the paying party was in breach of 
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contract by failing to pay within two months of completion of discharge. The 
case further went to the House of Lords, which rejected the Court of Appeal 
approach. Lord Brandon held: 65  
“All that happened was that the charterer did not pay liquidated damages 
for the detention of the ship at the time when the cause of action in respect 
of such damages occurred, or indeed at any time up to and including the 
date of the umpire's award. For that non-payment the only remedy which 
the law affords to the owners is interest on the sum remaining unpaid.”66 
Lord Brandon recognised that losses in this case cannot be increased by the 
award of further losses for currency exchange losses. That is because “claims 
to recover currency exchange losses as damages for breach of contract, 
whether the breach relied on is late payment of a debt or any other breach, are 
subject to the same rules as apply to claims for damages for breach of contract 
generally”. 67  Therefore, it appears that the House of Lords did not exclude 
recovery of currency exchange losses as damages in other types of breach of 
contract if they are not too remote.68 In this case, the House of Lords held that 
no exchange losses were recoverable because the damages are available for 
late payment of a debt but not for late payment of damages.69 In this regard, 
currency exchange losses are recoverable as consequential damages, when 
such damages are within the contemplation of the parties at the time of signing 
the contract, under the second rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.70   
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In EFT transactions, there are no statutory provisions relating to the recovery of 
currency exchange losses which could conflict with any right of recovery at 
common law. Thus, common law rules apply. It is the foreseeability of losses, 
both general and special, that governs recovery in the law of contract 
damages.71 In this regard, the recovery of currency exchange losses suffered as 
a result of late payment is allowed under either rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, if 
the necessary principles are satisfied.72 Thus, in the EFT transaction, recovering 
currency exchange losses depends on the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of initiating the transfer of funds, which is based on the facts of each case. 
The author’s view is that in the EFT transactions losses arising from differences 
in currency rates may possibly occur, nevertheless it is problematic for banks to 
predict which currency will depreciate. Therefore, there should be no 
assumption that the bank is aware of such losses. A customer must prove that 
currency rates losses were in the contemplation of his bank as possible to result 
from a delay in the transfer of his fund at the time of sending his payment 
instruction.       
This section contends that to determine whether there is currency liability for 
exchange losses, the court must first determine whether both parties in the EFT 
transaction intended currency exchange to be involved in the funds transfer. If 
so, the court should be clear that the delay in payment resulted in failure to 
exchange the funds at a favourable exchange rate, thereby causing exchange 
loss. The court must thus determine if there was a delay and if so which party 
was at fault. In contrast, if the court determines that the payee intends no 
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currency exchange upon the funds transferred there should be no currency 
exchange damages. The following pages are devoted to arguing that there is 
uncertainty in the recoverability of consequential damages within EFT 
transactions and thus it necessary to regulate or at least to establish proposal 
rules for covering such damages.  
6.3.2.2 The validity of the applicability of common law rules of 
consequential damages in EFT transactions 
One of the significant findings to emerge from this section is that the paying 
bank’s liability to recover consequential damages in EFT transactions is 
uncertain and that this uncertainty may cause concern in the banking sector. 
This is possibly an issue which needs to be resolved by the banking sector, 
especially in the absence of judicial identification of the ambit of the applicability 
of common law rules in EFT transactions. This concern stems not from the 
recovery of consequential damages but from the uncertainty that surrounds the 
requirements of consequential damages recoverability. This arises from 
problems such as the difficulty in distinguishing between what constitutes an 
“imputed knowledge” and what are the “special circumstances” in order to 
identify whether or not the bank has contemplated such losses, and is thus 
under liability to recover consequential losses.73  
As explained in the previous chapters, within common law rules it is the bank 
which bears the liability for any failure, fraud or negligence of the correspondent 
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or intermediary bank in executing the EFT transaction, although the banks in 
their standard term contracts can exclude or limit their liability for any failure or 
defaults in executing the payment instruction due to employees of 
correspondent or intermediary banks. Thus the customer who suffers losses in 
certain circumstances has no right to pursue the intermediary bank because 
there is no privity of contract between them and thus the intermediary bank 
owes no liability to the payer, even if the customer draws the attention of his 
bank to the “special circumstances”, at the time of issuing the EFT instruction to 
recover any consequential damages. This could be justified as the customer’s 
bank did not transfer the “special circumstances” to its agent (intermediary 
bank), as passing on such circumstances in the funds transfer system is 
impractical and costly and may hinder the high speed of the funds transfer. This 
leaves the customer without any remedy to recover either the direct damages or 
consequential damages from either the customer’s bank or the intermediary 
bank. 
In view of the situation described above, this chapter argues that the bank’s 
responsibility for either the direct damages or consequential damages should be 
regulated by particular rules specific to EFT. One part of the problem could be 
solved by amending the PSR 2009 and establishing clear rules for the 
governance of direct and consequential damages. One of the more significant 
findings to emerge from this study is that there is a need for model rules which 
allocate rules of risk of direct damages and consequential damages. Within 
consequential damages there are a number of important issues which need to 
be addressed. Moreover, the rules allocating risk in currency exchange loss 
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must include fundamental definitions. 74  These include the following: (1) the 
liability of each party to the EFT must be defined in order to determine which 
party is responsible; (2) clarification of whether there is exchange liability or not; 
and (3) establishing the circumstances under which each exchange rule would 
be applied to achieve the most equitable result.75 Such an approach could be 
adopted by SWIFT as the latter deals with international EFT’s. The conclusion 
reached in this research, that there are no particular rules covering 
consequential damages, supports the suggestion that there is a need for ‘model 
rules’ which would offer several advantages in addressing the recovery of 
exchange damages sustained in delayed EFT transactions. These advantages 
are: first, creating more confidence in foreign exchange rate dealings via EFT 
systems; secondly, a reduction in the delay involved in funds transfer, as banks 
would be liable in respect of exchange rate loss; thirdly, a reduction in the need 
for parties to resort to litigation as clear rules governing liability develop over 
time; fourthly, in conclusion, the fact that the customer who sustained losses as 
a result of foreign currency exchange rate would receive reimbursement for 
delayed funds transfers would serve to foster efficient techniques and 
improvements in the EFT transactions. In this regard, the ‘model rules’ would 
determine the exact points at which each party is liable and that will based on 
time of payment. Ideally, the rules should establish that: 
1- The payer should be liable for any foreign exchange rate losses 
happening between the time of issue of the payment instruction and the time 
of acknowledged receipt on the part of the payer’s bank. 
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2- The payer’s bank should be liable for any foreign exchange rate losses 
occurring between the time of its receipt of the payment instruction and the 
time of transmitting the instruction to the payee’s bank which has the 
opportunity to accept payment;76  
3- The payee’s bank should be liable for any foreign exchange rate losses 
occurring between the time it received the payment instruction and had the 
opportunity to accept payment, and the time at which it actually accepted 
payment.77  
6.4 Conclusion 
If the paying bank debits the customer’s account outside the customer’s 
mandate, the bank breaches its contractual duty to the customer to adhere to 
the customer’s payment instruction. Breach of contract activates the paying 
bank’s responsibility for the damages the customer bears, whether as a result of 
any unauthorized debiting of his account or as a result of a delay in payment. 
Such damages could be direct damages, consequential damages, interest loss 
or currency exchange losses. The recoverability of these losses is subject to the 
remoteness rule of Hadley v Baxendale,78 which classified damages as either 
direct damages or consequential damages. There are no particular rules 
governing the banks liability for consequential damages. EFT is used to make 
commercial transactions, which means the customer’s bank is aware that the 
customer uses EFT for commercial purposes, although such awareness is not 
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considered to be awareness of the special circumstances that the customer will 
bear commercial damages. The absence of particular rules covering 
consequential damages hinders the banks from executing the customer’s 
payment instruction at high speed and low cost. In practice, a bank excludes or 
limits its liability for unauthorized EFT transactions carried out due to the 
intermediary bank’s lack of care. One of the common law rules is that if there is 
no contract there is no case and therefore the customer does not have the right 
to sue the intermediary bank as there is no agreement between them. Due to 
this, the customer cannot claim for direct damages or consequential damages 
from either bank. It is the author’s view that it is of the utmost importance that 
the UK legislation pays more attention to this process of damage recoverable 
within the EFT in order to accord higher protection to the customer. In addition, 
the bank’s liability for direct and indirect damages should be determined by 
specific rules related to EFT.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion  
Although, in recent times EFTs have grown in importance owing to their internet 
use on a global scale for commercial and financial transactions, there is no set 
of comprehensive legal mechanisms in the UK to supervise, monitor, and 
appropriately govern them. There are numerous uncertain issues in the current 
legal system against which EFT transactions are executed particular there is no 
comprehensive set of rules exist to cover the EFT parties’ rights and 
obligations. Section 3 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 defines a bill of 
exchange as: ‘an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to 
another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is 
addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum 
certain in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer’. The 1882 
Act which governs bills of exchange and provides for their legal implementation 
by such means as cheques, cannot be applied to EFT transactions, as the 
distinctive delineation of bills of exchange and promissory notes confines the 
scope of the Act to such devices.  
English common law has defined a certain framework for the banker- customer 
relationship and the various circumstances in which that relationship is started 
and terminated. Definite implied terms have been added, to the banker-
customer relationship, from time to time by courts, in cases where the 
contractual agreement failed to solve contentious issues. Usually the banker-
customer relationship depends on implied contract, however an express 
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agreement is the basic ground in EFT transactions. The best example is 
payment by card transactions such as debit and ATM. The customer has no 
right to use such cards unless there is an express contract. In practice it is 
unusual to negotiate individualised contracts with the bank for each transaction; 
banks normally have their own uniform contracts. In general the EFT 
transactions are based on the banker-customer relationship and this is a 
particularly powerful and attractive idea. At some point, however, the contract 
runs out, and courts must address risks and liabilities which the parties have not 
foreseen or failed to address. English courts regard the legal nature of a 
payment instruction in a credit transfer transaction as an authority and mandate 
from a payer to his bank to transfer a sum of money to a payee’s account.1 It 
was held that such payment instruction is governed by the common law of 
agency.2 It was noted in R. v King3 that the effect of an electronic payment order 
executed via CHAPS was to “direct the paying bank to debit the paying 
customer’s account with £x to the credit of the payee’s account at another bank 
and to do so by means of an electronic device”.4  
Given the significance of the EFT system as a method of payment in the 
contemporary business world, one would imagine that the rules governing such 
a system would be highly advanced and would clearly allocate the 
accompanying risks to the parties involved. The Payment Services Regulations 
2009 do, when it’s applicable, but when it’s not unfortunately, no such rules 
exist in the United Kingdom. The purpose of the current study was to examine 
                                               
1
 Royal Products v Midland Bank [1981] 2 Lloyds Rep. 194 at 198 per Webster, J.  
2
 Ibid.; Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co (No.2) [1989] 1Lloyd’s Rep. 
608. 
3
 R. v King and Other [1991] 3 All E.R. 705. 
4
 Ibid., at p. 709 per Lord Lane; See section 2.5.3.4.  
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how the law allocates risks between the parties in relation to unauthorized 
payment, insolvency risk and privacy.  
7.1 The flaws of the PSR 2009 in the context of the 
allocation of risks associated with EFT  
A thorough examination of the provisions of the PSR 2009 indicates that they 
are limited in application, as they apply to funds transfers between banker and 
customer in the UK,5 and, between the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank 
within the EEA,6 covering EFT transactions denominated in Sterling, the Euro, 
and other European currencies.7 Equally important, the PSR 2009 distinguish 
between different types of customers, namely consumer and business, and in 
this regard, when the customer is not a consumer the parties have the right to 
agree to not apply several regulations relating to Part 6.8 Therefore PSR 2009 
do not comprehensively regulate the rights, obligations and liabilities of the 
parties to the transaction (payer, paying bank, payee’s bank, and payee) and 
their liabilities for unauthorized EFTs, non-payment, direct damages and 
consequential damages. The previous chapters have demonstrated that the 
PSR 2009, when it is applicable, are not without flaws and deficiencies. Thus, it 
fails to address all of the legal issues surrounding EFT transactions. The PSR 
2009 provisions offer new rights to the customer with regard to the 
countermanding of payment instructions, implementation time and charges. 
                                               
5
 PSR 2009, regulations 33(1)(a) and 51(1)(a). 
6
 Ibid., regulations 33(1)(b) and 51(1)(b). 
7
 Ibid., regulations 33(1)(c) and 51(1)(c). 
8
 Ibid., regulations 51(3)(a). 
 
325 
 
Furthermore, it stipulates that the funds must be made available to the payee by 
crediting the payee’s account with a certain time period. Nevertheless, this 
leads to problems when the payee’s account is overdrawn. The PSR 2009 fails 
to define the exact time of EFT finality and raises other problems without 
providing answers to them, for example: (a) the meaning of availability with 
regard to funds; (b) the issue of acceptance of the EFT instruction by the 
payee’s bank and the extremely important question of when the inter-bank EFT 
payment is deemed final; (c) the meaning of defective execution; (d) the funds 
discharged; and (e) the wrongful or non-exist a payee.  
The PSR 2009 present no solution to the problem of identity authentication and 
its effect on the parties’ liability for an authenticated but unauthorized EFT 
instruction. It does not specify which party should be liable for an authenticated 
but unauthorized payment instruction carried out by one of the payer’s 
employees, or by one of the paying bank’s employees, or by a third party. 
Furthermore, it contains no provisions for determining the standard of the 
security procedures which should be employed by the banks in the context of 
EFT. If the customer suffers any loss of money due to an unauthorized 
transaction, the PSR 2009 decree that the bank must refund the amount of the 
transaction with interest; but such a remedy is not available in the case of 
losses caused by delay or non-payment. The regulation of the EFT parties’ 
relationship by different forms of law, namely the PSR 2009, agency law and 
contract law, causes more confusion for both parties in the EFT transaction as 
their liabilities may be treated according to different sets of rules. The absence 
of a comprehensive framework governing the banker-customer contractual 
relationship with regard to rights, obligations and liabilities for unauthorized risk, 
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non-payment risk and confidentiality risk, together with the existence of different 
sources, leads to unpredictability, uncertainty and unfair treatment for both 
parties. 
7.2 Allocation of unauthorized risk and the problem of 
identity authentication 
The authorization of banks to execute EFT transactions on behalf of their 
customers is one of the important issues in the banker-customer relationship. 
Banks’ liability for unauthorized EFT payment depends on whether such 
payment is authorized or not. There is an important connection between identity 
authentication and the authorization of electronic payment instructions. 9 
Chapter three10 has demonstrated that in an electronic payment instruction the 
absence of physical meeting between the bank and customer means that the 
bank has no capacity for determining and identifying the person who issued the 
payment instruction. There is therefore normally a term in the banker-customer 
contractual agreement which specific security procedure according to which a 
customer’s electronic payment instructions will be tested. After the payment 
instruction is tested by passing the security procedures the payment instruction 
is an authenticated payment instruction. Although, using agreed security 
procedures present no final solution to identify the person who issues the 
payment instruction, or establish whether he was in fact authorized to do so or 
not. Applying the rules of agency law, contract law and the rules applying to 
                                               
9
 For more detail see chapter three, section 3.3.1. 
10
 Ibid. 
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forged cheques to an authenticated payment instruction leads to uncertainty 
and unpredictability.  
The common law provides that a bank is not entitled to debit its customer’s 
account unless the customer has authorized it to do so.11 Where a bank acts 
without customer mandate and debits its customer’s account on the basis of an 
unauthorized instruction, the customer is entitled to claim for re-crediting his 
account with the transaction funds and the interest on those funds.12 Where an 
unauthorized transaction is passed the bank may seek to make the customer 
liable. A customer is under a duty to inform his bank immediately he becomes 
aware of the unauthorized transaction. Otherwise he may be found liable for 
facilitating a forgery if a customer fails or delays to notify the bank about the 
unauthorized transaction. A bank may plead that its customer is estopped from 
asserting that the bank is not entitled to debit his account.13 Regarding the PSR 
2009 the customer is under an obligation to inform his bank ‘without undue 
delay’ upon becoming aware of the unauthorized nature of the transaction, and 
this can never exceed 13 months from the date when the payer was debited 
with the payment.14 Finally a customer may be found liable for an unauthorized 
transaction if the payer’s bank can prove that he acted fraudulently or 
negligently. The paying banks may seek to avoid liability for authenticated but 
unauthorized payment instructions by including term in their contracts with the 
customers that exclude or limit their liability for such payment instructions.15 
This leaves the customer with an unfair contract terms, and makes him liable for 
                                               
11
 See chapter three, section 3.4.2. 
12
 For a fuller discussion, see chapter six. 
13
 See chapter three, section 3.4.1.2. 
14
 PSR 2009, regulation 59(1) and regulation 51(3)(b). 
15
 Chapter three, section 3.3.2.2. 
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an authenticated but unauthorized payment instruction created by a third party. 
it is unfair for the customer to bear the liability for an authenticated but 
unauthorised payment instruction when such instruction created by a third party 
without the customer’s negligence. The bank is obliged to provide sufficient 
security procedures and thus an offender who obtains the customer’s security 
procedures without the customer’s negligence, the bank is liable for 
authentication but unauthorised transaction, not the customer. The bank bears 
the losses because such authenticated but unauthorized transaction accrued as 
a result of the technology that the bank makes its customers use. The customer 
bears no liability for failing to deal with such risks, because these are risks 
under the control of the bank. Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
rules governing paper-based payment orders are no longer adequate for the 
regulation of the rights, obligations and liabilities of banks and their customers 
and that there is a need for the formulation of a new set of applicable rules.  
The validity of security procedures is regulated by the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 and the Electronic Signature Regulations 2002, 
irrespective of the kind of electronic transactions for which they are used. These 
provisions establish the legal framework for e-signature and certification 
authority services. They account for the fact that simple and advanced 
signatures are, in fact, acceptable and valid in legal procedures.16 This study 
has shown that, in the context of EFT, the effect of the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 and the Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 has 
been to make the security procedures acceptable in evidence and also to prove 
the authenticity of the communication or data, or the integrity of the 
                                               
16
 Ibid., section 3.3.2.3. 
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communication or data. However, the legal effect of electronic signatures on the 
payer or the payer’s bank’s liability for any unauthorized payment instruction is 
not addressed and is, accordingly, left to the court’s discretion. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the following points should be taken into account 
when the rules are formulated in the context of EFT transactions, viz: 
1. The current law presents the customer’s right to authorize payment 
instructions only through explicit consent. While the author’s 
recommendation is that the rules should give the customer the right to 
authorize payment instructions through either explicit or implicit consent.  
2. The rules should place the customer under a duty to protect and 
safeguard his security procedures and to protect and safeguard the 
computer terminal from attack by hackers and others. Taking into 
account a customer is liable if he fails to inform his bank about any 
unauthorized transaction as soon as he becomes aware of such a 
transaction. 
3. It is reasonable and fair practice establishes rules which place the 
customer who acts without fault under no liability to bear any losses 
resulting from unauthorized instructions and the bank should bear all 
losses, even if it has acted without fault.17  
4. The rules should place emphasis on the bank’s duty to carry out 
reasonable security procedures.  
                                               
17
 Geva, B., ‘Consumer liability in unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers’, (2003) 38 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 207 at pp. 280-281. 
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7.3 Allocation of credit risk and the problem of EFT finality  
A payment instruction constitutes only a mandate and from this two 
consequences arise: First, the payer has the right to revoke the payment 
instruction unless it has been executed. Second, the payee has no right to the 
money transferred until the payment order is completed. In EFT transactions, 
completion of payment means the time at which the funds transferred are 
actually credited in the payee’s account and can be used by the payee as 
equivalent to cash. On the question of general rules, and with an absence of 
statutory guidance, the common law has investigated ‘payment finality’ and 
seems to have recognised two positions;18 depending on whether the transfer is 
“intra-bank” or “inter-bank”. For intra-bank transfers, courts acknowledge finality 
as the time at which the payer’s bank, or its agent, receives the payment 
instruction.19  It was held in Momm v Barclays Bank International Ltd 20  that 
payment had been completed when the “decision” to transfer the funds was 
irrevocably taken by the bank by setting the appropriate computer process in 
motion.21 In contrast, for inter-bank transfers, the courts have recognised that 
the point of finality is when the payee is informed by his bank of the receipt of 
the transaction funds and these funds are actually credited to the payee’s 
account.22 English law ‘settled’ that the ‘finality of payment’ takes place when 
one of the following events occurs: the first event is payment by the payee’s 
bank to the payee, usually by crediting the payee’s account with the transaction 
                                               
18
 For a fuller discussion, see chapter four, section 4.3.3.  
19
 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia (The Laconia) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 634; [1976] Q.B. 835; [1977] A.C. 850. 
20
 Momm v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1977] Q.B. 790. 
21
 Ibid., at pp. 881-882. 
22
 Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko AO [1933] 1 K.B. 47 at p. 57. 
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funds, regardless of whether the payee has been informed of the transfer.23 The 
other event is payment by the paying bank to the payee’s bank. 24  The 
determination of the time of occurrence of the second action, that of payment by 
the paying bank to the payee’s bank, depends on the method of payment. 
Accordingly, EFT payment finality takes place when the payee’s bank accepts 
the payment instruction from the payer’s bank and agrees to credit the payee’s 
account with the transaction funds, regardless of whether the payee’s bank has 
actually credited the payee’s account and regardless of whether it has informed 
the payee of the transfer.25  
Payment is presumed to be final for the payer when the payer’s bank obligates 
itself irrevocably to that payment, while payment is presumed to be final for the 
payee when the payee’s bank obligates itself by accepting the payment. In this 
thesis it has been argued that a customer who opens an account with a bank 
necessarily bears the risk of that bank’s insolvency. Thus the payer will be liable 
for the payment before the fund transfer transaction in the case of his bank’s 
insolvency but after the fund transfer transaction is made it is the payee who 
bears the risk of that insolvency.26 
Given the above exposition, it seems that the finality of EFT is at the destination 
bank in the relevant system. In a credit transfer the payment operation will be 
completed at the payee’s bank. Conversely, in a debit transfer the payment 
operation will be completed at the payer’s bank. Generally, the identity of the 
payee should be firmly established in the payment instruction; otherwise the 
                                               
23
 Chapter four, section 4.3.3.1. 
24
 Chapter four, section 4.3.3.3. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid., for a fuller discussion, see section 4.5. 
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destination bank must reject the instruction. Any agreement between the parties 
should also be taken into consideration.27 The proposed model for EFT finality 
rules is as follows:  
First, the credit transfer instruction becomes final when the payee’s bank is 
paid. 
1. In intra-bank transfers the credit transfer instruction is paid once the 
payer’s bank has debited the payer’s account. Thus, the payer has the right 
to revoke the payment instruction as long as his bank has not taken any 
action to execute the payment instruction; conversely, the payer has no right 
to revoke the payment instruction once his account has been debited. 
2. In an inter-bank transaction, the credit transfer instruction is paid when the 
payee’s bank, with the payee’s actual or ostensible authorization, has 
accepted to make the transfer on the payee’s behalf. The payee’s bank’s 
approval to make payment is shown by either (a) crediting the payee’s bank 
account, or (b) by actually crediting the payee’s account enabling the payee 
to use the funds in same way as cash. The payer has the right to revoke the 
payment instruction as long as the payee’s bank has not accepted the 
instruction. Acceptance by the payee’s bank of the credit transfer instruction 
makes the payment final and irrevocable.  
3. Completion of the credit transfer instruction makes the destination bank 
indebted to the payee as with a transaction fund. However, crediting the 
payee’s account and enabling the payee to use the funds transfer as cash 
may not be permissible in cases where: (a) the payee’s account is 
                                               
27
 Customs and Excise Commissioners v National Westminster Bank Plc (Authorisation: 
Mistake) [2002] EWHC 2204. 
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overdrawn; or (b) there is an agreement between the payee and the payee’s 
bank that the payee has no right to use the transaction funds until the 
payee’s account has actually been credited by the payer’s bank.  
Secondly, finality of debit transfer instructions is when the payer’s bank has 
debited the payer’s account and has not reversed the debit or refused to make 
the payment: 
1. The value date of the debit transfer instruction is considered final at the 
end of the day where the payment instruction is received, even if there is no 
actual debit to the payer’s account, assuming that the payer’s bank has 
accepted to make the fund transfer. 
2. The debit transfer instruction will not be considered final if the payer’s bank 
has reversed the debit or refused to make the payment. The bank must take 
this decision between the time of receiving the payment instruction and the 
end of the day on which the payment instruction was received. 
3. The payee has the right to revoke the payment instruction between the 
time of the receipt of the payment instruction by the payer’s bank and the end 
of the day following that on which the payment instruction was received. At 
the end of the day following the day on which the payment instruction was 
received the payee has no right to revoke the instruction and the debit 
transfer is to be considered final. Such a period is to ensure that the payer 
has been notified of the payment instruction.  
4. Completion of the debit transfer instruction makes the payer’s bank liable 
to the payee’s bank for the transfer of the funds within a time not exceeding 
the end of the day following the day on which the payment instruction was 
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received. After receiving the funds, the payee’s bank will in turn be liable to 
the payee for the funds transaction. At that point, any provisional credit 
provided to the payee is to be considered final. 
5. In a debit transfer instruction the payment is considered final and the 
payee’s bank is liable to the payee for the payment if the payer’s bank has 
debited the payer’s account and transferred the funds to the payee’s bank, 
even if the payee’s bank has faulty data or experiences telecommunication 
problems  
7.4 Privacy and the problem of disclosure to CRAs  
A recurring issue in EFT systems is how to create an acceptable level of 
consumer trust and confidence. As explained previously, the banker-customer 
relationship in EFT transactions is an agency contract and the element of 
privacy stems from this contract. Generally, an agent is under a duty of care 
and privacy to his principal.28 The principles of a bank's duty of confidentiality 
were identified in Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England.29 
The Tournier principles, however, left some issues unsolved. One of the Jack 
Committee recommendations was that a standard of best practice should 
require that, at the beginning of the bank-customer relationship, the bank should 
explain and describe very clearly how the banking system works and should 
invite customers to give or withhold a general express approval for their banks 
                                               
28 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 A.C. 134; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46. 
29 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461 at 427. 
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to submit opinions on them in response to status enquiries.30 However, the bank 
has the right to establish a term in its contract with the customer entitling it to 
disclose information concerning a customer’s creditworthiness. This thesis has 
argued that the doctrine in Turner’s case presents a clear explanation in the 
area of implied consent theory.31 In this regard, the best recommendation is that 
the principles governing the bank’s duty of confidentiality should be regulated by 
statute in order to avoid any ambiguities. Given the above position, it seems 
that the implied consent theory has been changed, since the Court of Appeal in 
Turner held that the bank has no right to disclose or exchange customer’s 
confidential information on the basis of the customer’s implied consent. 
Although, implied consent may exist in particular cases, its scope is very limited. 
Therefore, banks need to be extremely careful when relying on implied consent 
as a basis for disclosing customer information. Overall, it is fair practice to 
obtain the customer’s express consent before passing any confidential 
information to another party and if the bank fails to do so it will be liable for 
breach of a duty of confidentiality.  
Scant attention has been paid by government to some significant issues, 
namely the ambiguity surrounding the disclosure and exchange of customer 
data with the CRAs. Therefore, there is lack in the academic references in this 
subject. A connected argument is that credit data exchanges through CRA’s are 
executed in the interest of the parties involved. Banks depend on customer 
approval, which could be either express or implicit when customer’s data is 
given to CRA’s. This thesis argues that the disclosure of a customer’s 
                                               
30 
Report by the Review Committee on Banking Services: Law and Practice, op.cit., p. 49. 
31
 Turner v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2001] EWCA CIV 64.  
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confidential information to the CRAs is illegal unless the bank obtains the 
customer’s express authority for such disclosure. 32  Therefore it would be 
desirable to have a set of model rules, or at least a code of practice, which 
regulates these points and clarifies with precision the principles and conditions 
by which a bank can exchange information with CRAs. Such a model is needed 
to clarify and protect a customer’s private data and to balance a customer’s 
right of confidentiality with the public interest in data disclosure and with the 
disclosure by compulsion of law.  
Thus, the proposal for an approval model the author’s recommendations in this 
thesis is as follows: First, the model should include the bank’s procedures for 
notifying the customers as to how it might use their data, regardless of whether 
it is positive or negative, and should not exchange any customer information 
without the customer’s express approval. 
1. Before customers sign a contract involving an EFT system, the banks 
must provide them with a privacy notice written in understandable and 
clear language, explaining the conditions under which the EFT data, 
whether negative or positive, will be exchanged and disclosed to the 
CRA’s. 
2. That privacy notice should explain how the bank will use and protect 
customer information.  
3. The bank should obtain a new consent from the customer if there is any 
change in the terms and conditions of the privacy notice.  
                                               
32
 Ibid., section 5.4.4.1. 
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4. The bank must use customer data for exclusive purposes and according 
to the reason for its collection, such as for making debit or credit 
transactions. Further, data processing should be with significant 
protection and under internal control or direct supervision.  
5. The customer should have the right to refuse to sign the notice and the 
right to refuse the bank permission to exchange and use his data 
without any effect on the customer-banker relationship. Currently most 
banks offer online banking for their customers. As a result, registered 
internet banking customers must accept the bank's terms by exercising 
'tick-box' which enable the customer to exercise most banking 
transactions via the internet, for example, make payment, drawing 
cheques or transferring bank. Internet banking has developed that 
promises great advantages to banks and customers. Customers will 
adopt the online banking if they believe the system will bring 
advantages such as saving time by not physical visiting to bank and 
protect their confidential data. Online banking services will not process 
unless ticks the box to accept the bank's terms. That leaves customer 
without any right to refuse any bank's terms as the computer will not 
process customer transactions unless accept the general terms and 
condition by click on the particular box to accept the bank's terms. Thus, 
even with the online banking the customer should have the right to 
refuse the bank’s permission to exchange and use his/her data without 
any effect on the customer-banker relationship  
6. In the case of the customer’s refusal to give the bank general approval 
to disclose and exchange his data, the bank should obtain the 
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customer’s express approval each time the bank wants to exchange its 
customer data. 
7. The bank must clarify to the customer what a CRA is and in whose 
interest exchanged is the data. 
Secondly, there must be an emphasis on the voluntary nature of the disclosure 
of the customer’s data to the CRA’s. Such disclosure must be regulated and 
must be specific to particular data, with unlimited disclosure being 
unacceptable. Furthermore, it is essential also to regulate the CRAs and the 
ways in which they use and protect a customer’s private information. Thirdly, 
the bank must supply accurate customer data. Regarding accurate data, the 
CRAs should exercise reasonable care and skill in demonstrating the accuracy 
of data provided by the banks and should state the purpose for which they were 
exchanged and disclosed.   
This thesis concludes that the existing confidentiality laws do not provide the 
customer with an adequate level of protection and safety for the control of the 
recording and exchange of data relating to EFT transactions. Thus, the model 
proposed in this thesis should assist in providing sufficient protection to the 
customer. Disclosure of a customer’s data should be made to a third party only 
if it is necessary to the EFT procedure or for a purpose to which the customer 
has given express approval.  
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7.5 EFT, recoverability of damages and the problem of the 
validity of the applicability of common law rules of 
consequential damages  
The banker-customer relationship in EFT transactions is contractual and the 
measure of damages is that which is applicable in breaches of contract 
generally, that is in absence of contractual agreement to the contrary. Thus, 
where a bank has not executed one of its duties toward the customer in an EFT 
transaction it will have breached its contractual duty to the customer. In such 
case, the customer should be put in the same position that he would have been 
in had the bank acted in accordance with its agreement and executed the 
customer’s instructions properly. This is subject to the remoteness test 
developed in Hadley v Baxendale33 and applied in later cases.34 The general 
policy is that a customer is entitled to recover direct losses: his principal amount 
and interest losses thereon. Consequential damages which do not arise 
naturally are not recoverable, except where there is an express written 
agreement of the bank concerned.  
It is argued that the position concerning the recoverability of consequential 
damages under English law for banks which fail to make a fund transfer 
correctly or delay or non-transfer of funds is unacceptable for both banks and 
customers.  Under common law, consequential damages are not recoverable 
except when such damages a within the contemplation of the bank at the time 
                                               
33 Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Ex. 341. 
34
 The PSR 2009 which, when applicable, entitles the payer to request from the payer’s bank a 
refund of the amount involved in the transaction if the bank made the payment according to an 
unauthorized instruction, regulation 61. 
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when it receives the payment instruction. The bank should have notice of the 
special circumstances that triggered the customer’s losses at the time of 
received the instruction. Regarding the customers, a notice of “special 
circumstances” to the paying bank does not indicate that other banks in the 
payment system are a notice of “special circumstances”. Transmitting such 
notice to each bank involves in the EFT system is obviously too difficult 
because EFT as a methods of payment designed to work in speed and low 
cost. Thus, when banks exclude or limit their liability for any failure or default in 
executing the payment instruction on the part of an employed correspondent or 
intermediary bank, the customer has no right to pursue the intermediary bank 
because there is no privity in contract between them. This leaves the customer 
without remedy for recovery of EFT losses. Regarding banks, the knowledge of 
“special circumstance” will make the bank liable for consequential a damage 
which is not necessarily to be actual knowledge but could be an imputed 
knowledge. 35  The ambiguity resulting from the interpretation of imputed 
knowledge may cause banks huge funds.  
The existing non-specific rules covering the bank’s liability for both damages are 
indeed risk needs to be clarified by some sort of express regulations. This risk 
could be either that there is unpredictability or uncertainty in the paying bank’s 
liability due to the absence of an express agreement to carry out its liability; or 
the payer, as the weaker party, will bear the losses for non-payment or 
unauthorized EFT not executed as a result of his negligence or fault, where the 
paying bank has clearly expressed that it bears no liability for the particular 
kinds of risk associated with EFT transactions.  
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 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v Newman Industries [1949] 2 K.B. 528, at pp. 539-540. 
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7.6 Recommendations 
In the light of the examination of the existing law regulating EFT in the UK, the 
final question that should be addressed in this conclusion is whether there is a 
need to adopt a new independent body of law to govern EFT transactions. The 
Jack Committee raised this question and it was recommended that new rules 
for new technology were needed. 36  The significant argument against the 
necessity for a new body of law to govern EFT transactions stems from the fact 
that paper-based transactions and EFT transactions are only methods for 
transferring funds from one person to another. The dissimilarity in the standard 
that funds are transferred over does not affect the parties’ rights and duties 
since the purpose in all payment system is to transfer funds over from one 
person to another. Therefore, the current rules can be covered to address 
issues arising specifically in EFT systems.37 The case against the necessity for 
a new body of law to govern EFT transactions submits that where the common 
law and other payment systems rules fail, private contracts between the parties 
will usually fill the gap. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 when the term is 
“unreasonable” and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
when the term is “unfair” will guard customers against unreasonable and unfair 
terms. One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that 
there is a needing to adopt a new independent body of law to govern EFT 
transactions. Regulating EFT involves creating equilibrium between the 
predictability and certainty of the bank’s liability for risks associated with EFT 
                                               
36
 Report by the Review Committee on Banking Services: Law and Practice, (“The Jack Report”) 
(1989, London, HMSO, Cm 622), paras. 9.29 to 9.31. 
37
 Ibid., at para. 9.14. 
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and the protection of the customer from unfair contract terms imposed by the 
bank. The new rules are needed not to cover issues resulting from the aim of 
the EFT systems but from the method of achieving such aim. Accordingly, the 
most convincing reason to legislate for EFT system is to redress any existing 
laws that create obstacles to EFT transactions. Such obstacles typically contain 
rules laying down requirements as preconditions to legal effectiveness. Such 
rules expressly or impliedly require a particular form, for example, authenticate 
customer’s instructions in EFT transactions is completely different and raises 
different legal issues from an authentication of a cheque, on which the signature 
must be hand-written. The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 does not cover EFT 
system since its ambit of application is limited to paper-based transactions and 
not applicable to EFT transactions. Although, a thorough examination of the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 reveals that its rules are insufficiently 
comprehensive since they do not regulate EFT transactions involving non- 
European currency exchanges. Since it is common law which regulates EFT 
transactions involving the legal problems described above, the author argues 
that there is a definite need for a new independent body of law to govern EFT 
transactions, replacing the rules that were created to regulate only paper-based 
funds transfers. This thesis is showed that the private contracts, including the 
rules of clearing and payment system, are insufficient and drafted to guard the 
interest of the banks. Furthermore, it is improbable under current conditions that 
banks and cards issuers such as VISA and MasterCard will choose of their own 
volition to set up a regime of reversibility granting chargeback rights to 
customers globally. To date, these banks and card issuers have not even gone 
so far as to extend universal chargeback rights to disputes relating to products 
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and services, as CCA 1974 section 84 did for many UK consumers who 
purchase with credit cards. Nevertheless, the problem arises where debit and 
prepaid cards are subject to disputes. Debit cards holders may face the risk of 
supplier misconduct as a result of the absence of particular and effective rules 
for the protection of customers; yet, overwhelmingly, in emerging economies 
payment card issuers and card associations are self-regulating. Finally, a new 
legislation may be to create confidence in the legal and commercial 
environment among customers and banks.38 EFT transaction’s parties could be 
given motivations to prevent guard against common risks such as fraud and 
insolvency. Failing to prevent a loss from occurring, a rule may either distribute 
the loss according to the degree of fault or allocate the loss to the party that has 
the last clear chance to prevent such loss from occurring but failed (may be 
negligently ) to do so.  Within any arrangement, wherever commercial legal 
issue take place between banks and their customers, inevitability of result is 
more significant than the ambiguity of classic litigation.    
It is obvious that using EFT in banking circles create legal problems need more 
investigation and study to explain the difficulty which arising from using such 
systems. It is recommended that further research be undertaken in the following 
areas: the satisfaction of consumers with banks’ services in EFT transactions, 
particular addressing legal issue over error or authentications procedures; the 
outlining of a Code of Conduct for CRAs; the success or failure of the PSR 2009 
in practice may also be examined; and the outlining of a new policy for 
consumer protection.  
                                               
38 Smith, G. J. H., et al., Internet Law and Regulation (2007), pp.848-851; Bergsten, E. E., 
‘Legal aspects of international Electronic Funds Transfers’, (1987) 7 International Business Law 
649 at p. 652 and p. 655.   
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